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11 October 2017
Climate
Three things Christine Lagarde can do to cement her legacy on climate.
WASHINGTON DC, Oct 11 2017 (IPS) - The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and climate change do not often appear in the same headline together. Indeed, environmental issues have been, at most, peripheral to the Fund’s core functions. But now economists inside and outside the IMF are beginning to understand that climate change has significant implications for national and regional economies, and so it’s worth reconsidering the Fund’s role in addressing the climate challenge.
<p></p><p>To her credit, Managing Director Christine Lagarde has boldly injected the IMF’s voice into the global debate on policy responses to climate change and has identified a number of roles the Fund can play.</p><p>The Fund has conducted valuable work on how carbon emissions can be reduced through market prices that reflect the negative externalities of those emissions. In particular, the Fund has become a leading voice for quantifying and streamlining or eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, as well as for introducing carbon-pricing mechanisms.</p><p></p><p>What is still missing, however, is a bigger role for the IMF in enabling countries to prepare and manage the potential impacts of climate change. There are three things the Fund could do, building on its current efforts, that would make a big difference:</p><p></p><p>1. Deepen Research on Macroeconomic and Financial Impacts of Climate Change</p><p></p><p>In a climate change debate that has become heavily politicized, the Fund’s technical and nonpartisan voice is uniquely valuable. Few questions are as important as understanding the possible effects of a changing climate on the world’s economies, especially the most vulnerable ones.</p><p></p><p>The Fund has recently started to make important contributions in this area. In a paper published last year, the IMF started to look into the implications of climate change on so-called “small states”. And last week, the Fund devoted for the first time a whole chapter of its flagship World Economic Outlook to the impacts of weather shocks on economic activity.</p><p></p><p>Building on these foundations, the Fund should focus its research capabilities on a key question, namely whether climate change is having have a “level effect” or a “growth effect” on per capita income. If the former, then climate change will only destroy a given amount of income over time (think of damaged bridges and buildings) but not affect the capacity of the economy itself to grow. If the latter, then climate change is also harming the drivers of growth themselves, such as the productivity and availability of workers, the productivity of agriculture, and the flow of investment. The economy’s growth rate will slow as a result, and losses will compound year after year, leaving an economy significantly worse off than if only level effects applied.</p><p></p><p>Getting better answers to this question is essential for policymakers making decisions about how much to spend today to avoid damage tomorrow.</p><p></p><p>2. Formally Incorporate Climate Change Into Policy Dialogue</p><p></p><p>One of the Fund’s core functions is macroeconomic surveillance. This function brings Fund staff into regular policy dialogues (called Article IV consultations) with financial authorities in virtually every country in the world.</p><p></p><p>Financial authorities have a key role to play in preparing for climate change, as they are charged with budget planning and managing fiscal and financial risks. The Fund should bring climate risk into the dialogue as a formal part of its consultations, not just with small states, but with a much larger set of vulnerable countries as well, including systemically-significant ones.</p><p></p><p>This year, in collaboration with the World Bank, the Fund launched the first Climate Change Policy Assessment (CCPA) during the Article IV consultations for the Seychelles. The assessment focused on policy options to reduce vulnerability to climate change; the Seychelle authorities found it to be very useful. More CCPAs are planned – a small handful per year – but this is simply not fast enough given the urgency and gravity of the challenge.</p><p></p><p>The Fund should formalize CCPAs as a routine part of Article IV consultations for a broad swathe of vulnerable, low-income countries. This will require investing in staff capacity and training, including in the Fund’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department, which can help countries identify how climate risks and opportunities could affect their financial systems. Maximizing synergies with the World Bank on the CCPAs will also be necessary.</p><p></p><p>3. Treat Expenditures on Climate Resilience as Investments</p><p></p><p>Countries facing a balance-of-payments crisis often draw on IMF resources and enter into a program relationship with the IMF. One of the trickiest elements when negotiating such a program is how to treat different categories of spending and where to cut to restore fiscal balance. How should the Fund treat expenditures designed to provide financial protection against extreme weather events? These include, for example, deposits into a national reserve fund, premium payments on sovereign insurance against natural disasters, or the costs of issuing catastrophe (“cat”) bonds.</p><p></p><p>Protecting some of these expenditures from program-mandated cuts is fully appropriate, as they are designed to provide a measure of fiscal protection to the government in the aftermath of an extreme weather event. For instance, the Fund might treat cat bond issuance costs and insurance premiums as investments with potential upside, rather than as expenditures, thereby exempting them from cuts.</p><p></p><p>Managing Director Lagarde has positioned the IMF as an important and credible voice in the debate about climate change. Now it’s time for the Fund to expand and institutionalize this new role, helping poor and vulnerable countries understand and confront the macroeconomic and financial risks of climate change.</p><p></p><p>“This article was originally posted at World Resources Institute’s Insights blog”</p>
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11 October 2017
Climate
Whitehouse's floor soliloquies chug on. Is anyone listening?
For the 180th time, Sheldon Whitehouse took to the Senate floor this month to warn of the perils of climate change, blasting the fossil fuel industry, corporate greed and the failure of market capitalism to address global warming.
<p></p><p>Each week for years, largely without fail, the junior senator from Rhode Island waxes philosphical about ocean acidification, atmospheric temperature rise, devastated coastal communities, increases in storms, fires and floods. And every week, he urges Congress and the American people to act before it is too late.</p><p></p><p>But is anyone listening?</p><p></p><p>"I don't know," the Democrat recently told E&E; News during a sit-down in his office. "After all that effort, I certainly hope and pray it had an impact."</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse has gained a reputation as a lefty progressive with anti-capitalist undertones who rages against greedy corporate interests and the Koch brothers.</p><p></p><p>But he said he sees market capitalism as the most effective way to address global warming, much more so than increased regulation, a common Democratic battle cry. And the climate hawk is working to find common ground with those who once appeared to be his enemies.</p><p></p><p>In the wake of unprecedented extreme weather events such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Jose and Maria, the subject of climate change is back in the spotlight. And the administration's move to kill the Clean Power Plan gives lawmakers more room to act.</p><p></p><p>In a change from years past, more Republicans are joining Whitehouse and beginning to call for action. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said last month he would work with Whitehouse on a bipartisan carbon fee bill.</p><p></p><p>"I'm a Republican. I believe that the greenhouse gas effect is real, that CO2 emissions generated by man is creating our greenhouse gas effect that traps heat and the planet is warming," Graham said during a press conference (Greenwire, Sept. 20).</p><p></p><p>Even though many activists on the left want caps on emissions, Whitehouse says a carbon fee is much more efficient. "You get much more climate bang for your effort buck," he said.</p><p></p><p>And while he is not shy to criticize the GOP for what he considers inaction on the global warming issue, he is equally willing to call out fellow Democrats, as well.</p><p></p><p>"Remember Will Rogers? The 1930s-era comedian who said, 'I'm not a member of any organized political party, I'm a Democrat,'" he said. "No, we've done an absolutely crap job of fighting this fight. We allowed it to become polar bears versus jobs, which is ridiculous on both sides."</p><p></p><p>There are more jobs in green energy and renewables now than in the fossil fuel industry, he said. "And it's not polar bears that are suffering, it's beaches and fishermen and farmers right here in the United States."</p><p></p><p>'Capitalism is the solution'</p><p></p><p>At issue, Whitehouse said, is not capitalism as an economic system, but rather what he sees as a perversion of that system.</p><p></p><p>"I think market capitalism is the solution to the problem," he said. "The difficulty here is that market capitalism has been twisted by the fossil fuel industry, and they have completely polluted and captured our politics so that the natural course of things has been interfered with."</p><p></p><p>The "natural course" refers to an inevitable market collapse that often accompanies innovation. Whitehouse said when the economy shifts, for example, from horses to internal combustion engines, there is a "quite precipitous and quite painful" fallout, but it is usually contained within the affected industries.</p><p></p><p>"In this case, we spin this out too far; while we're waiting for that natural eventual precipitous market collapse [of the fossil fuel industry] to take place, we're also doing all this other damage that will then come back to haunt us, and for which there will be considerable blame," he said.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) on the Senate floor. C-SPAN</p><p>Critics believe the very nature of capitalism works against environmental protection. In her award-winning book "This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate," author Naomi Klein argues capitalism necessitates ongoing economic growth.</p><p></p><p>The ever-growing consumption model requires never-ending resource extraction, she says, thereby exacerbating global warming through continued carbon emissions. Klein, and others on the left, are pushing for a new economic model.</p><p></p><p>This idea runs counter to Whitehouse's position. He argues market capitalism is not inherently problematic, but rather has been "torqued and polluted and ruined" by the fossil fuel industry.</p><p></p><p>More specifically, the industry "enjoys" an annual subsidy in the United States of more than a half-trillion dollars a year, according to the International Monetary Fund, he said.</p><p></p><p>"In theory, under market capitalism, those negative externalities in the amount of $700 billion a year ought to be baked into the price of the product," he said.</p><p></p><p>In economic theory, a negative externality is the cost that is suffered by a third party as the result of a market transaction.</p><p></p><p>"The markets work, but when you have negative externalities not in the price, that's an economic failure, an economic dislocation," Whitehouse said. "But because it's so to the benefit of the fossil fuel industry, they've stepped over into the political side and have just beat the hell out of everybody in order to protect that massive subsidy."</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse said that usually, on the political side, lawmakers would recognize the $700 billion as a negative externality, but Republicans — he thinks — have become indebted to industry donors.</p><p></p><p>"You can't smoke in airplanes any longer because now we know what secondhand smoke does to children sitting next to you in the airplane," he said. "They won't let us do the equivalent of that for climate change because they make too much money off of the status quo."</p><p></p><p>For Whitehouse, the fight for climate action is not only a fight for the preservation of the planet, but also for what he sees as core American values.</p><p></p><p>'Baked into me'</p><p></p><p>The child of a prominent diplomatic family, Whitehouse said he spent time in places such as Laos and Turkey growing up, and watching his kin make sacrifices for high ideals had an effect.</p><p></p><p>"I spent my life as the son and grandson of Foreign Service officers, and we were not on the champagne and cocktails diplomatic circuit," he said. "We were in poverty-ridden countries, and we were in countries at war, and what I grew up around were Americans who put themselves and their families in harm's way because they believed in something."</p><p></p><p>It was evident to him from an early age that something about America was important enough for family and friends to subject their loved ones to malaria, dirty drinking water or poor living conditions.</p><p></p><p>"They do it because something matters. So that got baked into me pretty hard," he said.</p><p></p><p>"And if we have let this temple of democracy that men and women fought and bled and died to create and preserve get corrupted by one special interest in a way that will harm the lives of people all around the world and bring the democracy that we cherish into disrepute, shame on us."</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse first became passionate about climate change through his wife, a marine biologist who shared her findings concerning sea-level rise and ocean acidification in their home-state Narragansett Bay.</p><p></p><p>"The bay in which my wife did her research on winter flounder has risen nearly 4 degrees medium underwater temperature, and the flounder that she used to study are virtually gone," he said.</p><p></p><p>'Boom'</p><p></p><p>When Whitehouse arrived on the Hill in 2007, lawmakers were taking climate change seriously and working to draft a solution, he said. From 2007 to 2009, there were "bipartisan bills coming out of all sorts of places," he said. In 2008, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) ran for president on a climate change platform Whitehouse considered "great."</p><p></p><p>"And I thought, OK, this is a scientific problem, but government is working on this, we're doing our job," he said. "Then comes 2010, Citizens United decision. Requested and forecasted by the fossil fuel industry from the five Republicans on the Supreme Court and boom, like sprinters at the starting gun, they were off."</p><p></p><p>Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is the 2010 landmark Supreme Court case, which lifted restrictions on how much money large corporations can invest in political campaigns.</p><p></p><p>Since 2010, there has not been a Republican co-sponsor, with Graham as a potential exception, of serious carbon emissions reduction legislation, Whitehouse said.</p><p></p><p>"The fossil fuel industry took that huge political weaponry that they were given by the five Republicans on the Supreme Court in Citizens United and they turned it on the Republican Party and they crushed dissent, and they made [climate] look like a partisan issue, which it is not," he said.</p><p></p><p>'Science got me scared'</p><p></p><p>When a carbon cap-and-trade bill passed the House in 2009 but failed to gain traction in the Democrat-controlled Senate, Whitehouse was furious and began taking on the Senate floor to vent his frustrations with Congress' lack of action.</p><p></p><p>"The science got me scared, watching the corruption of the government that I love happen in front of my eyes got me mad," he said.</p><p></p><p>"So at that point, I thought, well, somebody has got to say something, just to let people know that the lights have not gone out here. The only way to do that around here with people as busy as they are is to put yourself on a schedule and tell your office every week, no excuses, no exceptions, I'm going to the floor."</p><p></p><p>And despite the yearslong quest, Whitehouse is convinced the climate change fight can be won. "I wouldn't rule out a carbon fee," he said. A confluence of action has given him hope.</p><p></p><p>In addition to Graham's announcement, large oil and gas players have said they support a carbon fee.</p><p></p><p>"Although they're lying, Exxon, Shell, Chevron, all the big oil companies, pretend to support carbon fee," he said. "So there's significance in their pretense, if they know they've got to at least pretend."</p><p></p><p>There is building support for a carbon fee in the business community, he said. In fact, more than 1,200 business across the globe, including U.S. companies like General Motors Co., are voluntarily assigning a dollar value to carbon dioxide to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Greenwire, Sept. 12).</p><p></p><p>And lastly, Whitehouse cited President Trump himself, who in 2009 signed onto a full-page ad in The New York Times saying climate change science is irrefutable and the consequences will be catastrophic and irreversible (E&E; News PM, Oct. 2).</p><p></p><p>"So is it a long shot? Yes, but those are all pretty interesting pieces that could come together as this thing develops," Whitehouse said.</p><p></p><p>"Ultimately, we win. We just hope that we don't win too late."</p><p></p><p>Twitter: @AriannaSkibell Email: askibell@eenews.net</p>
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28 September 2017
Climate
The most effective clean energy policy gets the least love.
by David Roberts@drvox
<p></p><p>Back in the 1990s and 2000s, when Democrats had more power in state governments, 29 states (and DC) passed some form of renewable portfolio standard (RPS), a policy that requires a state’s utilities to get a certain percentage of their power from renewable sources by a certain year.</p><p></p><p>Standards range from California’s wildly ambitious 50-percent-by-2030 to Ohio’s modest 12.5-percent-by-2026, and everywhere in between.</p><p></p><p>Though they aren’t as sexy as perpetually-discussed-but-rarely-passed carbon taxes, and they are flawed and insufficient in a number of ways, RPSs have been the quiet workhorses of renewable energy deployment in the US. According to one Lawrence Berkeley Lab report, fully 62 percent of the growth in US non-hydro renewables since 2000 has been undertaken to satisfy RPS requirements.</p><p></p><p>Consequently, there’s been a great deal of research done about their various costs, benefits, and impacts. One thing that’s been missing, however, is a comprehensive prospective analysis, projecting the total costs and benefits of RPSs going forward.</p><p></p><p>Happily, such an analysis was just published in the journal Environmental Research Letters.</p><p></p><p>If you’ve followed previous research literature on RPSs (and who hasn’t?), the top-line results probably won’t surprise you. Spoiler: The benefits of these policies will substantially outweigh the costs, even under conservative assumptions.</p><p></p><p>Aside from the basic finding, I do think the results can shed light on two important points — one important to the future of the US grid, one important to politics and policymaking in general. And y’all know how I love to make points.</p><p></p><p>First, though, a quick summary of the results.</p><p></p><p>RPS benefits will outweigh costs under almost any assumptions</p><p>The researchers used various datasets and methods to evaluate RPSs out through 2050, assessing them along three key metrics:</p><p></p><p>(a) national electric system costs and national and regional retail electricity prices; (b) environmental and health benefits associated with reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) and air pollution emissions and reduced water use; and (c) other impacts related to gross effects on employment and reductions in natural gas prices.</p><p>They modeled three scenarios, one with no RPS, one which took into account existing RPS commitments, and a high RE scenario in which RPSs were strengthened.</p><p></p><p>Under the high RE scenario, renewables are 35 percent of US power by 2030 and 49 percent by 2050.</p><p></p><p>So how do the costs and benefits balance out? Let’s skip to the end:</p><p></p><p>In the existing RPS scenario, electricity system costs range from -0.7 percent to 0.8 percent of no RPS system costs (which roughly amounts to plus-or-minus $31 billion).</p><p></p><p>In other words, depending on assumptions about the price of renewables and natural gas in the future, the direct costs to consumers could range from mild (roughly 1 cent per kwh in the most affected regions) to negative, i.e., a net savings for consumers. RPSs could very well pay for themselves even before externalities are taken into account.</p><p></p><p>Whereas the upper-bound estimate of existing RPS costs is $31 billion, the lower-bound estimate of air-quality benefits is $48 billion and the lower-bound estimate of climate mitigation benefits is $37 billion.</p><p></p><p>So: If existing RPSs are maintained through 2050, they will impose, at the very most, $31 billion in costs, and produce, at the very least, $85 billion in benefits. Seems like a pretty good deal.</p><p></p><p>The high RE scenario, which involves cranking up RPSs even in states that currently don’t have them, entails more pronounced costs (upper bound: $194 billion) but also more pronounced benefits (lower bound: $303 billion in air quality, $132 billion in climate). Still a screaming deal.</p><p></p><p>There are interesting caveats and methodological details in the paper — it’s always worth remembering how much results like this depend on the assumptions fed into the model about natural gas costs, electricity demand, the future cost of wind and solar, etc. — but let’s get on to my two points.</p><p></p><p>Point one: anything is better than coal</p><p>The bulk of the air-quality benefits in both RPS scenarios — and a substantial portion of total benefits — comes from “reduced SO2 and subsequently reduced particulate sulfate concentrations. Particularly important is the avoided premature mortality primarily associated with reduced chronic exposure to ambient PM2.5.”</p><p></p><p>Basically, reducing smog and other particulates in the air (by reducing SO2 emissions) produces enormous health benefits.</p><p></p><p>Guess where most of that SO2 comes from. Yup: coal plants. Most of the SO2 reductions in both RPS scenarios come from coal plants shutting down in the Central and Eastern US.</p><p></p><p>What this demonstrates, more or less, is that coal is so poisonous that virtually any alternative pencils out, once health effects are internalized. Coal is public health target number one.</p><p></p><p>It also demonstrates that the regions of the country with the weakest (or no) RPSs stand to benefit most from strengthening them.</p><p></p><p>And finally, it demonstrates that coal really is a convenient bogey man for renewables. Once coal has been driven from the grid and natural gas is the primary competitor, RE’s advantage on externalities will shrink. It won’t disappear, by any means, but natural gas’s air quality and climate impacts are marginally less ludicrous than coal’s. That will put RE in a somewhat tighter race.</p><p></p><p>Point two: real policies are better than imaginary policies</p><p>The authors make a point of saying that, although RPSs are clearly cost-effective — they generate benefits well in excess of costs — “we do not claim that RPS programs represent the most cost-effective path towards achieving these air quality and climate benefits.”</p><p></p><p>The standard economist objection is that the most cost-effective way to reduce an externality is to put a price on it. From that perspective, an RPS is just an indirect, inefficient way of putting a price on (some) pollutants.</p><p></p><p>This critique is irritating and wrong in many ways, but for the purposes of my point here, let’s grant it. Let’s say that pollution taxes have an efficiency advantage over clean energy mandates.</p><p></p><p>What clean energy mandates lack in efficiency, they make up for with another key quality that pollution taxes lack: They are real.</p><p></p><p>RPSs might not be the most cost-effective way to improve air quality, reduce carbon emissions, or stimulate the growth of clean-energy industries and jobs ... but they are real, working, doing all three of those things, right now, cost-effectively.</p><p></p><p>Democratic policies often seem caught between two sets of policy purists — on one side, wonks and economists, preoccupied with theoretical, more cost-effective alternatives; on the other side, activists, preoccupied with theoretical, stronger alternatives. (Yes, I’m still reliving the 2009 Waxman-Markey fight.)</p><p></p><p>There seems to be, on the left, less of that implacable pushing everywhere at once that you find on the right, less appreciation of half-a-loaf solutions that can be ratcheted up over time with steady effort.</p><p></p><p>RPSs are the perfect case in point. Everyone I know in energy-nerd world has their own bespoke objection to RPSs: They are too strong, or too weak, they should include this or that other technology, they don’t solve systemic externality issues, they are just a bargaining chip for carbon taxes.</p><p></p><p>But they exist. They are popular. They are working. Maybe economists could tear their eyes from carbon taxes and activists could tear their eyes from pipelines long enough to give them a few cheers.</p>
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18 August 2017
Climate
Wind and solar power are saving Americans an astounding amount of money.
Not getting sick and dying from pollution is worth quite a bit, it turns out.
<p></p><p>Wind and solar power are subsidized by just about every major country in the world, either directly or indirectly through tax breaks, mandates, and regulations.</p><p></p><p>The main rationale for these subsidies is that wind and solar produce, to use the economic term of art, “positive externalities” — benefits to society that are not captured in their market price. Specifically, wind and solar power reduce pollution, which reduces sickness, missed work days, and early deaths. Every wind farm or solar field displaces some other form of power generation (usually coal or natural gas) that would have polluted more.</p><p></p><p>Subsidies for renewables are meant to remedy this market failure, to make the market value of renewables more accurately reflect their total social value.</p><p></p><p>This raises an obvious question: Are renewable energy subsidies doing the job? That is to say, are they accurately reflecting the size and nature of the positive externalities?</p><p></p><p>That turns out to be a devilishly difficult question to answer. Quantifying renewable energy’s health and environmental benefits is super, super complicated. Happily, researchers at the Lawrence Berkeley Lab have just produced the most comprehensive attempt to date. It contains all kinds of food for thought, both in its numbers and its uncertainties.</p><p></p><p>(Quick side note: Just about every country in the world also subsidizes fossil fuels. Globally, fossil fuels receive far more subsidies than renewables, despite the lack of any policy rationale whatsoever for such subsidies. But we’ll put that aside for now.)</p><p>Here’s how much wind and solar saved in health and environmental costs</p><p></p><p>The researchers studied the health and environmental benefits of wind and solar in the US between 2007 (when the market was virtually nothing) and 2015 (after years of explosive market growth).</p><p>wind and solar, 2007-2015 (Nature Energy)</p><p></p><p>Specifically, they examined how much wind and solar reduced emissions of four main pollutants — sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), fine particulate matter (PM2.5), and carbon dioxide (CO2) — over that span of years. The goal was to understand not only the size of the health and environmental benefits, but their geographical distribution and how they have changed over time.</p><p></p><p>To cut to the chase, let’s review the top-line conclusions:</p><p></p><p> From 2007 to 2015, wind and solar in the US reduced SO2, NOx, and PM2.5 by 1.0, 0.6, and 0.05 million tons respectively;</p><p> reduction of those local air pollutants helped avoid 7,000 premature deaths (the central estimate in a range from 3,000 to 12,700);</p><p> those avoided deaths, along with other public health impacts, are worth a cumulative $56 billion (the central estimate in a range from $30 to $113 billion);</p><p> wind and solar also reduced CO2 emissions, to the tune of $32 billion in avoided climate costs (the central estimate in a range from $5 to $107 billion).</p><p></p><p>So, if you add up those central estimates, wind and solar saved Americans around $88 billion in health and environmental costs over eight years. Not bad.</p><p></p><p>That number is worth reflecting on, but first let’s talk a second about how they came up with it.</p><p>Uncertainties abound in measuring positive externalities</p><p></p><p>Tallying up these benefits is difficult for all sorts of reasons.</p><p></p><p>First, you have to figure out which sources are displaced, when and where, which meant researchers had to build a power system model that covered the country and produced hourly estimates.</p><p></p><p>Second, you have to figure out just how much of the primary pollutants — SO2, NOx, PM2.5, and CO2 — were avoided by displacing that power generation. To do that, researchers used EPA’s AVoided Emissions and geneRation Tool (AVERT) model. (Don’t ask.)</p><p></p><p>Third, you have to figure out the avoided impacts, and their value, of the local air pollutants (SO2, NOx, and PM2.5) that were prevented. To do that, researchers used a “suite of air quality, exposure and health impact models” from EPA and elsewhere. (Not all pollutants or impacts were included — impacts from other parts of the power plant lifecycle, like mining, were excluded, for instance. See the paper itself for many more caveats.)</p><p></p><p>Fourth, you have to figure out the avoided impacts, and their value, of the carbon dioxide emissions that were prevented. To do that, you need to know the “social cost of carbon” (the total quantified benefits of an avoided ton of CO2). Researchers used a wide range of estimates for the SCC.</p><p></p><p>In all those steps, there are uncertainties and ranges, some having to do with the limitations of models, some having to do with the limitations of our understanding of the impacts of pollution, some having to do with difficult-to-quantify intangibles like the value of a human life.</p><p></p><p>These uncertainties explain the wide range of estimates involved: premature mortalities range from 3,000 to 12,700; local pollution impacts from $30 to $113 billion; CO2 climate impacts from $5 to $107 billion. (It’s worth saying that there are good reasons to think most SCC estimates are lowballing — certainly $5 billion is ludicrous.)</p><p></p><p>These ranges reflect the simple fact that different models weigh things differently, from the physiological impacts of pollution to the value of missed work. This is part of what muddies the politics of environmental regulation: Costs are specific and concentrated; benefits are uncertain and diffuse.</p><p>Wind and solar benefits vary over time and from place to place</p><p></p><p>If you dig into the paper, you find that the most interesting data has to do with the variations in benefits across regions and over time.</p><p></p><p>It’s complex, but in a nutshell, the health and environmental benefits of wind and solar vary depending on what other sources are being displaced, and how much, and when.</p><p></p><p>For example, fuel shifting (coal to gas) and various pollution regulations have meant that the average pollution of conventional power plants fell over the years of the study. If conventional plants are emitting less, then displacing them avoids less. So on average, early wind and solar displaced more local pollutants per-MWh than later.</p><p></p><p>It’s slightly different with CO2. The average CO2 emissions of the power sector fell as well, thanks to fuel shifting, but not as fast — not fast enough offset the explosive growth of wind and solar. So the amount of CO2 displacement per-MWh has remained roughly steady.</p><p></p><p>Here’s what that looks like graphically — these are the benefits over time. CO2 is on the upper left:</p><p>displaced pollution (Nature Energy)</p><p></p><p>Wind and solar’s positive effects on local pollution have, on a per-MWh basis, fallen over time as other power plants have cleaned up somewhat. But their positive effects on CO2 pollution have remained steady. If it isn’t already, CO2 displacement will soon become wind and solar’s most valuable positive externality.</p><p></p><p>Wind and solar effects also varied widely by region, because some regions have cleaner power sectors than others. In California, wind and solar are mostly displacing natural gas. In the upper Midwest and mid-Atlantic regions, which rely more heavily on coal, wind and solar have greater impact.</p><p></p><p>Here’s what that looks like graphically. The first two rows show the marginal benefits of wind and solar by region; the bottom two rows show the total benefits by region:</p><p>pollution displacement by region (Nature Energy)</p><p></p><p>A few things jump out here.</p><p></p><p>First, wind power has had enormous air-quality benefits in the upper Midwest and the mid-Atlantic. Yuge!</p><p></p><p>Second, poor California is building the shit out of renewable energy, but it’s mostly displacing natural gas, which has relatively low levels of local pollution. That means the state is getting relatively little air-quality benefit from wind and solar — its shift to renewables is mostly benefiting the climate (look at that solar spike at the bottom).</p><p></p><p>Third, the Southeast, one of the regions that benefits most from every marginal addition of wind and solar (thanks to the prevalence of coal power), has built the least. That’s dumb.</p><p></p><p>Fourth, I hadn’t realized how big solar was in the mid-Atlantic region! It’s producing almost as much air-quality benefit as wind.</p><p>Subsidies are roughly in line with air and climate benefits, but only roughly</p><p></p><p>In something of a curious coincidence, the central-estimate health and environmental benefits of wind and solar in 2015 — 7.3¢/kWh and 4.0¢/kWh respectively — are “comparable to estimates of total federal and state financial support” for wind and solar.</p><p></p><p>So for all the various subsidies and tax breaks for wind and solar, we’re getting roughly what we paid for. (If you believe the central estimates. Of course, “central” does not mean “most likely,” so we still don’t really know exactly what we’re getting, but we’ll put that aside too.)</p><p></p><p>However, while the absolute level of subsidies might match the absolute level of benefits, they do not line up on a granular level. The health and environmental benefits of wind and solar vary widely by time and region, but most policy incentives for wind and solar do not. Federal tax incentives treat all wind and solar projects the same. And when subsidies do vary, as in state-level policy, it’s rarely connected to their varying benefits.</p><p></p><p>The conclusion the researchers draw from this subsidy mismatch is that “addressing air quality and climate change through policies directly supporting wind and solar is not necessarily the most cost-effective approach.”</p><p></p><p>That’s true, as far as it goes, though I think there are still plenty of good reasons to support wind and solar. What’s fun, though, is to think about what it might look like if state and federal supports for wind and solar did vary by time and region.</p><p></p><p>How might that work? Take the same pot of money and instead of flat, capacity-based subsidies, offer time-varying, per-KWh subsidies based the pollution-intensity of the power being displaced. That would be computationally difficult, but not theoretically impossible. (If you want to really nerd out, the Brattle Group proposed something roughly similar for energy markets in a white paper.)</p><p></p><p>Time- and location-sensitive subsidies would attract wind and solar investment to the regions where it will do the most air-quality and atmospheric good, increasing their impact. And as a bonus, those regions often overlap with regions badly in need of blue collar jobs and regions where the fight against climate change could use a political boost, so it could increase their sociopolitical impact as well.</p><p></p><p>California wouldn’t like that much. But the upper-Midwest sure would!</p><p>california</p><p></p><p>(CA Senate)</p><p>A final word on costs and benefits</p><p></p><p>In this case, as in all such cases, it is somewhat misleading to simply compare total subsidies with total health and environmental benefits. The total amounts are not all that matters. It also matters how costs and benefits are distributed — i.e., equity matters as well.</p><p></p><p>To put it bluntly: A dollar in federal taxes is not equivalent to a dollar of avoided health and environmental costs. The latter dollar is worth more than the former dollar.</p><p></p><p>Why is that? Simple: Federal taxes come disproportionately from the wealthy, via our progressive federal income tax, but health and environmental benefits disproportionately help the poor. And as any good economist will tell you, the same dollar is worth more to a poor person than it is to a rich person.</p><p></p><p>This is something that often gets lost in discussions of environmental regulations. It’s not just that their total benefits almost always exceed their direct costs. It’s that those benefits are uniquely egalitarian and progressive.</p><p></p><p>In the case of climate change, any reduction in CO2 emissions benefits everyone on Earth (egalitarian), while disproportionately helping the poor, who suffer earliest and most from climate impacts (progressive).</p><p></p><p>In the case of local air-quality benefits, cleaner air benefits everyone in the region who breathes (egalitarian), while disproportionately helping the poor, who are more likely to live in close proximity to fossil fuel power plants (progressive).</p><p></p><p>In terms of equity, converting a dollar of wealthy people’s money into a dollar of health for low-income communities seems like a good deal to me. And if you can get multiple dollars of low-income health benefit for every dollar of high-income taxes, well, that’s a no brainer.</p><p></p><p>Everybody breathes. Any dollar of federal income taxes used to produce a dollar of air and climate benefits is a net gain for justice.</p>
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14 August 2017
Climate
States are using social cost of carbon in energy decisions, despite Trump's views.
The climate metric, maligned by the Trump administration, helps build the cost of future climate harms into state electricity plans and markets.
<p></p><p>BY PETER FAIRLEY, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS</p><p>AUG 14, 2017</p><p></p><p>The social cost of carbon takes into account the costs of future damage to human health, property and the environment connected to the burning of fossil fuels. Credit: Mark Wilson/Getty Images</p><p>The social cost of carbon was an arcane but important tool in the federal climate toolbox until President Donald Trump targeted it in his sweeping March 2017 executive order to weaken climate actions.</p><p></p><p>Now, states are taking up the metric.</p><p></p><p>Policymakers and regulators in several states, including New York, Minnesota, Illinois and Colorado, are using the social cost of carbon to measure and reduce CO2 impacts from their power grids. Some are using it to compensate rooftop solar panel owners who feed low-carbon power in the grid. Others use it to incentivize nuclear power and renewable energy. Their efforts, aimed at reducing planet-warming greenhouse gas emissions, come as Congress and the Trump administration try to restrict its use.</p><p></p><p>"It's been striking to see the progress on this front even as the Trump administration has tried to undermine the use of a social cost of carbon," said Rachel Cleetus, chief economist and manager of the climate program at the Union of Concerned Scientists.</p><p></p><p>Put simply, the social cost of carbon is a dollar estimate of the future damages from droughts, sea level rise, heat waves and other climate impacts wrought by each ton of carbon dioxide released to the atmosphere. Climate change caused by planet-warming CO2 emitted by fossil fuel power plants will diminish ecosystems, damage infrastructure and harm people's health, but until there is a price on carbon, most of those costs will not be paid by power generators or passed on to their consumers. Instead they will be borne by the environment and the public.</p><p></p><p>By calculating a cost in today's dollars for these impacts, and using it when regulating energy investments and implementing climate policies, the states can put cleaner energy sources on a more level playing field with fossil fuels. Wind and solar farms, nuclear power and energy conservation efforts are often less expensive than harmful alternatives when the damage potential of fossil fuels is taken into account.</p><p></p><p>Many corporations use a similar approach by incorporating a "shadow carbon price," which bakes the future costs of climate change into their decision-making, Cleetus notes. Putting a price on carbon adds to today's cost of polluting power plants, helping companies to more accurately evaluate how expensive these long-term investments could be in the future, especially if stronger climate policies down the road lead to plant shutdowns before they reach the end of their lifespan.</p><p></p><p>"When making investments that are going to be around for decades, you want to make sure they take account of future conditions," Cleetus said.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Until recently, the use of a social cost of carbon at the state level has been overshadowed by another means of putting a price on carbon—"cap-and-trade" markets, such as California's, which set a cap on statewide emissions but allow companies to buy or sell emissions allowances within that cap.</p><p></p><p>But experts say state adoption of a social cost of carbon may have even greater impact, because social cost of carbon estimates are typically higher than carbon market prices. While states are using a variety of values for a social cost of carbon, most are above $40 per ton—about three times higher than recent carbon prices on the California market.</p><p></p><p>Power Planning with Future Costs in Mind</p><p>Minnesota and Colorado have both made moves this year involving a social cost of carbon: their states' public utility commissions (PUCs) issued rulings requiring their biggest utility—Xcel Energy—to consider a $43-per-ton social cost of carbon when planning new power plants.</p><p></p><p>"Whether the commissioners choose to act on it remains to be seen, but at least today they'll have the information," said Erin Overturf, chief energy counsel for the Boulder-based environmental group Western Resource Advocates, one of the petitioners that prompted the Colorado PUC ruling.</p><p></p><p>Colorado's PUC told Xcel Energy to use $43 per ton of CO2 pollution generated starting in 2022 and to set a schedule for ramping that up to $69 per ton by 2050. The starting figure matches the last estimates from President Barack Obama's Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, which Trump has disbanded.</p><p></p><p>The figure includes all projected climate damages through the year 2300. It then adjusts them to present values using a 3 percent discount rate—a parameter that spurs much debate among economists. The federal working group used three discount rates: 2.5 percent, 3 percent and 5 percent; higher discount rates afford less current value to future costs, while lower values do the opposite.</p><p></p><p>Minnesota's PUC followed suit in July. The state has used a social cost of carbon to guide its policies since 1993, but the value was outdated. The July ruling dramatically increased its upper range, from about $4.50 to $43 per ton. Xcel and other utilities will be expected to run cost-benefit studies using both a low-end figure, of just over $9, and the new high-end figure of $43, when assessing new power plant projects in the state.</p><p></p><p></p><p>"I’m not going to build new coal plants in today’s environment," Xcel CEO Ben Fowke said in April. Credit: Zach Gibson/Getty Images</p><p>Curiously, Xcel Energy appeared to take contradictory positions in the two states. Xcel's environmental policy manager in Minnesota, Nicholas Martin, told its PUC that "bold action is needed" on climate change and that a higher social cost of carbon would empower Xcel to cut carbon emissions "aggressively and affordably."</p><p></p><p>Meanwhile, in Colorado, Xcel officials went on the offensive against the social cost of carbon, arguing that it would be unduly "burdensome" and that large uncertainties in the federal working group's calculations rendered it unreliable — echoing attacks by conservative think tanks and Republican leaders.</p><p></p><p>If a social cost of carbon had to be used, Xcel argued, it should include only those climate damages occurring in Colorado or the United States, rather than worldwide. That critique matches changes in federal policy Trump made via his executive order. Federal agencies should set their own social costs of carbon, Trump ordered, but could base them upon harms to the United States only, not the world. Of course, emissions go into the global atmosphere, causing global problems.</p><p></p><p>During the Colorado proceedings, advocates for climate action and solar power pushed back hard.</p><p></p><p>"It got pretty heated," Overturf recalled. Only by valuing the impacts of climate change can the PUC consider how power plants in Colorado contribute to it and the harm it may cause to both Coloradans and the state's power system.</p><p></p><p>"By completely excluding ... externalities, you're really just sticking your head in the sand," she said. "We know that climate change makes our [power] generation fleet less efficient. We know that it causes wildfires and other natural disasters that affect our transmission and distribution system. We know that there are actual costs to utility customers that come from not acting to prevent catastrophic climate change."</p><p></p><p>Xcel Energy did not make an official available to comment but provided a statement to InsideClimate News saying it already uses a shadow price to "account for the risk of future carbon regulation." It added that Xcel opposed using the social cost of carbon in Colorado because that state's PUC, unlike Minnesota's, is not obligated by state statute to consider externalities such as climate damage.</p><p></p><p>Tilting the Scale to Cleaner Investments</p><p>The social cost of carbon is already having an impact on power choices in Minnesota, and that can only increase with the higher values approved in July, said Leigh Currie, senior staff attorney for the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy and a leading proponent of Minnesota's social cost of carbon boost.</p><p></p><p>She cites two examples where the PUC favored cleaner investments—proposed by power project developers or utilities—that cost a little more today but looked more economical when the social cost of carbon was added:</p><p></p><p>In 2014, the PUC approved a solar project that made headlines as the first head-to-head win for utility-scale solar power without any state subsidies over competing natural gas proposals. Minnesota's PUC picked the 100-megawatt solar project, proposed by Edina, MN-based Geronimo Energy, even though it cost "half a percent" more to build and run than the gas-fired competition. The PUC cited several countervailing factors favoring Geronimo's project, including the social cost of carbon analysis. The resulting Aurora Solar photovoltaic power project, the state's largest, was completed last fall.</p><p></p><p>Last year, the PUC approved Xcel's proposal to beginning shutting down the state's largest coal-fired power plant early and replacing its generation with a combination of wind, solar and gas-fired power. In the standard cost study, shutting the coal generators appeared to be one of the most expensive options on the table, but the scenario including the social cost of carbon showed it to be the cheapest, Currie said.</p><p></p><p>Energy consultant and former Maine regulator David Littell, with the nonprofit The Regulatory Assistance Project, estimates that 10 to 20 state PUCs are likely using a social cost of carbon in such planning and procurement decisions, although they may be flying under the radar. He said Maine's PUC used it during his service from 2010 to 2015.</p><p></p><p>Conscious Markets</p><p>Other states are giving the social cost of carbon at least an indirect role in competitive power markets, in which power plants bid to determine how often they run and what they earn for their electricity. Last year, New York and Illinois used the social cost of carbon to design revenue-boosting incentives to keep low-carbon nuclear power running despite stiff competition from cheap gas.</p><p></p><p>New York is now considering a broader application that would directly affect daily bids on the competitive power market.</p><p></p><p>New York's concept is to add a fee, based on the social cost of carbon, to bids from coal, gas and diesel-fired power plants. "Generating units that emit carbon would incur a penalty based on their level of carbon emissions and the social cost attributed to carbon," said Brad Jones, CEO of the New York Independent System Operator, in testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Energy last month. "The penalties collected by the NYISO would then be returned to customers in some equitable manner," he said.</p><p></p><p>Jones said the plan would harmonize NYISO's wholesale markets with the state's clean energy policies, which include goals to have half of the state's power come from renewable sources and cut greenhouse gas emissions 40 percent by 2030.</p><p></p><p>The idea is popular with economists because it means the prices consumers pay will more closely reflect electricity's full cost, including externalities (rather than just the cost to build and fuel power plants).</p><p></p><p></p><p>The Steel Winds wind farm in Lackawanna, N.Y., was built on the grounds of a former Bethlehem Steel Plant. New York has a goal of getting 50 percent of its power from renewable sources by 2030. Credit: John Moore/Getty Images</p><p>Littell expects that New York's plan would give an advantage to cleaner resources. Wind and solar farms, nuclear plants, and energy conservation providers should operate more often, he said, and get paid as much as $15 more per megawatt-hour for their resource compared to a power plant burning natural gas. That is a substantial increase from the average $18- to $40-per-megawatt-hour rate that the state's power suppliers earned last year (depending on the region).</p><p></p><p>John Moore, a senior attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Littell said the plan should also have a long-term effect on what types of plants get built, since investors make decisions based largely on the revenue they expect a plant will earn. Moore predicts that it will give a preference to gas plants that cost more to build but that operate more efficiently, and help cleaner options beat even the best gas plants "so that the region doesn't just continue to rely heavily on natural gas."</p><p></p><p>Using a social cost of carbon could help many more states avoid relying too heavily on gas, Cleetus said. She cited a 2015 report by the Union of Concerned Scientists that found that two-thirds of U.S. states were "putting their electricity consumers at financial risk because of an over-reliance on natural gas." Florida ranked highest, followed by several other southeastern states, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.</p><p></p><p>Fighting FERC?</p><p>NYISO, the New York state power grid operator released a study of its concept by the Brattle Group, a leading energy consultancy, on Friday. In a joint letter NYISO's CEO Jones and his counterpart at the New York State Department of Public Service announced that they would collaboratively discuss its feasibility with "all stakeholders and market participants."</p><p></p><p>Other markets could follow. PJM Interconnection, which operates a regional power market in the mid-Atlantic states, has already issued a proposal for integrating a carbon price.</p><p></p><p>New York has an advantage—since it has its own competitive market, it does not need to negotiate with other states to move forward. However, it will confront inevitable legal challenges from owners of fossil-fueled plants that argue using the social cost of carbon unfairly tilts the market against them.</p><p></p><p>Moore and others say recent federal court rulings on related challenges have been deferential to states' rights to incentivize attributes of their power supply. But a challenge could also be lodged with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which oversees wholesale electricity and gas markets and whose composition is in flux. The Senate recently approved two Republican Trump appointees to join the panel's incumbent Democrat. (Two more Trump nominees, one from each party, await Senate confirmation.)</p><p></p><p>What may be critical for New York and other states using the social cost of carbon is how they implement it. Both the federal courts and FERC have favored state interventions in electricity markets when state leaders, including the legislature and governors, rather than power system operators, define the policy and then delegate its implementation. As Moore put it: "The more the state drives the policy, the more likely the courts and FERC are to go along with it."</p><p></p><p>As for the federal government's use of social cost of carbon? Although Trump killed the inter-agency working group that set values for all agencies to use, the social cost of carbon lives on in Washington as a diminished version of its former self. Trump empowered each federal agency to set its own value, inviting them to ignore climate damage outside the U.S.</p><p></p><p>That is likely to draw a legal battle since carbon emissions cause global damage, Cleetus said: "Clearly with this administration they're going to attempt to lowball it. That will prompt legal challenges if they're using a low number that doesn't reflect the latest science or their legal obligations."</p><p></p><p>Meanwhile, Cleetus said, we're losing time. "If we don't take it into account, it doesn't go away. Society still bears that cost in terms of wildfires, or floods or sea level rise. You're just shoving that cost onto Americans at large."</p><p></p><p>PUBLISHED UNDER:</p><p>REGULATION COAL CLEAN ENERGY BUSINESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY</p><p>CLIMATE CHANGE DONALD TRUMP</p>
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05 August 2017
Climate
Why shifting regulatory power to the states won't improve the environment.
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<p>Local</p><p>US & World</p><p>Sports</p><p>Business</p><p>Entertainment</p><p>Life</p><p>Jobs</p><p>Cars</p><p>Real Estate</p><p>Menu</p><p>Why shifting regulatory power to the states won't improve the environment</p><p>Michael A. Livermore, University of Virginia Updated 9:03 am, Saturday, August 5, 2017</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>(The Conversation is an independent and nonprofit source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts.)</p><p>Michael A. Livermore, University of Virginia</p><p>(THE CONVERSATION) President Trump and his appointees, particularly Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt, have made federalism a theme of their efforts to scale back environmental regulation. They argue that the federal government has become too intrusive and that states should be returned to a position of “regulatory primacy” on environmental matters.</p><p>“We have to let the states compete to see who has the best solutions. They know the best how to spend their dollars and how to take care of the people within each state,” Trump said in a speech to the National Governors Association last February.</p><p>Some liberal-leaning states have responded by adopting more aggressive regulations. California has positioned itself as a leader in the fight to curb climate change. New York is restructuring its electricity market to facilitate clean energy. And Virginia’s Democratic governor, Terry McAuliffe, has ordered state environmental regulators to design a rule to cap carbon emissions from power plants.</p><p>State experimentation may be the only way to break the gridlock on environmental issues that now overwhelms our national political institutions. However, without a broad mandate from the federal government to address urgent environmental problems, few red and purple states will follow California’s lead. In my view, giving too much power to the states will likely result in many states doing less, not more.</p><p>Politicians are happy to praise states’ rights, but they rarely say much about what federalism is supposed to accomplish. Granting more power to the states should not be an end unto itself. Rather, it’s a way to promote goals such as political responsiveness, experimentation and policy diversity.</p><p>Many U.S. environmental laws include roles for states and the federal government to work cooperatively to achieve shared objectives. Often, this involves the federal government setting strict goals, with states taking the lead on implementation and enforcement. This careful balance of federal and state power has been implemented by Republican and Democratic administrations alike.</p><p>In recent years, scholars have expanded on Justice Brandeis’ famous “laboratories of democracy” model of federalism with the notion of “democratic experimentation.” Brandeis’ core insight, updated for contemporary society, is that decentralization lets state and local governments experiment with different policies to generate information about what works and what doesn’t. Other states and the national government can use those insights to generate better policy outcomes.</p><p>But as I have shown in recent work, there is no guarantee that state experimentation will produce neutral technical information. It also can generate political information that can be put to good or bad uses.</p><p>For example, state experimentation with pollution controls may allow regulators to identify cheap ways to reduce emissions. On the other hand, big polluters may use the opportunity to figure out clever ways to avoid their obligations.</p><p>This happened in the 1970s and ‘80’s after the Clean Air Act was enacted. State experimentation allowed polluters to learn that by building very tall smokestacks at electric power plants, they could send pollution downwind while keeping local officials happy. Experimentation resulted in information on how to push pollution around instead of cleaning it up, and utilities in midwest states used this knowledge to shift pollutants to states downwind in the Northeast.</p><p>It makes rhetorical sense for the Trump administration to wrap its environmental agenda in federalism. Air and water pollution are unpopular, and conservation groups have called out Trump’s policies and budget for undoing “environmental safeguards.”</p><p>Reframing deregulation as federalism turns the issue into a debate about how to allocate power between the national government and the states. But striking the right balance between federal and state power requires careful attention to context and the costs and benefits of decentralization.</p><p>For example, Pruitt has formally proposed to rescind the Clean Water Rule, an Obama administration regulation that clarifies the jurisdiction of EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers to regulate smaller water bodies and wetlands under the Clean Water Act. One might think that without EPA on the beat, states will take a more central role in water pollution control. But in fact, many states have passed laws banning any clean water regulation that is more stringent than federal standards. Shifting responsibility in this area back to states will create a policy vacuum instead of space for experimentation.</p><p>There is even more need for a federal role in addressing problems that have global impacts, such as climate change. Once greenhouse gases are emitted, they do not just cause warming in the place where they were released. Instead, they mix in the atmosphere and contribute to climate change around the world. This means that no given jurisdiction pays the full cost of its emissions. Instead, in the language of economics, these impacts are externalities that are felt elsewhere.</p><p>This is why a global agreement is needed to effectively slow climate change. The United States has already withdrawn from the Paris climate accord. If we pull back on regulating greenhouse gases nationally as well, many states will have little incentive to take action.</p><p>Under the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan, which Pruitt is reviewing and has told states to ignore, every state was required to figure out how to meet a carbon reduction goal. However, it did not dictate how they should do it.</p><p>This approach would have produced valuable political information from red and purple states, which tend to rely more heavily than blue states on fossil fuels. By forcing Republican leaders to craft state climate policies and sell them to their constituents, the Clean Power Plan promoted what I consider truly useful experimentation that could have helped break the national gridlock on climate policy.</p><p>Now, without a prod from the federal government, those experiments are unlikely to occur. EPA’s retreat will mean that we have less, not more, insight into smart and politically viable ways of cutting carbon emissions.</p><p>Any regulation can be improved on, and the Trump administration could have risen to that challenge. Instead, the leadership at EPA is abdicating the agency’s traditional leadership role. In doing so, it is promoting stagnation and backsliding rather than innovation.</p><p>This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article here: http://theconversation.com/why-shifting-regulatory-power-to-the-states-wont-improve-the-environment-78245.</p><p></p><p>MOST READ</p><p>1Starting Sept. 1, there’s a new requirement for getting a...</p><p>2Tinder date turned one Texas man's life into a living hell</p><p>3Employee of Mexican music group reportedly beheaded by Gulf...</p><p>4Woman casually robs a Sprint store with assault-style rifle</p><p>5Astros call up infield prospect J.D. Davis from AAA</p><p>6H-E-B drive-through with BBQ and breakfast tacos opening in Texas</p><p>72 teens killed execution-style over purse, 10 arrested</p><p>8What you need to know about Tango Blast, Houston's most...</p><p>9Putin shares photos of his vacation in Russia's Siberia mountains</p><p>10Baby sitters accused of putting flea-infested kids in U-Haul Get News Sent to You</p><p>Choose from our most popular newsletters below. 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10 July 2017
Climate
Is a car maker about to save the planet?
“I think a lot about electric cars,” Tesla CEO Elon Musk famously said at a party at the very end of the 80s. “Do you think a lot about electric cars?” The problem with thinking a lot about electric cars is that certain things become impossible to unthink: powering a car with fossil fuels, meeting 21st-century challenges with 19th-century answers, become more than irresponsible. It becomes ridiculous.
<p></p><p>You’ll never know when the tipping point is – it’s possibly as little as five minutes – but think enough about electric cars, especially if you’re a car manufacturer, and wham … you’re Volvo. They were rolling along perfectly happily until they thought too hard: about their business model and benefit to society; about climate change and their future customers; and so they made the decision that all their cars would be fully electric, or at least hybrid, by 2019. Not one car solely powered by internal combustion engine will come off a Volvo production line by 2020.</p><p></p><p>It is impossible to overstate the significance of this, and not because you are ever likely to buy a brand-new Volvo. If every branded car is a Veblen good – that is, something you want precisely because it is expensive, to flag to the world your ability to own it – then the Volvo is a peculiar inversion, the car you buy that looks less flash than it is, to show the world that you’re not the kind of person who shows off what they’ve bought. Nope, nobody here is buying a brand-new Volvo in 2019.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Yet this will instantly change the charging infrastructure for electric cars: there have already been pretty extraordinary advances in charge speed. You can fully charge an electric vehicle – one with a range of about 105 miles – in half an hour from a supercharger in a garage, which is the difference between being able to use an electric car in a normal way, and having to rebuild your life around it. However, there aren’t enough superchargers, in Europe or the US, and, maddeningly, a lot of the slower chargers – which take four to six hours – still call themselves “high speed” because that’s what they were when they were installed. Volvo will shunt progress forward worldwide on genuinely high-speed charging points, as well as battery production and research and development into battery storage.</p><p></p><p>Perhaps the greater impact still will be on other car manufacturers: those which have an electric vehicle (EV) model – such as Nissan with its Leaf, BMW with the quirky i3, Hyundai and the delightful Ioniq – will look altogether less weird. For a car manufacturer to reject the technology altogether will start to look luddite to the point that it will probably become untenable. Hybrid cars, meanwhile – which ultimately still rely on petrol, however good their regenerative braking is – have overnight become a kicking-off point in climate-conscious development, rather than the compromise solution. This will be annoying for Toyota, but the Prius has had a good run.</p><p></p><p></p><p>The car industry is always taught as a classic in the MBA model of business behaviour: it seeks to make a profit, and does so. Its product has massive, devastating consequences for the world, but nobody can see them. The necessity for improvement would therefore come from one of two places – consumers demanding less polluting vehicles, which would damage profit; or innovators from outside, producing something cleaner, which can’t happen with cars because of the high barrier to entry.</p><p></p><p>And so, the argument goes, the car industry, perceiving electric cars to be a threat to the profitable petrol model, and facing no challenge from modernisers, has simply done what a business does – put shareholder value maximisation first and ignored the negative externalities.</p><p></p><p>This reading is blind to an emotional dimension that’s far more important than profit: petrol versus electricity is a culture war, a battle between the petrol head and the hippy, the self-sufficient Randian hero and the bleating environmentalist.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Who Killed the Electric Car?, a 2006 documentary, tells the story of General Motors and their EV1, an electric car it made in the 90s. The car failed not because nobody wanted one, but because too many did: GM became anxious that it would look as though California legislators – who had launched a zero-emissions target – had won. Other states might have followed, and the mighty car giant would become the bitch of some democratically elected representatives, the prospect of which was so appalling, they recalled all the cars and crushed them.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>This story is not about money: it is about raw human emotion, played out at an institutional level. A comparison often made is to the tobacco industry, which kept itself going by indignantly denying claims that its products caused death. But if a cigarette had come along that did the same job and didn’t cause cancer, would it have seriously quashed it simply to protect its existing manufacturing model? And if it had, would that have been business or pleasure?</p><p></p><p>There is another, related precept, relevant to climate change: the classic understanding of the relationship between government and industry. The state is meant to enforce social good through regulation, tax, and funding, while industry is supposed to respond by innovating to meet those challenges and restrictions.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>This overestimates the smooth pursuit of social benefit by government (well, maybe except for Sweden) but, more critically, underestimates the human beings who run the companies. The profit-model effectively removes moral agency from commerce, turning its CEOs into donkeys, to be directed only by carrots and sticks. We then bemoan their mulishness and sly ways, as they avoid the stick and do backroom deals with the carrot-holder.</p><p></p><p>We cannot split the world into those who want the best for it on one side, and those who will make a profit under whatever conditions are available on the other. If we’re to believe in positive collective action enough to pursue it, we have to re-imagine business as a human activity whose profit motive is partial, not paramount.</p><p></p><p>Not one car solely powered by internal combustion engine will come off a Volvo production line by 2020</p><p>Clearly, the environment would benefit most if we were to stop driving altogether. Electricity is only cleaner if it’s made in a cleaner way, and long-term, the goal has to be an electric car powered by renewable energy. There is a case to be made about the looming crisis of our lithium demands, as all our waking activities hop from one battery to another. Those are conversations to have alongside, and not instead of, the electrification of cars.</p><p></p><p>The American physicist and environmentalist Amory Lovins gives a lecture about catastrophic climate change and our prospects for avoiding it. It starts with him arriving with a helmet on his head and inviting people to hit it. It’s made of the chassis material of the future. It doesn’t look particularly impressive, he looks like a nerd with a bowl on his head. It’s hard to conceive, from a standing start, what car chassis material ought to look like, yet you have to admit, it should not weigh much. The talk ends with a portrait of a car that is so light that it can incorporate its own solar panel, so modern that it can store its own energy, so efficient that its range, give or take a bit of wear and tear, is infinite, and its cost, less the purchase price, nil.</p><p></p><p>This is not a component of the fight against climate change, this is the component. This is the single biggest change that would alter the course of history. We are some discoveries away from perfection – solar power storage isn’t there yet – but the main factor is speed. It will change all our lives if we get there fast enough, and mire us in catastrophe if we don’t. Volvo just made it faster.</p>
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13 June 2017
Climate
Explainer: The challenge of defining fossil fuel subsidies.
EXPLAINERS 12 June 2017 16:51
<p>Explainer: The challenge of defining fossil fuel subsidies</p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p> </p><p></p><p> </p><p>JOCELYN TIMPERLEY</p><p>12.06.2017 | 4:51pm EXPLAINERS</p><p>Explainer: The challenge of defining fossil fuel subsidies</p><p> </p><p>Just over a year ago, the G7 group of nations pledged to end all “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies” by 2025.</p><p></p><p>This language disappeared from the latest annual G7 communique, signed in Sicily last month, while a similar G20 promise to end subsidies has no deadline.</p><p></p><p>Meanwhile, on the fringes of such promises lies the perpetual discussion of what the concept of fossil fuel subsidies does – or doesn’t – actually include.</p><p></p><p>Attempts to add up the annual global total range from a few hundred billion through to the massive $5.3tn estimate published by the International Monetary Fund in 2015.</p><p></p><p>Carbon Brief takes an in-depth look at the ways fossil fuel subsidies are measured – and why semantic arguments over definitions may be missing the point.</p><p></p><p>The definition issue</p><p>Consumer subsidies</p><p>The IEA: a consumer subsidy approach</p><p>Consumer subsidy reform</p><p>Production subsidies</p><p>Does the UK have fossil fuel subsidies?</p><p> </p><p>The OECD: an inventory approach to production subsidies</p><p>The closest thing to a definition</p><p>The IMF stirs it up</p><p>Can externalities be subsidies?</p><p>What’s in a pledge?</p><p> </p><p></p><p>The definition issue</p><p>There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes a fossil fuel subsidy. Multiple organisations make assessments each using their own, unique approach. The huge range of estimates for the value of fossil fuel subsidies is driven by both the methods they use to calculate them and the countries covered.</p><p></p><p>From government spending on infrastructure, such as oil pipelines, to price controls on domestic energy, these organisations often count fossil fuel subsidies or support in very different ways. The table below breaks down how four major bodies make their calculations. These are examined in further detail below (as are producer, consumer and “post-tax” subsidies).</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Consumer subsidies</p><p>The subsidies in most analysis can be broken down into two types of subsidies: those given to producers and those to consumers.</p><p></p><p>Consumption (or consumer) subsidies are those which reduce the price of energy to consumers, for example, through government controls on the cost of petrol or power. These have often been put in place to lower transport bills or help poor families access electricity.</p><p></p><p>Calculations of consumer subsidies effectively measure the difference in the domestic price of the fuel compared to the global market price. William Blyth, an expert in energy security and climate change policy and author of a 2013 report on fossil fuel subsidies for the UK’s Environmental Audit Committee (EAC), tells Carbon Brief:</p><p></p><p>“It’s very easy to tell in a particular country if a price of petrol is lower than the going rate, then that’s a clear measure of the [consumer] subsidy. […] It’s how subsidies are often done particularly in developing countries where governments want to make energy products cheaper for consumers, because it’s a popular policy decision, and that can affect, for example, petrol and diesel prices, LPG [liquid petroleum gas] for cooking, and so on.”</p><p></p><p>The trouble with this, says Blyth, is that consumer subsidies are, in fact, often applied to products, such as petrol, which only the relatively rich can afford. “That subsidy is coming from the general tax base.`So, in fact, what you see is that that subsidy is actually creating a transfer of wealth from poorer to richer people,” he explains.</p><p></p><p>Much of the global attention on subsidy reform has been looking at overturning consumer subsidies. However, as they are largely absent in richer nations, this narrows the focus of subsidy reform to developing countries. “That picture of the world tended to say energy subsidies is a developing country issue and it’s not really an issue for developed countries,” says Blyth.</p><p></p><p>The IEA: a consumer subsidy approach</p><p>In its calculations of fossil fuel subsidies across 40 developing world countries, the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) uses the “price-gap” approach, a method which compares domestic energy prices to the international market price and, therefore, largely incorporates only consumer subsidies.</p><p></p><p>This approach means the IEA does not try to explain how or if producers are compensated by government for selling their products at a lower price. Instead it simply calculates the price difference and labels this a subsidy. This could have been provided via a direct budgetary transfer – which is usually considered a subsidy – or through a tax concession – which some don’t consider as a subsidy. Either way the IEA doesn’t report this.</p><p></p><p>While most broadly accept that what the IEA calculates can indeed be called a “subsidy”, there are some areas of discord. For instance, Assia Elgouacem, a consultant at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), tells Carbon Brief:</p><p></p><p>“One point of contention that emerges from the IEA price-gap approach is that a number of hydrocarbon-producing countries are of the opinion that the reference price should be based on the cost of production rather than on import- or export-parity pricing.”</p><p></p><p>The IEA’s most recent report put global fossil-fuel subsidies at $325bn in 2015 – just 6% of the IMF’s total estimate for subsidies for 2015, which included producer subsidies and externalities (see below).</p><p></p><p>Consumer subsidy reform</p><p>The IEA’s 2015 estimate was also down 35% from almost $500bn in 2014, a drop which the IEA said reflected lower fossil-fuel prices and a subsidy reform process that has gathered momentum in several countries, from Mexico to Egypt.</p><p></p><p>These concerted efforts in many developing countries to remove consumer fossil fuel subsidies are especially significant since government expenditure on such subsidies can exceed public spending on education or health in some countries.</p><p></p><p>In Indonesia, for example, spending on fossil fuel subsidies in 2016 is thought to have come to less than 1% of GDP, compared to over 3% in 2014, when President Joko Widodo implemented a series of reforms after taking office three years ago.</p><p></p><p>Meanwhile, in India, alongside other reforms, a campaign launched by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi in 2015 encouraged rich Indians to voluntarily give up their Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) subsidy in order to “make a personal contribution towards nation-building” and help poor people to move away from burning firewood. Over 10 million people have already signed up to relinquish their subsidy.</p><p></p><p>A recent report from the Nordic Council of Ministers found that countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Morocco and Zambia, who are already undergoing energy reforms, would particularly benefit from transferring funds that normally go on fossil fuel subsidies towards sustainable energy investment, such as renewable energy and energy efficiency.</p><p></p><p>Production subsidies</p><p>Unlike consumer subsidies, production subsidies are those which make it less costly for producers to develop resources in the first place. They can include things such as tax breaks for capital investment, requiring a lower share of profits to be given as tax from developing a resource, public finance specifically given to fossil fuel production, and, in some analysis, investment by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).</p><p></p><p>Blyth tells Carbon Brief:</p><p></p><p>“It’s basically giving more of the wealth which is generated from exploiting these fossil fuel resources to the producers, at the expense of the national government, which is the party to that kind of agreement.”</p><p></p><p>However, as Blyth explains, these type of subsidies can be hard to define. And as it is difficult to measure the effect of a particular production subsidy on the global price, they tend not to show up in the price-gap methodology used by groups such as the IEA.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>With such a large array of ways of providing production subsidies, it can also be difficult – and contentious – to label what actually is a production subsidy and what isn’t.</p><p></p><p>This has proved controversial in several countries, including the UK, which claims it has no fossil fuel subsidies.</p><p></p><p>Does the UK have fossil fuel subsidies?</p><p>The UK defines fossil fuel subsidies as government action that “lowers the pretax price to consumers to below international market levels”.</p><p></p><p>Since a reduction in the usual rate of tax paid in a certain sector (such as North Sea oil and gas) doesn’t fit into this definition, the government says this isn’t subsidy.</p><p></p><p>Therefore, despite multiple reports highlighting how the UK gives frequent financial support to prop up its oil and gas industries, the government argues it is simply lowering the sector’s already higher-than-usual rate of tax and has no fossil fuel subsidies.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Government response to a 2015 Freedom of Information (FOI) request asking for information on fossil fuel and renewable subsidies. The government reiterated this stance in February 2017.</p><p>For instance, chancellor Philip Hammond recently announced new help for the North Sea oil and gas industry, also highlighting the “unprecedented support already provided to the oil and gas sector through £2.3bn packages in the last three years”.</p><p></p><p>A recent Carbon Brief analysis found the UK’s North Sea oil and gas sector actually became a net drain on public finances in 2016, with the sector receiving an overall £396m in 2016, even when tax payments were taken into account. Another investigation released by Greenpeace and Private Eye in April found the UK had pledged £4.8bn in financial support to fossil fuel firms since 2010 through UK Export Finance, the government agency that supports risky export deals to boost international trade by providing guarantees, insurance and reinsurance against loss.</p><p></p><p>As Blyth explains, the reason the labelling of production subsidies such as those in the UK is so contentious is because they are in essence the result of a negotiation on how resources that are generated from exploiting oil and gas reserves are split between the private company and the country.</p><p></p><p>He tells Carbon Brief:</p><p></p><p>“That becomes a very individual sort of negotiation in most cases, and there isn’t really an international global standard against which to measure what’s normal…The way producer subsidies are defined is a deviation from the normal tax regime of the country. But the normal tax regime for the UK is different from the tax regime of Norway and the Netherlands and wherever else, so it’s not really possible to define what [deviation from normal] means globally.”</p><p></p><p>It’s worth noting that in the same FOI document quoted above, the government said it had given over £4bn in direct subsidies to renewables in 2014 to 2015.</p><p></p><p>In some ways, this goes to the heart of the debate over fossil fuel and renewables subsidies in developed countries, which often amounts to the issue of comparing often direct payments given to renewables to the tax breaks, reduced-rate VAT, investment support or even unpaid externalities which are used to support fossil fuel production.</p><p></p><p>The OECD: an inventory approach to production subsidies</p><p>The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – a collective of 34 democracies with market economies which aims to stimulate economic progress and world trade – reports on fossil fuel “support mechanisms”. Its estimates broadly cover producer support to fossil fuels in the 34 OECD countries and a handful of large partner economies, such as Russia, India and China.</p><p></p><p>The OECD uses the term “support”, which it says is deliberately broader than some conceptions of “subsidy”, in a bid to get away from debates over what is and isn’t included.</p><p></p><p>Unlike the IEA, the OECD uses an “inventory” approach to provide a bottom-up breakdown of the policies and instruments governments are using to support or provide preference for fossil fuels in some way over alternatives. This could include, for example, the use of budget support to provide tax breaks or consumption subsidies for diesel. “For that you have to go into the detail of national tax regimes for the oil and gas sector etc, and it’s quite a detailed study,” says Blyth. It’s worth noting that the OECD does not try to strictly quantify the total amount spent on fossil fuel support using an exhaustive analysis.</p><p></p><p>According to Ronald Steenblik, a trade policy analyst at the OECD, totalling up the IEA and OECD estimates is a reasonable way to approximate the spend on worldwide support to fossil fuels. He tells Carbon Brief:</p><p></p><p>“A golden rule for inter-governmental organisations is ‘thou shalt not duplicate work that other organisations do’. So the OECD’s estimates complement the information provided by the IEA…There is a bit of overlap between [the two] estimates – mainly regarding Mexico and India (we are working with the IEA to eliminate those) – but, otherwise, adding the two sets of estimates together yields a rough approximation of most of the world’s support to fossil fuels.”</p><p></p><p>Shelagh Whitley, head of the climate and energy programme at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a UK-based thinktank which publishes regular reports on fossil fuel subsidies, says the OECD’s approach is actually the most practical instruction manual for those seeking reform.</p><p></p><p>This is because it gives specific policy-by-policy information on what can be changed; whether that be a certain type of support in a particular state or region, through to an oil field or mine. “The other institutions are looking more at data that can shape government policy or can shape international policy,” she says.</p><p></p><p>The OECD’s most recent inventory in 2015 catalogued almost 800 individual measures in the 41 mainly developed countries it covers. These had an overall value of $160bn-$200bn per year between 2010 and 2014. The OECD noted such support “seems to follow a downward trend” – again both because of low oil prices and policy signals from governments.</p><p></p><p>The closest thing to a definition</p><p>The OECD bases its inventory on the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’s 1994 definition of fossil fuel subsidies – the only internationally agreed definition of the term.</p><p></p><p>It labels subsidies as a “financial contribution by a government” which “confers a benefit” on its recipient. It specifically includes grants, loan guarantees, tax breaks and the provision of goods or services by the government in its definition. As noted above, some governments such as the UK sideline this definition, by arguing their tax breaks are not subsidies.</p><p></p><p>Like the OECD, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (see above) uses the WTO definition in its reports on fossil fuel subsidies. However, it goes over and above the types of producer subsidies included in the OECD inventory to include public finance (such as loans given by majority state-owned banks) and investment by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in fossil fuels.</p><p></p><p>In its 2015 report on G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production, the ODI – in collaboration with Oil Change International (OCI) – found these amounted to $452bn a year, over twice the amount in the OECD’s inventory. (The report also singled out the UK for substantially increasing support for fossil fuels production in recent years to prop up its increasingly uneconomic domestic industry.)</p><p></p><p>Blyth argues much of the reason behind this higher value comes down to what is defined as “normal” and, therefore, what deviations from the normal are.</p><p></p><p>For instance, he says, the OECD tends to say things such as tax breaks on capital investment for decommissioning of old oil rigs are managing the end of life rather than production subsidies. The ODI/OCI study, on the other hand, says any sort of tax break – even for decommissioning old oil rigs – would still count as a subsidy, since this lowers the overall cost to the industry.</p><p></p><p>(It’s worth noting here that the OECD is currently in the process of updating its inventory, with the new version set to be released this autumn. According to the OECD, this will include a method for measuring the “subsidy-equivalent” of concessional loans and loan guarantees along with some examples.)</p><p></p><p>The ODI analyses often concentrate mainly on economies with producer rather than consumer subsidies, with its reports looking at blocs such as the G20 and the EU. In its most recent report, released last month, it found 10 EU member states had given an average of €6.3bn per year in subsidies to coal over the past decade. Six of these had even introduced new subsidies – worth a collective €875m per year – to support the coal sector since 2015, the year the Paris Agreement was made.</p><p></p><p>The list of organisations calculating subsidies in one way or another goes on, with calculations by a raft of others including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, alongside many non-profit or research bodies, such as the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), Bankwatch and Influence Map.</p><p></p><p>But there is one organisation which a few years ago took a more radical (and fiercely debated) approach to calculating fossil fuel subsidies: the International Monetary Fund (IMF).</p><p></p><p>The IMF stirs it up</p><p>The International Monetary Fund (IMF), conceived at a UN conference in 1944, is a Washington DC-based body of 189 nations which works to promote international economic cooperation and standardise exchange rates. Its mandate was updated in 2012 to include all macroeconomic and financial sector issues that bear on global stability.</p><p></p><p>Back in the lead up to the UN Paris climate conference in 2015, the IMF released a major report which reignited the discussion over the worldwide cost of fossil fuel subsidies.</p><p></p><p>The report estimated that the world would be spending a colossal $5.3tn on energy subsidies in 2015, with most of this supporting fossil fuels. Equal to $10m a minute, this is an amount greater than the total annual healthcare spend by all the world’s governments. It is also around ten times the IEA and OECD values combined.</p><p></p><p>If all these subsidies were eliminated, the IMF said worldwide government revenue could be raised by $2.9tn, around 4% of the global economy in 2015. Meanwhile, global CO2 emissions would be cut by over 20% and air pollution deaths more than halved, the IMF said.</p><p></p><p>These are huge numbers. However, as several commentators noted, the IMF’s report looked at something rather different than most of the other attempts to add up subsidies to the energy sector. This is because it was one of first estimates of energy subsidies which incorporated “externalities” (or, as it called them, “post-tax subsidies”) into its calculations.</p><p></p><p>The IMF effectively said that any failure to factor in the full costs of using fossil fuels should be counted as a subsidy. This included any financial burden which fell on society due to the effects of air pollution or climate change caused by using fossil fuels. Removing these subsidies would, in practice, mean increasing the price of energy to cover the full health and environmental costs of using fossil fuels.</p><p></p><p>The IMF concluded all this made its calculation an “extremely robust” estimate of the true cost of fossil fuels – and how much they were being propped up by governments.</p><p></p><p>According to Blyth, the IMF report was important as it brought together the subsidy debate and carbon pricing debate, which had previously taken place in parallel. He says:</p><p></p><p>“Basically, what they’re saying is that the new normal should be to include, for example, carbon prices and carbon taxes into the price of the fuel, so that you’re paying for the external environmental damages and so on within the price of that fuel. And if that’s not priced in then that’s counted as a subsidy. That’s really changing the game in terms of subsidy definition.”</p><p></p><p>The grid below gives a basic breakdown of the types of subsidy (or otherwise) covered by the four main organisations covered in this piece.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Comparison of the subsidies or support to fossil fuels covered by different organisations. *Note that this is a broader metric which may in some cases capture the impact of the other subsidy types. Grid by Carbon Brief</p><p>Can externalities be subsidies?</p><p>The IMF report prompted much debate on whether externalities can really be labelled as subsidies. “[T]here is something rather Orwellian about describing a failure to tax something as a subsidy,” wrote Sam Bowman in the Daily Telegraph. “Rebranding externalities as subsidies might make for good headlines in the left-wing press, but it also makes for stifled debate and woolly thinking.”</p><p></p><p>Brad Plumer in Vox, meanwhile, pointed out that even if you accept the premise of allowing externalities to be subsidies, the IMF included some that are pretty tenuous to say are caused by fossil fuel use, such as traffic fatalities and congestion. Still, it’s worth pointing out that the lion’s share of the cost of externalities in the IMF report were from global warming and air pollution.</p><p></p><p>Others rejected the IMF’s inclusion of consumption subsidies, such as lower-than-typical VAT rates (as occurs in the UK, where the VAT rate on gas and electricity is just 5% compared to the standard 20%). “They’ve simply assumed that everything consumed in the economy should be paying much the same tax rate in order to raise revenue to pay for government,” wrote Tim Worstall in Forbes. “This just isn’t what we would normally describe as a subsidy although we can, if we want to, stretch the meaning to include it. However, do note that this means that renewables are gaining very much the same subsidies.”</p><p></p><p>(It’s worth noting that some experts, including Blyth, do consider reduced VAT rates a consumer subsidy. “The UK is almost unique in the OECD countries in having such a low VAT rate,” he tells Carbon Brief. “Normal economic theory would say that you should as far as possible keep the same VAT rates across all products. So that means, in my view, that it is subsidies.”)</p><p></p><p>But many also rallied to praise the inclusiveness of the IMF report, which some viewed as illuminating the unfair wider financial support with which fossil fuels are often privileged. Nicholas Stern, climate economist at the London School of Economics and author of the influential 2006 Stern review, said the report “shatter[ed] the myth that fossil fuels are cheap” by showing “just how huge their real costs are”.</p><p></p><p>According to Blyth, one of the most interesting things about the IMF calculation was to see how much the scale of the externalities – whether or not they are acknowledged as subsidies – tended to dominate that of subsidies under their normal definition.</p><p></p><p>For instance, the figures for air pollution and global warming externalities alone added up to over $4tn, compared to just $333bn for the more conventional forms subsidies (“pre-tax subsidies”). Blyth says:</p><p></p><p>“I think it puts it into a wider context: ultimately, the community of analysts and so on who are trying to push against subsidies are, ultimately, doing it for environmental reasons, so I think it puts the whole thing on a common sort of footing.”</p><p></p><p></p><p>IMF breakdown of post-tax subsidies by energy type and externalities. The breakdown of the figures in the 2015 report discussed in this piece are circled. Source: IMF working paper. How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies 2015.</p><p>What’s in a pledge?</p><p>Fossil fuel subsidies have featured on and off in G7 statements since 2009 (at the time G8, before Russia’s ejection), but 2016 was the first time the group had set a concrete deadline for phase out.</p><p></p><p>But while campaigners cautiously welcomed this 2025 pledge, many urged the G7 to go further by agreeing on a comprehensive phase out of fossil fuel subsidies by 2020. Now, with this pledge dropped from the latest communique last month, it remains unclear whether or not erasing fossil fuel subsidies will remain a priority for the G7. (The 2025 pledge was included, though, in the communique issued today by the G7 environment ministers meeting in Bologna.)</p><p></p><p>In March, though, G20 countries affirmed their commitment to phasing out “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption” (essentially a nod to consumption subsidies). Their communique also included for the first time a call for all G20 countries to undergo a peer review of such subsidies. (It’s worth noting that the UK has declined to take part in this, arguing it does not need to since under its own definition of fossil fuel subsidies it doesn’t have any).</p><p></p><p>However, the G20 pledge continues to address only a “medium term” phase out despite calls from climate vulnerable nations to set a deadline for this, preferably of 2020.</p><p></p><p>The table below sets out the statements on fossil fuel subsidies given by both the G20 and the G7 each year since 2007.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>For instance, a detailed study released this year by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) looking at the impacts of US government subsidies on oil production and CO2 emissions found that, even at today’s low oil prices, almost half of the new oil fields in the US depend on them in order to go ahead. The report estimated these subsidies could shift about 20bn barrels’ worth of still-undeveloped oil reserves from unprofitable to profitable. Once burned, this oil would emit around 8 billion tonnes (Gt) of CO2 – about 1% of the world’s remaining carbon budget under the Paris Agreement’s 2C target, the SEI said.</p><p></p><p>It’s worth noting that the US has already undergone its fossil fuel subsidy peer review under the G20 – as has China – and has itself identified 16 subsidies it gives to fossil fuel producers. However, Peter Erickson, a co-author of the SEI report, tells Carbon Brief he would be “surprised” if the new administration under Donald Trump continues to look as closely at these subsidies as past administrations have.</p><p></p><p>To review: the U.S. Govt lists 16 subsidies to fossil fuel producers. Somehow @RexTillersonHQ wasn’t “aware” of this https://t.co/rydQpVYorv pic.twitter.com/n3FAfwmpKi — Peter Erickson (@SEI_Erickson) January 11, 2017</p><p>The ODI also looks into the climate impacts of fossil fuel subsidies. Another of its reports, released in February in collaboration with the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI), estimated that a complete removal of subsidies to fossil fuel production globally would reduce the world’s emissions by 37GtCO2 between 2017 and 2050. At an average of 1.1GtCO2 per year, this is the equivalent of eliminating all emissions from the aviation sector, the report said.</p><p></p><p>But even in the case of agreement to phase out such fossil fuel subsidies, there is a need for agreement as to what counts within this – and what doesn’t. The G20 and G7 have no concrete definition of what should be included, leaving the door open to arguments – see the UK – that certain types of support for fossil fuels simply don’t count.</p><p></p><p>The multitude of different organisations looking at subsidies using different approaches, arguably, doesn’t help this debate. As Whitley argues, the issue is not necessarily that organisations disagree on the “definition” of a subsidy – it is simply that they are looking at different types of support, often in different countries. Ultimately, she tells Carbon Brief, the definition argument is beside the point:</p><p></p><p>“The issue is not whether or not [countries] by definition have subsidies. The issue is whether they are providing support to fossil fuels when they have pledged to end the use of fossil fuels under the Paris Agreement.”</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>The point, she says, is that governments are using a range of tools to provide support for those developing fossil fuels. And these tools are important to identify, not just to see a shift away from this support, but also to allow those same tools to be used to support other things, such as green energy. She says:</p><p></p><p>“We’re often told by governments we don’t have resources, we don’t have the funds to support green energy, we don’t have the money to give to climate finance. But actually if you look at the tools that are used for our current energy system a lot of that is to support fossil fuels and those tools are there.”</p><p></p><p>The question then becomes not whether this or that tax break counts as a “subsidy”, but whether governments are gearing their full support towards decarbonising their countries’ energy systems in order to avoid dangerous temperature rises, as they have promised to do in the Paris Agreement.</p><p></p><p>Sharelines from this story</p><p> Explainer: The challenge of defining fossil fuel subsidies</p><p>Comments</p>
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31 May 2017
Climate
Thoughts on power markets? Executives have a few.
It's March. Southern Co. CEO Tom Fanning is sitting in a hotel lounge in downtown Houston talking energy policy, President Trump and what's wrong with U.S. power markets.
<p></p><p>At one point, Fanning brings up a name many in the electric industry know, especially in Houston: Pat Wood III.</p><p></p><p>The former Texas regulator and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission chairman pushed what became, in Fanning's view, "a failed experiment" to spread Texas' merchant approach to electricity. Fanning, whose company is based in Atlanta, says he still believes in "the model that we live in, that we fought hard to retain — the integrated, regulated model."</p><p></p><p>And Wood? He's committed to his competitive vision, even if there's room for market tweaks. He described, in a March phone conversation, how he drank the "Kool-Aid" years ago when he saw positives from deregulating the natural gas sector.</p><p></p><p>"Margins are there to be eroded, and so that's what competitive markets do beautifully," said Wood, chairman at Dynegy Inc. "So I'm proud to be associated with that, and I'm proud to wear the laurel that Mr. Fanning gave me."</p><p></p><p>As questions swirl around business models, no U.S. debate may be more important for the electricity sector than one on wholesale market design. Low gas and power prices, government aid for some generation, and uninspiring demand are causing heartache for generators such as Dynegy and NRG Energy Inc. Sagging economics also raise questions for any party that owns aging power plants fueled by coal and nuclear energy.</p><p></p><p>To explore where the electric discussion is heading, E&E; News compiled takes from some of the industry's most prominent observers. The views came largely from interviews and appearances at conferences in Texas this year, including CERAWeek by IHS Markit, the Energy Thought Summit, and events put on by the Gulf Coast Power Association and KPMG.</p><p></p><p>The picture that emerges is one of competing interests and goals. For some players, there's defense of a regulated model. For many, the question is how to reimagine competitive markets to ensure both electricity and compensation are adequate. Renewables and their federal incentives and intermittent nature are often fodder for debate.</p><p></p><p>A consensus on solutions remains elusive. Parties sought to hash out some ideas during a FERC technical conference this month, including potential actions by grid operators (Energywire, May 3). And FERC nominees have faced questions about market issues. In any case, there's no love lost between regulated providers and merchant power companies.</p><p></p><p>"We're not a utility," Robert Flexon, Dynegy's CEO, declared last week in Houston. "We don't like utilities. We're a competitive player."</p><p></p><p>Kemper and Vogtle</p><p></p><p>Life has become more complicated for Southern since Fanning sat down to talk this past March. At the time, he touted the long-term planning that can accompany a regulated structure. But it remains to be seen what extra costs Southern's customers may face with billions of dollars on the line from two major projects.</p><p></p><p>In Mississippi, the Kemper County Energy Facility has seen continued delays as it aims to capture carbon dioxide from a coal-fueled power plant. And Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC, a key contractor for planned nuclear reactors at Plant Vogtle in Georgia, filed for bankruptcy in the wake of cost overruns (Energywire, May 25).</p><p></p><p>We're not a utility. We don't like utilities. We're a competitive player.</p><p>Robert Flexon, CEO at Dynegy Inc.</p><p>"Two words: Kemper. Vogtle," Wood said this year, suggesting such projects are "way out of economic reason" for ratepayers. Wood was speaking for himself and not necessarily companies where he's on the board, including Dynegy, SunPower Corp. and Quanta Services Inc.</p><p></p><p>Fanning said the integration of "making, moving and selling energy and single points of responsibility" is preferred to "so-called organized markets." But Wood talked customer choice and said, "Liberty always wins.</p><p></p><p>"In the great cycles of history, monopolies tend to end up on the shore of failed dreams, and liberty kind of goes on down the river," Wood said.</p><p></p><p>For companies in competitive wholesale markets, though, design remains front and center. Are markets actually competitive? Should nuclear and renewables and coal and other sources receive special treatment? Who should bear the risk of new investments? How urgent is change as consumers enjoy lower power prices driven by cheaper natural gas?</p><p></p><p>Uncertainty is evident among non-utility power producers, which are facing takeover and merger rumors. At the same time, Energy Secretary Rick Perry has called for a review of U.S. power markets, including examining baseload power and reliability.</p><p></p><p>Another marker came recently as PJM Interconnection LLC, a grid operator with a presence in the Mid-Atlantic and Midwest, announced lower capacity prices in much of its footprint (Energywire, May 24). And Exelon Corp. said yesterday that it plans to retire the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania unless the state provides policy reform.</p><p></p><p>Challenges for Exelon</p><p></p><p>Fanning, who's chairman of the Edison Electric Institute that represents investor-owned utility companies, referenced Exelon CEO Chris Crane back in March, calling him "a nuclear guy in the middle of merchant markets."</p><p></p><p>"And at one time, that was really profitable, but now it's not," Fanning said, suggesting Crane was running one of the best U.S. nuclear businesses in a failed model. Crane, speaking in March in Austin, Texas, said market designs weren't sustainable for an all-of-the-above strategy.</p><p></p><p>"When the government and the markets decide to pick winners and losers versus outcomes, it skews the market," Crane said. He suggested an overemphasis on wind energy destabilized the market in Texas. Fanning said overbuilding renewables and squeezing out some baseload capacity could have "long-term consequences."</p><p></p><p>But much has been made about subsidies that Exelon lined up for some reactors in Illinois and New York, though those setups were challenged in court (Energywire, Jan. 11). Crane said, "The competitive market was skewed years ago when we decided we wouldn't take a load shape, a demand shape, we would incent based off of a technology."</p><p></p><p>To him, a way forward for states that want cleaner energy would be having regional transmission organizations put a price on carbon. He acknowledged that might not happen in the near term.</p><p></p><p>Crane looked back at the polar vortex of 2014, which he said showed the value of nuclear plants. The focus should be on reliability and capacity, he said.</p><p></p><p>"You hope that we don't turn parts of the country into a third-world country or what you see in the Caribbean when you've got the rolling brownouts during the day," Crane said. "I think we're much more sophisticated, and we can work together to come up with the designs."</p><p></p><p>A view from the West</p><p></p><p>Edison International comes at the discussion from its own angle after unloading a merchant generation business.</p><p></p><p>Pedro Pizarro, CEO of California-based Edison, called the positioning "less an indictment of the whole merchant model and more a reflection of how we view the potential for returns in the sector." The company still relies on merchants for electricity, he said in Houston this year, and he hopes other players in that space are healthy while they're needed.</p><p></p><p>"I think it's a tough business," Pizarro said. "It's not one that we want to be in."</p><p></p><p>He expects "continuing work to make sure that the markets' price structures adequately compensate generators who are now shifting from really focusing on meeting peak needs to meeting flexible ramping needs," as an example.</p><p></p><p>CEO Ben Fowke of Minnesota-based Xcel Energy Inc. said operating in a regulated market enables long-term planning. But he also recognized a need to be thinking about how energy is delivered to customers.</p><p></p><p>"I have a saying inside the company that, if we want to stay regulated, we better think competitively," Fowke said in Austin this year. "And we apply competitive discipline to all of our decisions, to our culture, to the way we hold each other accountable, to driving innovation."</p><p></p><p>On the other hand, he said organized markets "tend to be more short-run-oriented" and can stir up "unnecessary swings and volatility." He said they are hurting the ability for nuclear plants to operate amid low prices, and that will need to be addressed further in his view.</p><p></p><p>Different places, different models</p><p></p><p>Barry Smitherman, a former Texas energy regulator, said it's fine to see different models in different parts of the country, including competitive ones managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), PJM and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator.</p><p></p><p>I've had a lot of meetings with a lot of folks over the last year, and I’m like, 'We got low prices and we got a lot of energy. I don't know what to do for ya.'</p><p>Brandy Marty Marquez, a member of the Public Utility Commission of Texas.</p><p>"And those markets ought to run competitively until such time as the Congress of the United States says we're going to do it differently," he said in a March interview. For Texas' main grid, such a decision could fall to state lawmakers.</p><p></p><p>Smitherman said people in restructured markets have been aided by low power prices in light of low natural gas prices.</p><p></p><p>"You can say it's not the competitive model, it's low gas, but in the competitive market, gas is the marginal fuel, so it has effectively set the price, which has been very low," Smitherman said.</p><p></p><p>He is a member of NRG's board, though his comments didn't necessarily reflect the views of the NRG board or management.</p><p></p><p>After speaking in Houston this year, Christine Tezak, a managing director at ClearView Energy Partners LLC, reflected on wholesale power and said many people "who were optimistic about restructured markets are disappointed."</p><p></p><p>A drop in wholesale power prices over time, Tezak said, has a lot more to do with input pricing tied to gas than with "the brilliant efficiency of market solutions."</p><p></p><p>Tezak mentioned that factors such as renewable portfolio standards and distributed generation lower the demand available to the rest of the competitive market.</p><p></p><p>A period of 'disruption'</p><p></p><p>"Our markets are going through a significant disruption and transformation," Mauricio Gutierrez, CEO of NRG Energy Inc., said during an April interview.</p><p></p><p>He said it's good to have cheap, abundant and domestic shale gas as renewables become more cost-efficient. Gutierrez also said demand is becoming smarter while state policies are dipping into the electric realm.</p><p></p><p>His concern? "I'm seeing state actions that basically retrench as opposed to embracing the change," he said. Gutierrez called for "market-based solutions" that have the right price signals and factor in all externalities, such as carbon dioxide.</p><p></p><p>Exelon's Crane, in an interview, said stakeholders need to get together to look at reliability and costs and come up with the right market design.</p><p></p><p>But should he and others have seen gas prices dropping before the plunge and adjusted?</p><p></p><p>"I can tell you that nobody saw it," Crane said, adding that "the rate of efficiency that came into the fracking" wasn't seen "even by the industry."</p><p></p><p>Does he still believe in competitive markets?</p><p></p><p>"We are what we are, and it would be very tough to put the competitive market back into a regulated" setup, Crane said. "And we're not seeing a lot of desire for it. If you're a regulated market and your business model's stable, I'm sure you want to stay a regulated model. I think we need to keep working on this competitive market."</p><p></p><p>Facing a 'conundrum'</p><p></p><p>Dynegy raised eyebrows last year when it supported draft legislation in Illinois that would've given a boost to some coal-fueled units (Energywire, Nov. 22, 2016). That plan didn't pan out, though aid for some Exelon nuclear generation moved ahead.</p><p></p><p>Wood said recently that, in his view, the southern Illinois market is "broken" and needs a more competitive model. Competitive markets may not always please shareholders, but Wood said such markets shift risk from ratepayers to competitive companies.</p><p></p><p>When supplies are tight, according to Wood, a company can come "to the rescue" and "get paid for it."</p><p></p><p>Still, Gordon van Welie, CEO of ISO New England, told a gathering in Austin this year that "how to maintain the market structure" is a big near-term challenge. The CEO said efforts to decarbonize can push out "resources that we use to keep the lights on in the wintertime, so there's a real conundrum."</p><p></p><p>He's also pessimistic about the idea of relying on "an energy-market only construct" that's seen in ERCOT. Wholesale prices in that Texas market can rise to $9,000 per megawatt-hour with scarcity conditions, while capacity payments to generators in other U.S. regions are common to try to ensure there's enough supply.</p><p></p><p>"In an energy-only market design, you have to politically be willing to kind of live through the tide going out," Cheryl Mele, ERCOT's chief operating officer, said in Austin this year.</p><p></p><p>At the Public Utility Commission of Texas, a docket is now open to study points raised in a study funded by Calpine Corp. and NRG — which both generate power — on possible market changes related to price formation.</p><p></p><p>Commissioner Brandy Marty Marquez remarked during a recent webcast that the body needs to define what issue to address.</p><p></p><p>"I've had a lot of meetings with a lot of folks over the last year, and I'm like, 'We got low prices and we got a lot of energy. I don't know what to do for ya,'" Marquez said.</p><p></p><p>Twitter: @edward_klump Email: eklump@eenews.net</p>
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18 May 2017
Climate
The pilgrims of progress who are leading us to self-destruction.
I’m sitting at the bottom of my garden, reading Paul Kingsnorth’s astonishing new book, Confessions of a Recovering Environmentalist. It’s too late, he says. There is no way we can reverse the environmental changes that will lead to our destruction. And the very idea of progress, of continual forward momentum, is precisely the engine of our destruction. I start to daydream. My thinking slips sideways. I start puzzling about the Progressive Alliance. What is a progressive? And how are they related to the progress Kingsnorth believes has been destroying our planet?
<p></p><p></p><p>The word “progressive” twists and turns in our political life, constantly shifting its meaning. Tony Blair repurposed the term for those broadly on the left who didn’t want to call themselves socialists. Yet David Cameron was also frequently described that way. Now, however, the term progressive means not Tory. The Progressive Alliance urges tactical voting from Labour, Lib Dem and Green voters, to limit the size of Theresa May’s victory. Being progressive is a big party, and almost everyone is welcome. How about Rick Wakeman, I wonder? After all, he was the poster boy of progressive rock … you remember, interminable keyboard solos by men with long hair and silly silver boots. I know, I’m being slightly facetious. But these days he’s a big donor to the Conservatives. It’s hard to know who progressives would not invite to their party.</p><p></p><p>And how come the very idea of progress is intuited as something broadly of the left? A hundred years ago in Italy, the so-called futurists were fascists, appropriating the language of technological progress for the far right. “Idealists, workers of thought, unite to show how inspiration and genius walk in step with the progress of the machine, of aircraft, of industry, of trade, of the sciences, of electricity,” gushed the futurist founder Filippo Tommaso Marinetti. Love of progress isn’t just for progressives. Hell, only last week, even Kim Jong-un was lauding his latest missile launch as a “great leap forward”.</p><p></p><p></p><p>The historian Sidney Pollard described the belief in progress as “the assumption that a pattern of change exists in the history of mankind … that it consists in irreversible changes in one direction only, and that this direction is towards improvement”. These days progressives would write humankind. And yes, that’s an improvement. But the idea that history consists of some continual and inevitable elevator towards human betterment is hardly borne out by the environmental catastrophe that our ingenuity and greed are currently visiting upon this planet. Species disappearing, ice melting, topsoil vanishing, choking with carbon emissions – when our forebears spoke breathlessly about future progress, this wasn’t what they had in mind.</p><p></p><p>Kingsnorth doesn’t romanticise the past. He just points out that seeing the future with rose-tinted spectacles is now more “socially acceptable”, and therefore more dangerous: “The kind of people who are disgusted by an idealized past can often barely contain their enthusiasm for an idealized future.”</p><p></p><p>In economic terms, progress goes by the name of growth. Ever onwards, ever upwards, calls the money-making machine. And we are its servants, poor Homo economicus. Trapped by debt, we are encouraged by our leaders to run ever faster (they call it productivity) to make and buy more useless and invented stuff – even if that means us borrowing more to do it. The possibility of one or two Green MPs aside, all of those we will elect to parliament next month will believe economic growth to be an unquestionably good thing. No party will ever form a government on the basis that we will need to learn to live with less. A collapsing planet is a niche interest, an inconvenient externality that will one day be resolved by technological progress – that contemporary deus ex machina, good for all occasions.</p><p></p><p>Ovid had something to say about all this towards the end of the first century BC: “Clever human nature, victim of your inventions, disastrously creative.” That’s the sort of wisdom you don’t need progress to achieve.</p>
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18 May 2017
Climate
Gov. Terry McAuliffe takes action on climate change.
ENVIRONMENT
<p>Editorial: Gov. Terry McAuliffe takes action on climate change</p><p>18 hrs ago </p><p> smokestack</p><p>ALEXA WELCH EDLUND</p><p>It’s hard to argue with the basic premise behind Gov. Terry McAuliffe’s Tuesday order on greenhouse gas regulation. Carbon dioxide emissions contribute to global warming and need to be curbed, somehow. Is the governor’s approach the best one? That’s a different story.</p><p></p><p>McAuliffe has directed the Department of Environmental Quality to draw up rules targeting only one source of CO2 emissions, albeit a big one: power plants. What’s more, they haven’t been written yet. So aside from a general sketch that looks vaguely like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative there’s little to praise or condemn.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Not that Republicans have held back. House Speaker Bill Howell accused the governor of overreaching, and another legislator trotted out the shopworn “war on coal” complaint. While it’s true that CO2 regulations fall heavily on coal-fired power generation, that’s because burning coal emits a great deal of CO2. Complaining about that looks a bit like complaining that restrictions on second-hand smoke are a “war on cigarettes.” For similar reasons, it’s wrong to label CO2 regulation an attack on ratepayers. To the contrary, carbon limits are simply an effort to make consumers internalize the actual, but until now unpriced, cost of their fossil-fuel consumption.</p><p></p><p>The optimal solution is a carbon tax (offset by equivalent tax cuts elsewhere) — the most efficient and market-friendly way to address the negative externalities of energy use. But that approach is highly transparent and less susceptible to manipulation by special-interest lobbying than complicated regulatory schemes. No wonder it never gets any traction.</p>
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10 May 2017
Climate
How big money in politics blocked US action on climate change.
In his new book, “Captured: The Corporate Infiltration of American Democracy,” Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Democrat of Rhode Island, rails against the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision, which opened up a floodgate of corporate political contributions, much of it in the form of “dark money” whose origins do not have to be disclosed.
<p></p><p>Whitehouse, calling the ruling “a mischief-riddled legal monstrosity,” argues that the resulting meteoric rise in corporate political spending has had a profoundly disabling effect on the democratic process, including when it comes to climate change legislation.</p><p></p><p>In an interview with Yale Environment 360, Whitehouse contrasts Republican stances on climate change pre- and post-Citizens United. Before the 2010 ruling, “There was a constant steady heartbeat of Republican climate change activity in the Senate,” says Whitehouse. Then, after the ruling, “No piece of carbon dioxide regulation legislation has managed to get a single Republican co-sponsor in the Senate.” The reason? Moderate Republicans fear political retribution from the powerful Koch brothers and their allies in the fossil fuel industry.</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse, who sits on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, maintains that corporate leaders who believe in climate science urgently need to support like-minded Republicans. “One of the reasons [Republicans] exist in this state of fear of the fossil fuel industry artillery is that the corporate leaders who are good on climate have not set up any counter-batteries of their own to provide a little bit of cover … If you’re a Republican senator, you look at fossil fuel-funded front groups that are threatening your elimination as a political figure on the one side, and you look at the other side, and everybody is just sort of standing around looking at the ceiling tiles. Nobody is saying to you, `Look, you got to do the right thing here. I know those guys are going to come after you, but we will have your back.’”</p><p></p><p>Yale Environment 360: In your book, you write that talking to Republican senators about climate change is like talking with prisoners about escape. So if Republicans are in prison, who is the warden and who gave the warden the power?</p><p></p><p>Sheldon Whitehouse: The warden is the Koch Brothers’ political apparatus, which at this point is, in many respects, actually bigger and more formidable than that of the Republican Party. And what gave them their power is the five Republican appointees on the Supreme Court who made the terrifically misguided Citizens United decision and allowed the biggest special interests to spend unlimited amounts of money in politics.</p><p></p><p>e360: What do the Koch Brothers want?</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: They want to be able to pollute without having to pay the externality costs, as an economist would say, of their pollution. They would love to be able to compete against other energy sources and have the public pay for the responsibility of the poisoning of our atmosphere and oceans and all the climate consequences that they cause, and not have that baked in the price of their product, which is lousy economics, but really, really good for their finances.</p><p></p><p>e360: In your book, you compare some Republican stances and legislative activity on climate change before the Citizens United decision and after that decision. Describe that contrast a bit.</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: I got elected in 2007, and for all of that year and 2008 and 2009, there was a constant steady heartbeat of Republican climate change activity in the Senate. We didn’t actually get a bill done, but there were numerous versions of legislation floating around. Hearings were held. A lot of bipartisan work was going on, and it is more or less exactly what you would expect the Senate to be doing on a big and difficult issue — working in a bipartisan way to try to find a solution. Then comes January 2010 and the Citizens United decision, which the fossil fuel industry asked for and expected and took instant advantage of. And from that moment forward, no piece of carbon dioxide regulation legislation has managed to get a single Republican co-sponsor in the Senate.</p><p></p><p>e360: You’ve had a number of Republican colleagues tell you behind closed doors some interesting and quite honest things regarding their support of climate change legislation and climate science. Talk about that.</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: Well, if you look at what the three former Republican Treasury secretaries recently said in their report recommending that Republicans get behind putting a price on carbon emissions, one interesting piece of that report was them saying that this was an issue that the Republican Party really needed to get right on because otherwise they risked staining the brand of their party and losing an entire generation of young voters who know that climate denial is nonsense and they aren’t going to put up with it. It’s not just the three Treasury secretaries who feel that way. There are plenty of Republican senators who are just as politically attuned and just as bright as those secretaries. So a lot of them are feeling the same pinch. They’re hearing from their home state universities that are teaching climate change. They’re hearing from fishermen who are concerned about fisheries moving about, farmers who are suffering extraordinary drought and flooding, and in their pine forests out West, they’re seeing the pine beetle munching its way through thousands of square miles of forest.</p><p></p><p>There’s this building-up of information pouring in and pressure on them and an understanding that they’re really on the wrong side of the issue. There’s no safe passage for them to do anything about it because there stand the sentinels of the fossil fuel industry threatening them with political extermination if they dare to budge, and pointing at [former U.S.] Representative Bob Inglis as the example of a really conservative politician who they just plain took out for the sin of taking an interest in climate legislation. </p><p></p><p>e360: Yes, Bob Inglis is the poster child in that regard. He was “primaried” in South Carolina and lost to a Tea Party candidate in a runoff. </p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: I think that Bob is being really brave and is energized on the climate change issue, and he is trying to steer his party towards climate solutions that comport with conservative economic principles, and there are such solutions. </p><p></p><p>e360: Do you think some Republicans are embarrassed by this science-denial stance that they feel they have to take?</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: Absolutely, particularly people I know who’ve been long-time New England Republicans and can remember environmental heroes like Rhode Island’s Republican Senator John Chafee and all the way back to Teddy Roosevelt. The idea that this is a party that has to be sold out to polluting special interests runs really against a lot of the traditional Republican independent, conservation-oriented grain. So yeah, there’s a lot of embarrassment about where the party is — even among Republican senators there’s a lot of embarrassment. They’d love to find a way to get into a place where we could be doing a climate bill. But at this point, the Citizens United decision has given the fossil fuel industry and the Kochs, who are part of the fossil fuel industry, such incredible political artillery that they’re waiting until it’s not a suicide mission.</p><p></p><p>e360: Recently, 17 Republican members of the House signed a resolution vowing to work constructively to find “economically viable ways to combat climate change,” and they cited the conservative principle “to protect, conserve, and be good stewards of our environment.“ Is this a hopeful sign to you, and do you think we’ll see any of those 17 return to office after the 2018 election?</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: I think we probably will. I think there’s an understanding with Speaker [Paul] Ryan and with the big Republican funders that if you’re Representative [Carlos] Curbelo and you represent the Florida Keys, and they’re starting to lose their fresh water, and everybody knows that the reefs are dying, and they’re looking at Army Corps of Engineers flood maps that show that the Keys get overwhelmed by the sea, it’s pretty hard to expect him to continue with climate denial. And I suspect that a détente has been reached where as long as they promise that all they will do is meaningless resolutions, then everybody else will sort of stand back and let them sign this comfortable half-resolution. I don’t think it’s very impressive when you look at the number of actual solutions that are out there that the best that they can do is say, “We think we should be looking for a solution,” and they won’t actually get behind any actual solution.</p><p></p><p>e360: You close your book by imploring readers to “wake up and get off the couch.” What does that look like on the ground in terms of opposing what you see are these negative consequences of Citizens United on climate change solutions?</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: Well, it looks like the hundreds of thousands of people at the climate march in Washington. It looks like scientists beginning to stand up against all the science denial and having their own science march. It looks like the explosion of voter interest in activity specifically on this issue that has occurred since President Trump was elected and started leading this country down a really disgraceful climate path. And I hope that it actually ultimately looks like some of America’s big, good corporations, the Cokes and the Pepsis and the Walmart’s and the Apples and the Googles and Unilevers and so forth doing something about climate change as part of their lobbying priorities in Congress. </p><p></p><p>At the moment, one of the problems with these Republicans and one of the reasons that they exist in this state of fear of the fossil fuel industry artillery is that the corporate leaders who are good on climate have not set up any counter-batteries of their own to provide a little bit of cover, a little bit of counter pressure. So if you’re a Republican senator, you look at fossil fuel-funded front groups that are threatening your elimination as a political figure on the one side, and you look over at the other side, and everybody is just sort of standing around looking at the ceiling tiles. Nobody is saying to you, “Look, you got to do the right thing here. I know those guys are going to come after you, but we will have your back.”</p><p></p><p>e360: You represent the state of Rhode Island. If climate change progresses unabated, what does your state look like in the coming decades?</p><p></p><p>Whitehouse: It looks like an archipelago. The western end of Newport becomes an island as the flooding rises. The towns of Warren and Bristol break off and become islands with new islands of their own. Warwick Neck, which is a big part of the city of Warwick, becomes an island. We probably lose a good deal, if not all, of our coastal ponds since the barrier beaches either get overwhelmed or run back against the backside of the coastal pond. And we have to do something really big to protect Providence. We need basically a dike across the valley there to keep downtown Providence from being overwhelmed. So it’s going to be a really big deal in a state whose map has looked more or less the same for thousands and thousands of years. In the next 80 years we might have to redraw all those maps into an archipelago of new islands carved out by rising seas. </p><p></p><p>But to close on a more enthusiastic note, I really do think that public pressure and scientific pressure and the emerging facts on this issue, at some point, are going to break the back of the fossil fuel political apparatus, and that cannot come soon enough.</p><p></p><p>Diane Toomey is an award-winning public radio journalist who has worked at Marketplace, the World Vision Report, and Living on Earth, where she was the science editor. Her reporting has won numerous awards, including the American Institute of Biological Sciences' Media Award. She is a regular contributor to Yale e360 and currently is an associate researcher at the PBS science show NOVA.</p>
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02 May 2017
Justice
Moving away from the pro-growth economy.
Moving Away From the Pro-Growth Economy
<p>Gavenus, Erika | May 2, 2017 | Leave a Comment</p><p></p><p></p><p>Economy by spDuchamp | Flickr | CC BY 2.0</p><p></p><p>The current economic system being utilized and internalized relies on perpetual growth. It has long operated counter to the reality that we are confined to a finite planet with finite resources. Yet, this system continues to be practiced and promoted globally. As the environmental and social repercussions of disbelief in limits become increasingly clear, so does our need for a new economic system —one that is not wedded to growth. Neither growth in the number of consumers nor growth in the amount consumed.</p><p></p><p></p><p>But what would an alternative to the pro-growth economy look like? There are multiple thinkers and organizations taking on exactly this question. However, these efforts can be disparate and focused on their differences rather than their common agreement that an alternative to pro-growth economics is not only possible but required.</p><p></p><p>With support and guidance from multiple experts, the MAHB has compiled a list of resources and organizations relevant to the discussions of why a new economic system is needed, what might the system look like, and how do we make the necessary transition. The MAHB was particularly interested in how, or if, these resources incorporated human population numbers and growth into their assessments of the economy. The resources identified so far explore how human population growth factors into economic growth, the limits to growth, the disconnect between economic growth and improved human wellbeing, theories in response to the limits, and proposed policies and practices for moving away from our “obsession” with growth.</p><p></p><p>You are encouraged to explore the full document. This is a working version and your feedback is very welcome. You can either contact Erika with suggested changes, or make suggestions directly to the online version here.</p><p></p><p>Special thanks to Peter Fiekowsky for connecting with the MAHB to push this project forward and provide financial support for its pursuit.</p><p></p><p>The MAHB Blog is a venture of the Millennium Alliance for Humanity and the Biosphere. Questions should be directed to joan@mahbonline.org</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Moving Away From the Pro-Growth Economy</p><p>An annotated bibliography</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>April 2017 Working Draft</p><p></p><p>Prepared by Erika Gavenus with the Millennium Alliance for Humanity and the Biosphere</p><p>Financial support from Peter Fiekowsky</p><p>Introduction</p><p>The current economic system being utilized and internalized relies on perpetual growth. Which has long operated counter to the reality that we are confined to a finite planet with finite resources. Yet, this system continues to be practiced and promoted globally. As the environmental and social repercussions of disbelief in limits become increasingly clear, so does our need for a new economic system --one that is not wedded to growth, growth in number of consumers and amount consumed. </p><p></p><p>What are the alternatives to a pro-growth economy? There are multiple thinkers and organizations taking on exactly this question. However, these efforts have largely been disparate and focused on their differences rather than their common agreement that an alternative to pro-growth economics is not only possible but required. </p><p></p><p>The resources collected below explore how human population growth factors into economic growth, the limits to growth, the disconnect between economic growth and improved human well-being, theories in response to the limits, and proposed policies and practices for moving away from our “obsession” with growth.</p><p>Areas for Further Research and Efforts</p><p>Development of macroeconomic model (or expansion of existing model) that can provide meaningful predictions of what an economy without growth would look like.</p><p>Political will, move to get “no-growth” into political and social discourse.</p><p>Adaptation of existing theories and models for assumption of reduced human population size.</p><p>Definitions</p><p>Economy or Economic System: “Economics boils down to making choices among scarce means that satisfy human wants” (Hueting 1990, Ecological Economics). The economy, or economic system, is the interrelated set of production and consumption activities that determine how these scarce resources are allocated.</p><p>Economic Growth: Typically refers to an increase in the capacity for the economy (as defined above) to produce goods and services. This is often measured by gross domestic product (GDP), which considers a nation’s entire economic output. Ecological economists have made the case for re-framing economic growth as an increase in throughput, both in resources used and waste produced.</p><p>Population: Refers to the number of humans currently living in particular area, in the case of this conversation often the world.</p><p>Well-being: There are multiple approaches to defining wellbeing. Most of the resources included here use Sen’s capability approach: “In this approach what is valued is the capability to live well” (Sen, 1984, p78). That people have access to real opportunities to do and be what they have reason to value (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).</p><p>Bibliography Structure</p><p>Resources are presented below according to sections applicable to the discussion of a new economic system. Within sections, resources are listed alphabetically by author’s last name. The Outline View can be used to easily navigate between sections.</p><p></p><p>Annotated Bibliography Outline</p><p></p><p>Resources of Overarching Applicability: p3</p><p>Population and Economics: p9</p><p>Limits to Growth: p13</p><p> Limited Resources & Sinks: p13</p><p> Economic Growth & Wellbeing: p24</p><p> Equity: p28</p><p>Theories in Response to Limits: p29</p><p> Ecological Economics: p37</p><p> Low-Growth & No-Growth: p44</p><p> Steady-State Economy: p45</p><p> Degrowth: p48</p><p>Macroeconomic Models: p60</p><p>Practices and Policies Based on Theories: p65</p><p> Metrics & Indicators: p66</p><p> Considering Externalities, “Getting the price right”: p71</p><p> Social Shifts: p74</p><p> Political Shifts: p80</p><p> Commons-Based Economy: p84</p><p> Localized Economies: p87</p><p> Restructuring: “Cinderella Economy,” Reduced Work Hours, etc.: p87</p><p></p><p>Along with their bibliographic information, brief summaries of the works are provided. The summaries focus on how the resources contribute to the discussion surrounding the particular section. Some resources cut across sections, and are therefore listed in multiple areas. </p><p>Following the annotated bibliography a list of additional sources is provided, according to the same sections. These additional sources are accompanied by third-party summaries, with the source noted. Finally, a list of organizations of interest is shared.</p><p>Materials of Overarching Applicability</p><p>Jackson, T. (2009) Prosperity Without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet. New York, NY: Earthscan, Taylor & Francis Routledge.</p><p></p><p>Throughout this book, Jackson tackles the questions of: What is prosperity? Can greater prosperity be achieved without eroding the basis for the well-beings of others now and in the future? If so, how do we move towards systems that promote prosperity within the confines of a finite world?</p><p></p><p>In answering the first of these questions, Jackson heavily relies upon the theory of prosperity as possessing the capabilities for flourishing, that is “how well are people able to function in any given context” (p41). Jackson claims, “A prosperous society can only be conceived as one in which people everywhere have the capability to flourish in certain basic ways.” These “certain basic ways” follow the central human capabilities defined by Nussbaum (2006, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, nationality and policy design): life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one's environment. Jackson accepts this list, but clarifies that they are not “a set of disembodied freedoms” but rather “a range of ‘bounded capabilities’ to live well --within certain clearly defined limits” (p45). Capabilities are bounded, according to Jackson, “on the one hand by the scale of the global population and on the other by the finite ecology of the planet” (p45). Ultimately, this brings Jackson to define prosperity as, “the ability to flourish as human beings --within ecological limits of a finite planet’ (Chapter 12). </p><p></p><p>With this definition in mind, Jackson makes two different points about the role of economic growth in regards to the second question. First, Jackson argues and provides evidence that, despite its prominence in metrics and policy priorities, economic growth is not the same thing as rising prosperity. Jackson refers to Kasser’s statement, “materialistic values such as popularity, image and financial success are psychologically opposed to ‘intrinsic’ values like self-acceptance, affiliation, a sense of belonging in the community. Yet the latter are the things that contribute to our well-being. They are the constituents of prosperity”. Second, Jackson points out the detrimental effects economic growth, and consequently increased throughputs, have on the environment and ecosystem services that are critical to current and future well-being. Jackson argues that though decoupling--reducing the ecological intensity per unit of economic output--is vital, there is little to no evidence that absolute decoupling is occurring and will achieve ecological targets without reducing growth in population and income per capita. With evidence that economic growth does not guarantee increased ability to flourish, but does push against the ecological limits we must operate within, Jackson calls for the dismantling of “this materialistic vision of prosperity” (Chapter 9).</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Despite this call, Jackson does recognize that, because it is so entrenched in our current economic and social systems, economic growth does promote prosperity indirectly through economic stability and as a means for social participation. Considering the relationship between economic growth and stability, Jackson explains, “...the dilemma of growth has us caught between the desire to maintain economic stability and the need to remain within ecological limits. This dilemma arises because stability seems to require growth, but environmental impacts ‘scale with’ economic output: the more the economy grows the greater the environmental impact--all other things being equal’ (Chapter 8). Further, “We have no models for how common macro-economic ‘aggregates’ (production, consumption, investment, capital stock, public spending, labour, money supply, and so on) behave when capital doesn’t accumulate” (Chapter 8), but the assumption is that “the modern economy is structurally reliant on economic growth for its stability” (p14). Economic stability, including job security, does contribute to prosperity partially through providing ways for people to participate in society. Jackson also argues that consumerism is so entrenched in our social interactions that income, consumption, and the status they generate have become means for participating in the life of society, gaining a sense of identity, meaning and purpose, and defining our dreams. In these ways, economic growth is linked in a strained fashion to prosperity through both the current social and economic systems.</p><p></p><p>Consequently, both the economic and social systems must be addressed if we aim to promote prosperity within the confines of a finite world. Jackson outlines two specific components of change:</p><p>Need to fix the economic system, to develop a new ecologically literate macro-economics, a resilient economy--capable of resisting external shocks, maintaining people’s livelihoods and living within our ecological means--is the goal we should be aiming for here.</p><p>Shifting the social logic of consumerism. This change has to proceed through the provision of real, credible alternatives through which people can flourish...They must also provide capabilities for people to participate fully in the life of society, without recourse to unsustainable materialistic ways. (Chapter 10) </p><p>These changes require government action: “A transition from narrow self-interest to social behaviors, or from relentless novelty to considered conservation of things that matter, can only proceed through changes in underlying structure, changes that strengthen commitment and encourage social behavior. And these changes require governments to act.” Jackson points out, for those who would argue this is not the place for government, that policy decisions have routinely promoted growth and consumerism and that “A state framed narrowly as the protector of market freedom in the unbounded pursuit of consumerism bears no relation to any meaningful vision of a social contract” (Chapter 10).</p><p></p><p>Finally, Jackson outlines concrete steps to build the systematic changes needed:</p><p>Establishing the ecological limits</p><p>Resource and emission caps and reduction targets (contraction and convergence)</p><p>Fiscal reform for sustainability (ecological tax reform)</p><p>Support for ecological transition in developing countries</p><p>Fixing the economic model</p><p>Developing an ecological macro-economics</p><p>Investing in jobs, assets, and infrastructure (Cinderella economy)</p><p>Increasing financial and fiscal prudence</p><p>Revising the national accounts</p><p>Changing social logic</p><p>Working time policy</p><p>Tackling systemic inequality</p><p>Measuring capabilities and flourishing</p><p>Strengthening social capital</p><p>Dismantling the culture of consumerism</p><p>These changes promote an economy that delivers prosperity --the capabilities for flourishing within the ecological limits of a finite planet. “The means to livelihood, perhaps through paid employment. Participation in the life of society. A degree of security. A sense of belonging. The ability to share in a common endeavor and yet to pursue our potential as individual human beings’ (Chapter 12).</p><p></p><p>Ultimately, Jackson identifies three areas where more efforts are needed: development of an ecological macro-economic model, refinement of specific policy asks, and recruitment of a political “champion”.</p><p></p><p>Brown, P.G. and P. Timmerman (eds.) (2015) Ecological Economics for the Anthropocene: An emerging paradigm. NY, USA: Columbia University Press.</p><p></p><p>Editors Brown and Timmerman bring together a comprehensive look at the origins of ecological economic, how the field has developed and diverged from its original aims, and finally how an increased consideration of ethics, justice, and liberty are required for the field to adequately respond to the challenges of the anthropocene. Brown and Timmerman describe the explicit objectives of ecological economics as “being concerned with three issues: scale, distribution, and efficiency’ (p4). Whereas ecological economics was critical in pushing for the inclusion of scale in these objectives, and for scale to be defined by the realities of thermodynamics and ecology, throughout the book authors call for greater incorporation of ethics. Erickson writes in the Foreword, “Natural science must help ecological economists define the boundary conditions of sustainable scale. Ethical debate and public process must negotiate just distribution. Sustainability and justice then frame the design of well-regulated markets to achieve genuine economic efficiency” (p xi). This book pushes ecological economists beyond the comfortable territory they have settled into applying mainstream economics to the existing agenda of ecologists and environmentalist: seen in efforts to get the price “right”, assign market-value to ecosystem services, and incorporate externalities. Erickson notes that bolder conversations occur among ecological economists, but that they have largely “grown content to talk to one another but are unwilling to step outside [their] comfort zone to articulate and lobby for change in policy circles” (p xii).</p><p></p><p>In contrast to claims that as a value-neutral approach economics should remain separate from ethics, Brown and Timmerman argue that ethics reside at the very heart of economics. “Two important elements of the current economistic approach are often overlooked: (1) it not only provides an explanation of how markets, transactions, and so on function, but it also contains (in spite of its value-neutral rhetoric) a powerful ethical formulation of what it is to be a human being in search of well-being; and (2) at its heart is an abstract, ideal model --a set of quasi-scientific claims about the operations of a social system” (p1). In Chapter 1, Timmerman provides examples of alternative economic theories to demonstrate that standard economic theory “is based on a specific range of assumptions drawn from a specific period in modern history --a historical artifact of a particular period of thought and time rather than a universal truth” (p22). Timmerman goes on to explain how standard economic theory goes about taking “elements of how people might act and then does what it can to prove that that is how they do in fact act --or if they do not act in that way, they are somehow wrong or misguided” (p23). Taken together, the Introduction and first chapter prove precedent for inclusion of ethics in economic theory. </p><p></p><p>Brown goes on in Chapter Two to present an ethics for economics in the Anthropocene. Brown’s discussion touches on what both justice and liberty mean in a world with natural resource constraints. “One prerequisite for shifting from the existing economy to an ecological economy would be to provide an accounting of the injustices we do in exercising free choice” (p106). This discussion is carried into Chapters Four and Five, in which Goldberg and Garver consider the possible measurements, indicators, and boundaries that should be standard to ecological economics. Goldberg and Garver agree that the scale of these boundaries needs to be derived from natural science, but that ethics-based decisions are also necessary in terms of distribution and pursuing efficiency.</p><p></p><p>Jennings expands upon this discussion in Chapter Ten in considering an ecological political economy and liberty. Jennings defines the ecological political economy as the activity system, whereas an ecological political philosophy is the conceptual and normative order needed to achieve it. In contemplating liberty, Jennings argues:</p><p>“...our task is to reclaim and reconstruct the concept of liberty so that, in our moral imagination and our public philosophy, ecologically destructive behavior would not be seen as a manifestation of freedom at all; rather, it would come to be repudiated as a manifestation of ignorance, irresponsibility, and alienation that negates freedom” (p295).</p><p>In Chapter Eleven, Harvey expands on Jennings call and explicitly looks at how such fundamental changes to culture can be accomplished. Harvey presents the process as fundamentally discoursive and goes on to outline two conditions under which challenger discourses achieve cultural acceptance: genuine accommodation to some extent of competing ideologies and expectations (limited to secondary principles), and resonation to some degree with the subconscious “common sense” of popular culture. “...there is a gap to be filled between analysis of the problem --the ecological crisis-- and the solution, an ecological political economy. This gap is a systematic consideration of the process by which the solution may be realized --and most importantly, the levers and interventions available to change agents and how they be used to best effect” (p350).</p><p></p><p>The book concludes with an overview of future research opportunities and a fresh vision for the human prospect. Areas for future research are far reaching and include: rethinking ethics, rethinking agency, rethinking rationality, rethinking the human, changing our relationship to the community of beings, reconsidering justices and distribution, recasting education, rethinking price, embracing a plurality of values, measuring economic production as a biophysical process, modeling and growth, fitting the economy to the earth, developing the field of ecological finance, trading in the language of “free” trade, rethinking transactions, and rebuilding governance and law. Clearly, the authors believe that ecological economics in the context of the Anthropocene cannot continue to be a side-shoot of the traditional market-based economic system, but instead must fully embrace systematic changes to our economic, social, and ethical ways of being.</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R., J. Cumberland, H. Daly, R. Goodland, and R. Norgaard (1997) An Introduction to Ecological Economics. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press LLC.</p><p></p><p>The authors present an introduction to ecological economics, including the economic and ecological histories it builds upon, how it differs from neoclassical economics, and what it means for our way forward. Broadly, “Ecological economics represents an attempt to recast economics in this different scientific paradigm, to reintegrate the many academic threads that are needed to weave the whole cloth of sustainability” (p18). The authors state, “Economics arose in midst of moral questions with respect to the obligations of individuals to larger societal goals while chances for personal material improvement emerged...Key ethical issue has always been whether the pursuit of individual greed can be in the interest of society as a whole” (p19). Classic economics answered these questions with the theory that market forces operate as an “invisible hand” that guides free markets to a beneficial state of equilibrium. Individuals pursuing self-interests within the market, therefore, benefit the common good. This theory relies on multiple assumptions, some which deviate from reality. Despite these differences, the theory of the market as an “invisible hand” continues to dictate economic policies. Ecological economics is a commitment to working across the disciplines of ecology and economics to improve both economic and environmental policies. At its heart, ecological economics holds three interdependent goals: sustainable scale, fair distribution, and efficient allocation (p79).</p><p></p><p>It is ecological economics’ inclusion of scale that most distinguishes it from neoclassical economics. Scale refers to the “physical volume of throughput”, that is “the flow of matter-energy from the environment as low-entropy raw material and back to the environment as high-entropy wastes” (p80). The author argue that when attention is paid to the scale of the current economy is is clear that “limits have been reached and exceeded” (p12). Unlike neoclassical economics, ecological economics does not make the assumption of substitutability between human-made and natural capital, which is often used to argue against the presence of environmental limits to economic growth. Grounded heavily in the science of thermodynamics, ecological economics instead assumes the types of capital are complements but not perfect substitutes and makes the point that due to the “increasing scale of human presence” we have switched from facing a limiting factor of human-made capital to one of natural capital. As we move forward, natural capital and the unique role it plays in the economy, must be sustained.</p><p></p><p>The total impact, or economic throughput, determines whether natural capital can be sustained and serve as assets for future generations. Similarly to the I=PAT formula of Holdren and Ehrlich, the authors note “In a full world both human numbers and per capita resources use must be constrained” (p88). The authors go on to dismiss the potential for decoupling and further technological fixes to meaningfully reduce this impact. Stating, “...the welfare of the poor, and indeed of the rich as well, depends much more on population control, consumption control, and redistribution than on the technical fix of a 5- to 10-fold increase in total factor productivity” (p103).</p><p></p><p>In the above statement, and in other instances throughout the book, the authors explicitly mention the need to realize a stable human population size that is consistent with an economy of sustainable scale. In this, the authors are clear that “...the policy of focusing solely on population control is known to be insufficient” (p110). Instead, they propose that demographic research and policies expand to consider other issues and move beyond solely focusing of population control:</p><p>“...a new framework should expand the definitions of issues: focus not only on population size, density, rate of increase, age distribution, and sex ratios by also on access to resources, livelihoods, social dimensions of gender, and structures of power. New models have to be explored in which population control is not simply a question of family planning but of economic, ecological, social and political planning; in which the wasteful use of resources is not simply a question of finding new substitutes but of reshaping affluent lifestyles; and in which sustainability is seen not only as a global aggregate process but also as one having to do with sustainable livelihoods for a majority of local people” (p111).</p><p></p><p>This new framework fits with the general point that the scale of population and consumption together determine our total impact. Whereas the total impact is ultimately constrained by what earth has capacity for, it is up to society to decide how to divide it between numbers of people and per capita resources. Decisions about this division relate to the second and third goals of ecological economics: fair distribution and efficient allocation. In regards to fair distribution, the authors assert that it would be “Reasonable for ‘the poor’ to demand access to remaining natural resource base --at least to reach minimally acceptable material living standards” (p14). Referencing concepts including the threshold hypothesis for the relationship between wellbeing and income and Max-Neef’s nine categories of human needs, the authors also stress the difference between qualitative development and quantitative throughput growth. “A developing economy is one that is getting better, not necessarily bigger, so that the well-being of the (stable) population improves” (p16).</p><p></p><p>Ultimately, the authors present some concrete directions for ecological economic policies to pursue: 1) broad natural capital depletion tax (Costanza & Daly 1992); (2) application of precautionary polluter pays principle; and (3) system of ecological tariffs (p221). Additionally, the case is made for “Getting the price right” by finding ways to include environmental externalities. The author conclude with the following sentiment:</p><p>“...over centuries of believing the progress will take care of our progeny, modern peoples lost their sense of responsibility for their offspring and the institutions needed to assure appropriate transfers of assets. Let’s consider the institutional aspects that complemented and maintained responsibility” (p160).</p><p></p><p>Overall, the book provides a very sound introduction to economics, ecology, and ecological economics. This is helpful both for understanding the strengths of ecological economics, and some of the critiques the movement have received. Particularly, criticism that the ecological economic movement thus far has fallen short of its goals because it continues to look for solutions within the neo classical economic system, is also applicable to this book.</p><p></p><p>Population and Economics (P&E;)</p><p>The materials below relate to how human population and economics are related. This relationship is considered both in terms of how human population growth can drive increased GDP, and also how larger human populations potentially stress and limit progress.</p><p></p><p>APPG (2007) ‘Return of the population growth factor --its impact on millennium development goals’. Report of the Hearings by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health. London: Population and Sustainability Network.</p><p>A report from the All Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health that takes a critical look at how continuing high fertility and subsequent population growth presents challenges to development and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, especially in the context of the poorest countries. “The evidence is overwhelming: the MDGs are difficult if not impossible to achieve with the current levels of population growth in the least developed countries and regions.” (p4). For each MDG, the report systematically examines how population growth affects the targeted outcomes. It could be argued, that the targets set previously by the MDGs, and now by the Sustainable Development Goals, better represent increases in wellbeing than increased GDP does. By considering how population growth challenges achievement of these goals, the report is also providing evidence for how population growth challenges increased well-being.</p><p></p><p>Ayres, R. (2008) ‘Sustainability economics: where do we stand’. Ecological Economics 67: 281-310.</p><p>In this overview of environmental economics, resource economics and sustainable economics, Ayres also describes the economic growth inherent in the growing human population. Ayres summarizes this discussion with two figures. Figure 5 presents the effects of predicted growth on worldwide use of resources if current consumption and production patterns are maintained (p286). Figure 6 presents the effects of predicted population growth on worldwide use of resources if consumption figures worldwide were raised to those of developed countries (p287). These figures raise the issues of distribution and scale.</p><p></p><p>Boumans, R., R. Costanza, J. Farley, M.A. Wilson, R. Portela, J. Rotmans, F. Villa, and M. Grasso (2002) ‘Modeling the Dynamics of the Integrated Earth System and the Value of Global Ecosystem Services Using the Gumbo Model’. Ecological Economics 41(3): 529-560. Doi: 10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00098-8.</p><p>The authors developed a global unified metamodel of the biosphere (GUMBO) to simulate the integrated earth system and assess the dynamics and values of ecosystem services. GUMBO is used to project different scenarios based on two variations concerning assumptions about key parameters in the model, arrayed against two variations of policy settings concerning the rates of investment across natural, social, human, and built capital. The model and scenarios explicitly include human population within human capital, and human population varies across the scenarios with defined interaction with other services and goods. Critically, human capital is a composite of human population and knowledge. Consequently, in GUMBO reduced human population does not automatically reduce human capital if knowledge is increased.</p><p></p><p>Hardin, G. (1985) An Ecolate View of the Human Predicament. http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_ecolate_view_human_predicament.html</p><p>In a follow-up to his often cited article, Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin re-visits the central idea and clarifies, “Under conditions of overpopulation, freedom in an unmanaged commons brings ruin to all.” In this rewording, Hardin specifically includes the role overpopulation has in driving unsustainable use of the commons, and equates overpopulation with scarcity. Hardin further illuminates this in stating:</p><p>“not all aspects that we regard as part of the carrying capacity for human beings can be increased to the same extent. We can increase the amount of food energy we extract from the environment, but how do we increase the amount of wilderness for recreation or the extent of lonely beaches and wild rivers needed for the renewal of the spirit. If several variables are included in the reckoning of carrying capacity, maximizing the one that can be most easily maximized, and keying population size to that variable, will necessarily diminish the per capita allotment of all other goods.”</p><p></p><p>Holdren, J.P. and P.R. Ehrlich (1974) ‘Human population and the global environment’. American Scientist 62: 282-292.</p><p>In this paper, Holdren and Ehrlich tackle the misconceptions they feel are both dangerous and common among decision makers: </p><p>“(1) the absolute size and rate of growth of the human population and has little or no relationship to the rapidly escalating ecological problems facing mankind;</p><p>(2) environmental degradation consists primarily of ‘pollution,’ which is perceived as a local and reversible phenomenon or concern mainly for its obvious and immediate effects on human health; and</p><p>(3) science and technology can make possible the long continuation of rapid growth in civilization’s consumption of natural resources” (p282).</p><p>In doing so, the authors classify environmental problems according to the damage they pose to human beings as either “direct assaults” or “indirect effects”. “Indirect effects” largely consist of the environmental problems that are posed to undermine the functioning of natural systems humans rely on. Though most attention at the time (1974) focused on minimizing “direct assaults” such as polluted water sources, the authors argue, “The most serious threats of all, however, may well prove to be the indirect ones generated by mankind’s disruption of the functioning of the natural environment” (p282). They support this argument by briefly reviewing “public-service” functions of the global environment and establishing that the operations of natural biological processes are both irreplaceable and indispensable, or non-substitutable. Unfortunately, through examples of desertification and deforestation, Holdren and Ehrlich demonstrate that civilization’s aim “to manage ecosystem in such a way as to maximise productivity,” is incompatible with “nature’s” tendency “to [manage] ecosystems in such a way as to maximize stability” (p287). This tendency is causing mankind, as a global and biological force, to become “comparable and even exceeding many natural processes,” pushing systems away from stability (p287). The scale of the resulting environmental deterioration is explained by the authors with the equation: </p><p>“Environmental disruption = population x consumption per person x damage per unit of consumption” </p><p>--which is the basis for the I=PAT equation, also attributed to the authors. Thus, the population size, consumption and effect per unit of consumption interact multiplicatively to determine the extent of environmental disruption. The authors clarify, “For problems described by multiplicative relations like the one just given, no factor can be considered unimportant” (p288). Thus, actions taken to reduce the environmental disruption caused by humans “should include measures to slow the growth of the global population to zero as rapidly as possible. Success in this endeavor is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving a prosperous yet environmentally sustainable civilization” (p291). This article provides critical background on how human population size is considered to interact with consumption, and the importance of addressing both in efforts to reduce environmental disruption.</p><p></p><p>Kerschner, C. (2010) ‘Economic de-growth vs. steady-state economy’. Journal of Cleaner Production 18: 544-551.</p><p>In this review of the concepts of economic de-growth and a steady-state economy. Kerschner concludes that the concepts are in fact complements. Kerschner does note that economic de-growth and steady-state economics differ in their handling of the population issue. Whereas Herman Daly explicitly raises the role of population growth in economic growth and calls for limited brith licenses, statements on demography in the economic de-growth literature have thus far been “inconsistent and underdeveloped”. Kerschner argues that, “stabilisation or de-growth of the economy inevitably requires stabilisation or de-growth of the number of humans respectively,” and criticizes the “missing, patchy or incoherent,” treatment of the population problem by de-growth authors. (p546). Kerschner suggests that the bottom-up focus of the de-growth movement could lend a more acceptable and effective approach to the population problem than current top-down suggestions, like Daly’s limited birth licenses.</p><p></p><p>Sorman, A.H. and M. Giampietro (2013) ‘The energetic metabolism of societies and the degrowth paradigm: analyzing biophysical constraints and realities’. Journal of Cleaner Production 38: 80-93.</p><p>Sorman and Giampietro analyze the implications, the feasibility and the desirability of possible trajectories of economic downscaling from an energetic perspective. The authors use the approach of societal metabolism to account for the profile of energy flows required and consumed by societies. In this analysis, the authors explore the possible implications of demographic changes on societal metabolism. The model considers how “Demographic variables affect both: (i) the supply of working hours; and (ii) the requirement of working hours; within the metabolic pattern.” (p84). Based on the modeled implications of demographic changes, Sorman and Gioampietro find that, “population is and will remain a relevant variable to be considered,” even in the context of developed countries. The authors therefore urge degrowth proponents to more consistently consider the driver of human population.</p><p></p><p>U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (1991) Energy in Developing Countries, OTA-E-486. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.</p><p>A report considering the energy constraints facing developing countries. “Significant obstacles include financial constraints, difficulties in increasing biomass fuel supplies, institutional and policy factors, and environmental factors.” (p12). In addition to the potential benefits of increasing per capita energy consumption among developing countries, the report specifically includes population projections and states, “The increase in population alone in developing countries would account for a 75 percent increase in their commercial energy consumption by 2025 even if per-capita consumption remained at current levels.” (p11).</p><p>Limits to Growth (L2G)</p><p>What makes constant economic growth unsustainable? The resources below answer this question by presenting the physical limits that exist for both natural resources and natural sinks, arguing against the assumption of substitutability between natural and human-made capital, and demonstrating that absolute decoupling is not a reasonable solution. Other authors point out that further growth in GDP, or income, does not necessarily result in improved well-being, and therefore bring into question the merits of pursuing further growth in such instances. The final section presents resources that consider how the limited remaining resources and sinks should be distributed.</p><p>Limited Resources & Sinks</p><p>Assadourian, Erik (2010) ‘The Rise and Fall of Consumer Cultures’. In State of the World 2010: Transforming Cultures; from Consumerism to Sustainability, edited by Linda Starke and Lisa Mastny, 3-20. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute. http://blogs.worldwatch.org/transformingcultures/contents/.</p><p>This call for society to move aways from a culture of consumerism situates the myriad of current efforts to change economic system within the context of social changes necessary. “Preventing the collapse of human civilization requires nothing less than a wholesale transformation of dominant cultural patterns.” (p3). In the first chapter Assadourian outlines the primary limits facing current consumption patterns, primarily: limited resources, unreasonable expectations for decoupling, and disconnect between improved wellbeing and increased consumption. “The exploitation of these resources to maintain ever higher levels of consumption has put increasing pressure on Earth’s systems and in the process has dramatically disrupted the ecological systems on which humanity and countless other species depend.” (p4).</p><p></p><p>Ayres, R. (2008) ‘Sustainability economics: where do we stand’. Ecological Economics 67: 281-310.</p><p>In this overview of environmental economics, resource economics and sustainable economics, Ayres provides thorough explanation of the limits facing continual economic growth with special attention to to the linked problems of energy supply and climate change. Ayres explains how the assumed elasticity of substitution (how easily and completely can they be used in place of one another) between resources and capital influences perceptions of limits. “In principle, it has been widely accepted by economists that scarcity is not an immediate problem and that capital may be substituted for most physical resources, at least up to some point that might be quite far in the future.” (p284). Echoing Georgescu-Roegen, Ayres describes the popular conceptualization of economic activity as a closed loop between production, consumption and investment as “an immaterial perpetual motion machine, in violation of both of the laws of thermodynamics.” (p292). Ayres argues that the real economy more closely resembles a large-scale materials processing system in which virtually none of the materials consumed by the economy are recycled at present, especially in regards to energy.</p><p></p><p>Ayres, R. and J. van den Bergh (2005) ‘A theory of economic growth with material/energy resources and dematerialisation: Interaction of three growth mechanisms’. Ecological Economics 55, 96-118.</p><p>Ayres and van den Bergh clarify the nature of energy and material resources in a non-optimizing growth theory framework. The authors modify the conventional theory by: (1) identifying multiple feedback mechanisms so that the cost of production through demand on growth is considered; (2) developing a production function that distinguishes between resource use, technical efficiency, and value creation. The authors developed the model recognizing, “that existing growth theory with environment and resources does not give rise to theoretical and empirical information that is useful in a debate on structural economic change aimed at reducing the use of energy and materials.” (p97). The authors’ model reflects the reality that, “in the future, as growth continues, both renewable and non-renewable natural resources may become scarce and even limiting, whereas unskilled human labor and produced capital will be increasingly plentiful.” (p97).</p><p></p><p>Bishop, Richard C. (1978) ‘Endangered species and uncertainty: The economics of a safe minimum standard’. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 60: 10-18.</p><p>Bishop proposes the safe minimum standard approach to species extinction and calls for avoidance of extinction unless social costs are unacceptably large. “This decision rule states that the SMS should be adopted unless the social costs of doing so are unacceptably large. How much is ‘unacceptably large’ must necessarily involve more than economic analysis, because endangered species involve issues of intergenerational equity.” (p10). In the absence of definitive predictions of consequences, Bishop argues extreme care must be used in the context of irreversible consequences like extinction. This approach can likewise be applied to other instances of irreversible consequences, and the argument shifted to what is a safe minimum standard as opposed to passable maximum.</p><p></p><p>Boulding. K. E. (1966) ‘The economics of the coming Spaceship Earth’. In H. Jarrett (ed.), Environmental quality in a growing economy, pp. 3-14. Baltimore, MD: Resources for the Future/John Hopkins University Press.</p><p>Boulding suggests that systems need to be reconsidered from an open “frontier” system, to a closed “spaceship” system. The “spaceship” represents a system “without unlimited reservoirs of anything, either for extraction or for pollution, and in which, therefore many must find his place in a cyclical ecological system which is capable of continuous reproduction of material form even though it cannot escape having inputs of energy.” (p8). Boulding explains that within a closed system, fossil fuels represent a capital stock of stored-up sunshine (one of the two available energy inputs, the other being from the earth’s own internal heat and motion). “Because of this capital stock of energy, we have been able to maintain an energy input into the system, particularly over the last two centuries, much larger than we would have been able to do with existing techniques if had had to rely on the current input of available energy from the sun or the earth itself. This supplementary input, however, is by its very nature exhaustible.” (p4). The “spaceship” economy therefore would not aim to maximize throughput through consumption and production, rather with stock maintenance.</p><p></p><p>Campbell, C. J., and J. H. Laherrère (1998) ‘The end of cheap oil’. Scientific American 278(3): 78-83.</p><p>This article considers how continued over-consumption of limited oil resources will lead to the end of “cheap oil” and force transition to a post-oil economy. “The world is not running out of oil --at least not yet. What our society does face, and soon, is the end of the abundant and cheap oil on which all industrial nations depend.” (p83). </p><p></p><p>Costanza, R. and H. E. Daly (1992) ‘Natural capital and sustainable development’. Conservation Biology 6: 37-46.</p><p>Costanza and Daly come together in this article to support the “constancy of total natural capital” rule as a prudent minimum condition for assuring sustainability. The authors explain: “A minimum necessary condition for sustainability is the maintenance of the total natural capital stock at or above the current level. While lower stock of natural capital may be sustainable, society can allow no further decline in natural capital given the large uncertainty and the dire consequences of guessing wrong.” (p37). At the heart of this argument is an assumption of limited substitutability of manufactured for natural capital. Constanza and Daly discuss methodological issues concerning the degree of substitutability that is reasonable. The authors also distinguish between growth, “material increase in size”, and development, “improvement in organization without size change”. This differentiation implies that, “growth cannot be sustainable indefinitely on a finite planet. Development may be sustainable, but even this aspect of change may have some limits.” (p37).</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R., R. d’Arge, R. de Groot, S. Farber, M. Grasso, B. Hannon, K. Limburg, S. Naeem, R.V. O’Neill, J.Paruelo, R.G. Raskin, P. Sutton, and M. van den Belt (1997) ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital’. Nature 387(6630): 253-260. Doi: 10.1038/387253a0.</p><p>Costanza et al. estimate the current economic value of 17 ecosystem services for 16 biomes, finding that for the entire biosphere the value is estimated to be in the range of US$16-54 trillion per year --compared to the global gross national product total around US$18 trillion per year. This approach has received some push back, and the authors rightfully note: “The economics of the Earth would grind to a halt without the services of ecological life-support systems, so in one sense their total value to the economy is infinite.” (p253). Instead, the calculations are for the “incremental” or “marginal” value of ecosystem services, that is “the estimated rate of change of value compared with changes in the ecosystem services from their current levels.” (p253).</p><p></p><p>Douthwaite, R. (2012) ‘Degrowth and the supply of money in an energy-scarce world’. Ecological Economics 84: 187-193.</p><p>Douthwaite outlines how energy will become scarcer as fossil fuel resources are used, how this will affect the price of energy and consequently financing systems. Douthwaite explains, “As energy gets scarcer, its cost in terms of length of time we have to work to buy a kilowatt-hour, or its equivalent, is going to increase...energy is cheaper today that it is ever likely to be again in terms of what we have to give up to get it.” (p7). This leads the author to concluding that richer countries do not have a choice between growing and de-growing their economies. Degrowth is going to be forced by declining fossil energy supply. The choice they do have, as Douthwaite see it, is how they handle and are prepared to handle, the contraction. The article presents three tools that Douthwaite sees as essential if degrowth is not to result in catastrophic collapse: “(i) a system to share the benefits from using increasingly-scarce fossil fuels, (ii) new ways of financing businesses and (iii) the introduction of debt-free regional and local currencies.” (p1).</p><p></p><p>Ehrlich, P.R. (1989) ‘The limits to substitution: Metaresource depletion and a new economic-ecologic paradigm’. Ecological Economics 1(1): 9-16.</p><p>Assumptions about substitution are central to differing opinions on the presence of limits to economic growth. In this article, Ehrlich presents evidence countering the neoclassical economic assumption that “one resources is just like the other”. This evidence includes examples wherein substitution is not feasible/highly expensive (e.g. dams to replace flood-control services of forest ecosystems) or in which the substitutions come with “unquantified ultimate social and environmental costs”. (p13). Ehrlich’s conclusions support the presence of limits to economic growth, and the need to rapidly address the drivers of economic growth: human population size and per capita consumption.</p><p></p><p>Ehrlich, P.R. and A. Ehrlich (2016) ‘Population, resources, and the faith-based economy: the situation in 2016’. Biophysical Economics and Resource Quality 1(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41247-016-0003-y</p><p>Paul and Anne Ehrlich summarize today’s population-resources-environment situation in comparison to the situation in 1986 when their seminal book The Population Bomb was published. In concluding that the human predicament is now much more serious than in 2016, the authors specifically discuss “faith-based macroeconomics” and the assumptions current neoclassical economics hinge on. Specifically, the authors criticize “faith in continuous economic expansion through technology, markets, and the so-called knowledge economy” and provide the example of Paul Krugman’s position that further growth is a cure for problems. (p3). The authors also question the assumption that people make rational, informed choices --an underpinning of how markets are thought to be efficient. The authors do praise the work of multiple ecological economics to push the discipline towards recognizing real-world constraints. Ultimately, the authors conclude that a profound change of society is required to “provide a slim hope of avoiding a collapse of civilization,” a change that would include moving away from myths of continued economic growth.</p><p></p><p>Galaz, V., F. Biermann, B. Crona, D. Loorbach, C. Folke, P. Olsson, M. Nilsson, J. Allouche, A. Persson and G. Reischl (2012) ‘“Planetary Boundaries”’--Exploring the Challenges for Global Environmental Governance’. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 4(1): 80-87. Doi: 10.1016/j.cosust.2012.01.006.</p><p>Following-up on Rockström et al.’s article A safe operating space for humanity in which nine ‘planetary boundaries’ with possible threshold effects are identified, Galaz et al. consider the global governance challenges of responding to these boundaries. Though the original article’s conclusion of drawing a ‘safe operating space for humanity’ can prove highly controversial, Galaz et al. argue that article’s more general insight should not be overlooked: “that global environmental change unfolds between complex and multiple bio-geophysical systems with possible non-linear dynamics.” (p80). Focusing on that insight, Galaz et al. ask what are the implications for Earth system governance. The authors discuss four interrelated global environmental governance challenges:</p><p>“The four identified challenges are related to, first, the interplay between Earth system science and global policies, and the implications of difference in risk perceptions in defining these boundaries; second, the capacity of international institutions to deal with individual ‘planetary boundaries’, as well as interactions between them; third, the role of international organizations in dealing with ‘planetary boundaries’ interactions; and fourth, the role of global governance in framing social-ecological innovations.” (p80).</p><p>The authors conclude by providing some suggestions for addressing these challenges, which they present in Table 1, along with each possible intervention’s potential and limitations. (p85). </p><p></p><p>Goodland, R. (1995) ‘The concept of environmental sustainability’. Annals of Ecology & Sustainability 26:1-24. </p><p>Goodland reviews the debate surrounding the concept of environmental sustainability and the related aspects of growth, limits, scale, and substitutability. (p1). This review begins by outlining the concept of sustainability and distinguishing between social, economic, and environmental sustainability. Goodland defines environmental sustainability as, “the ‘maintenance of natural capital,’” from which Goodland presents the output rule, input rule, and operational principles. Goodland notes that environmental sustainability must be prioritized partially for its role in enabling economic and social sustainability to be realized. In regards to social sustainability, Goodland explains, “Poverty reduction has to come from qualitative development, from redistribution and sharing, from population stability, and from community sodality, rather than from throughput growth.” (p3). As indicated by this previous quote, Goodland concurs that growth and development are not synonymous: “Growth implies quantitative physical or material increase; development implies qualitative improvement or at least change.” (p9). The author also concurs that, “substitutability is the exception, not the rule...that most (but not all) forms of capital are more complementary or neutral and are less substitutable.” (17).</p><p></p><p>Hall, C. and J. Day (2009) ‘Revisiting the limits to growth after peak oil’. American Scientist 97(3): 230-237. http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/feature/revisiting-the-limits-to-growth-after-peak-oil</p><p>Hall and Day take a critical look at some of the leading publications from the 1970s, particularly The Limits to Growth (1972), that brought attention to the diminishing resource base for humans. Comparing values predicted by the limits-to-growth model and actual values the authors suggest that, “there is growing evidence that the original ‘Cassandras’ were right on the mark in their general assessments, if not always in the details or exact timing, about the dangers of continued growth of human population and their increasing levels of consumption in a world approaching very real material constraints.” (p230). Hall and Day argue that The Limits to Growth along with other seminal publications of this era, need to be revisited and included in contemporary conversations.</p><p></p><p>Howarth, Richard B. (1992) ‘Intergenerational justice and the chain of obligation’. Environmental Values 1: 133-140.</p><p>Howarth counters the arguments put forth by Schwartz (1978) that “the contingent status of future generations implies that the present generation is under only limited obligations to provide for future welfare”. (p138). Instead, Howarth posits “the principles of intergenerational justice follow directly from the principle of justice between contemporaries [intragenerational justice]” and that “adherence to one would seem to require adherence to the other if one’s views are to be internally consistent”. (p139). This argument is built upon the moral premises that: (1) “Principles of justice require a uniform distribution of resources between contemporaries if each individual would derive similar benefits given equivalent life opportunities;” (2) “It is wrong to place others in a position where they are unable to fulfill their moral obligations to third parties;” and (3) “It is wrong to cause individuals to come into existence whose lives are worth not living.” (p135). Extending a chain of obligation from generation to generation, Howarth concludes, “we are obligated to leave behind a world that is qualitatively as satisfying to our successors as the world left to us by those who came before.” (p139).</p><p></p><p>Hubbert, M.K. (1974) Nature of Growth http://www.resilience.org/stories/2007-02-27/hubbert-nature-growth</p><p>In his testimony to the Hearing on the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1974 before the Subcommittee on the Environment of the committee on Interior and Insular Affairs House of Representatives on June 6, 1974, Hubbert sets out to, “discuss some of the aspects of growth in general in an effort to see the bearing which these relationships may have upon our evolving social system.” Hubbert begins with an extensive review of the work he had done considering mineral and energy resources and their significance in the evolution of the world’s technological civilization. Hubbert then goes on to consider other limits to growth beyond energy constraints.</p><p></p><p>Hueting, R. (1990) ‘The Brundtland report: A matter of conflicting goals’. Ecological Economics 2(2): 109-118.</p><p>Hueting criticises the Our Common Future report by the World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the Brundtland report, for its call for a new era of economic growth, for equating Gross National Product with economic growth, and for using economic growth as the indicator of economic success and increased welfare.Hueting argues that in doing so, the Brundtland report “conceals the existing conflict between the increase in production as measured in GNP and the safeguarding of our environment, and brings to the fore the basically non-existent conflict between environment and employment. By doing so it hampers the choices that must be made it we want to conserve and restore the basis of our existence for ourselves and for generations to come.” (p109).</p><p></p><p>Institute for Integrated Economic Research (2011) Low Carbon and Economic Growth –Key Challenges http://www.iier.ch/pub/files/Sun%2C%2007/31/2011%20-%2016%3A11/Green%20Growth%20DFID%20report.pdf</p><p>This report challenges the assumption of decoupling, “that it is possible to grow or maintain economic output while at the same time reducing the anthropogenic production of greenhouse gasses.” (p3). The authors suggest a different development path is necessary for future, and explain that this is necessary because cheap fossil fuel energy --which was critical to the development of industrialized countries-- will no longer be available “either due to extraction limits or because they include the cost of externalities”. (p3). The main macroeconomic view tends to identify four drivers of economic progress and growth: labour productivity gains, substitution, technology progress, and population growth. This report, in contrast, stresses the role fossil fuel energy use has in improving labour productivity, technology has as an enabler of higher and more efficient energy consumption, and globalization has in reallocation of resources and energy. Ultimately, the report concludes that a different development path is needed, that the path needs to be based on “the introduction of simple, mostly non-industrial renewable and sustainable technologies”, and that such a paradigm will likely reduce the potential to grow for most economies, but particularly for aspiring industrial societies (like China).</p><p></p><p>Meadows, D. H., D. L. Meadows, J. Randers and W. W. Behrens (1972) The limits to growth. New York: Universe. (http://www.donellameadows.org/wp-content/userfiles/Limits-to-Growth-digital-scan-version.pdf)</p><p>This seminal work on the analysis of limits to economic growth was published in 1972. The team used the innovative model World 3 to consider. World 3 “is based in system dynamic—a method for studying the world that deals with understanding how complex systems change over time. Internal feedback loops within the structure of the system influence the entire system behavior.” Among the analysis’s conclusions: </p><p></p><p>Meadows, D., Randers, J., and Meadows, D. (2004) Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing. http://donellameadows.org/archives/a-synopsis-limits-to-growth-the-30-year-update/</p><p>Three of the authors of The Limits to Growth (1972) revisit the original report’s findings and consider if and how the situation has changed over the 30 years since the original publication. They find:</p><p>“While the past 30 years has shown some progress, including new technologies, new institutions, and a new awareness of environmental problems, the authors are far more pessimistic than they were in 1972. Humanity has squandered the opportunity to correct our current course over the last 30 years, they conclude, and much must change if the world is to avoid the serious consequences of overshoot in the 21st century.”</p><p></p><p>Polimeni, J.M., K. Mayumi, M. Giampietro and B. Alcott (2008) The Jevons Paradox and the Myth of Resource Efficiency Improvements. London, UK: Earthscan.</p><p>Polimeni et al. present the Jevons Paradox and explain how it counters claims that increasing resource efficiency will reduce the burden we place on the environment. Jevons Paradox describes the scenario in which “as technological improvements increase the efficiency with which a resource is used, total consumption of that resource may increase rather than decrease” (pX). This is explained, because increased efficiency can reduce the price of the resource, as demand is decreased, or free up income for other services and consumables. Reducing the cost of consuming a valued resource, according to a foundation principle of economics, results in people consuming more of it, not less. In the context of Jevons Paradox the authors “investigate in a rigorous manner the question of whether industrial nations can expect to continue in their present mode based on the hope and expectation of increasing efficiency in energy use” (pX). In this investigation the authors present examples of the Jevons Paradox, and examples of how taxes can be used to avoid the Paradox by maintaining high prices. They conclude, “The key to avoiding the Jevons Paradox is to adopt the principle that neither efficiency improvements, nor any other approach to reducing resources use (including voluntary conservation), can be allowed to reduce the cost of consumption” (pXV). </p><p></p><p>Rockström, J., W. Steffen, K. Noone, A. Persson, F.S. III Chapin, E.F. Lambin, T.M. Lenton, M. Scheffer, C. Folke, H.J. Schellnhuber, B. Nykvist, C.A. de Wit, T. Hughes, S. van der Leeuw, H. Rodhe, S. Sörlin, P.K. Snyder, R. Costanza, U. Svedin, M. Falkenmark, L. Karlberg, R.W. Corell, V.J. Fabry, J. Hansen, B. Walker, D. Liverman, K. Richardson, P. Crutzen, and J.A. Foley (2009) ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity’. Ecology and Society 14(2): 32. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/. ALSO: Nature 461: 472-475.</p><p>In this paper, Rockström et al. put forth a proof of concept for a planetary boundaries approach to global sustainability. The authors set out to “define planetary boundaries within which [they] expect that humanity can operate safely” (p1). They identify nine planetary processes: climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone, global phosphorous and nitrogen cycles, atmospheric aerosol loading, freshwater use, land use change, biodiversity loss, and chemical pollution. They go on to set measurable boundaries and zones of uncertainty for each process (Table 1). Due the amount of uncertainty surrounding these boundaries and their potentially non-linear interactions with other boundaries, the authors argue, “...that no boundary can be transgressed for long periods without jeopardizing the safe operating space for humanity” (p21). Unfortunately, based on the author’s preliminary analysis “humanity has already transgressed three boundaries (climate change, the rate of biodiversity loss, and the rate of interference with the nitrogen cycle)” (p23). This approach provides a more comprehensive way of tracking the multifaceted effects humans are having on the environment and consequently eroding the services we require to operate safely. It does face some challenges when translating the planetary boundaries to global environmental governance as outlined by Galaz et al. 2012. Among the challenges is the limited understand of how the processes and boundaries interact with each other.</p><p></p><p>Sorman, A.H. and M. Giampietro (2013) ‘The energetic metabolism of societies and the degrowth paradigm: analyzing biophysical constraints and realities’. Journal of Cleaner Production 38: 80-93.</p><p>Sorman and Giampietro analyze the implications, the feasibility and the desirability of possible trajectories of economic downscaling from an energetic perspective. The authors use the approach of societal metabolism to account for the profile of energy flows required and consumed by societies. The authors specifically analyze the implications of the declining supply of net energy sources on the metabolic pattern of a sample of developed countries. Figure 7 (p87) clearly illustrates the metabolism of energy within society and the external metaphysical constraints present. Using historical data from 1992-2005 the authors also show that “in spite of a reduction of energy intensity… the pace of energy consumption per hour of activity in the PS [Primary and Secondary] sectors has been increasing. In modern countries, technological progress is increasing labor productivity but is not reducing energy consumption per hour of work (see Fig. 10)!” (p88). This evidence relates to Jevons’ Paradox and undermines claims that technological progress and the resulting increases in efficiency can reduce throughputs.</p><p></p><p>Tainter, J.A., T.F.H. Allen, A. Little and T.W. Hoekstra (2003) ‘Resource Transitions and Energy Gain: Contexts of Organization’, Conservation Ecology 7(3): 4. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol7/iss3/art4/</p><p>Tainter, Allen, Little, and Hoekstra take an energy gain approach to consider what settlement and organization changes will be needed within postcarbon societies. “Since the development of industrialism and economies based on fossil fuels, the world’s wealthier nations have been in a high-gain [energy] phase… we know that someday the energy opportunity cost of fossil fuels will reach the point that our dependence on such fuels will diminish” (p10). In transitioning to lower-gain energy sources, the authors argue that more dispersed and more organized efforts will be required to maintain a sufficient flow of energy. The authors go on to point out that dispersed use of low quality resources can cause greater environmental degradation, therefore supporting the stance that reducing energy consumption is a critical piece of transitioning to postcarbon societies that cause less environmental degradation.</p><p></p><p>Turner, G. (2014) Is Global Collapse Imminent?, MSSI Research Paper No. 4, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, The University of Melbourne. http://sustainable.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/MSSI-ResearchPaper-4_Turner_2014.pdf</p><p>Turner provides another review of the Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972), this time specifically comparing that report’s modeled “standard run” or business-as-usual to forty years of economic and population data. Limits to Growth called for considerable change in social behavior and technological progress early in the advance of environmental or resource issues. Turner finds that these were not achieved, and that data collected since the publication of the Limits to Growth most closely aligns with the projected “standard run” of the Limits to Growth World3 model. This “standard run” resulted in “collapse of the economy and human population (i.e. a relatively rapid fall)... in the 21st century, reducing living conditions to levels akin to the early 20th century according to average global conditions” (p4). Turner concludes that this paper “aims to forewarn of potential global collapse--perhaps more imminent than generally recognized--in the hope that this may spur on change, or at least to prepare readers for a worst case outcome” (p5).</p><p></p><p>Turner, K., S. Morse-Jones and B. Fisher (2007) ‘Perspectives on the “Environmental Limits” concept’. Research report completed for the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. London: Defa.</p><p>This report aims to link the general concept of “environmental limits” to a system that can be practically used to support decision making regarding the sustainability of consumption and production in contemporary society. The report further uses the opportunity to consider the differences between “weak” and “strong” sustainable development. Mainly, “Weak and strong proponents disagree about the degree to which it is possible to substitute between the elements of the total stock of capital,” which is comprised of physical or man-made capital, human capital, social capital, natural capital p.ii). The report suggests that the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes and that the environmental limits question should be: “at what level can humans utilise ecosystems and the abiotic environment without a deleterious effect on human welfare?” (p.ii). Within this framing, environmental limits can arise in the form of “biophysical scarcity, social preferences, geopolitical vulnerability, economic forces and ecosystem functioning, and threshold effects” (p.i). Finally, the report puts forth a simple checklist framework that can be used for assessing environmental limits:</p><p>(1) examine the life cycle assessment (LCA) of the product to identify which components or processes should be considered in light of source and sink limits;</p><p>(2) consider each component or process in terms of the source and sink limits described above, if there is the possibility of hitting a limit then a red flag should be raised, if there is only indicative evidence then an amber light should be indicated and if there is no risk of reaching a limit then a green light should be indicated;</p><p>(3) review the outcomes with respect to “priority effects‟ such as, for example, human health, biodiversity and climate change;</p><p>(4) create a summary table of the flagged limits, their magnitude, and significance; and,</p><p>(5) using the LCA and the summary table identify the point in the production or consumption path where a policy intervention should be considered (p.i).</p><p></p><p>Victor, P. A. and G. Rosenbluth (2007) ‘Managing without growth’. Ecological Economics 61(2-3): 492-504. Doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.03.022.</p><p>Victor and Rosenbluth use the dynamic simulation model LOWGROW to explore various growth scenarios for Canada. This analysis is driven by arguments that developed countries should consider managing without economic growth due to the environmental and resources constraints, the apparent decoupling of growth from increased well-being, and the insufficiency of economic growth for meeting policy objectives including full employment, reduced poverty, and protection of the environment. Ultimately, the authors describe a scenario with conditions under which “the rate of unemployment in Canada could be reduced to historically low levels, poverty eliminated and greenhouse gas emissions reduced to comply with Canada’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, without relying on economic growth” (p493).</p><p></p><p>Economic Growth & Wellbeing</p><p>Diener, E. and M. Seligman (2004) ‘Beyond money --towards an economy of wellbeing’. Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5(1): 1-31.</p><p>In this article, Diener and Seligman criticize the sole use of economic indicators as a measure of human well-being. The authors show that economic indicators have numerous shortcomings, and when used as an approximation for well-being to influence policy decisions can be misleading about what society values. Instead, the authors call for well-being to be central to policy decisions and propose creating a national well-being index that can be used to facilitate this role. The national well-being index would “systematically assess key well-being variable for representative samples of the population.” Variables included in the index would include: “positive and negative emotions, engagement, purpose and meaning, optimism and trust, and the broad construct of life satisfaction.” (p1). The article provides an in-depth analysis of a long list of factors potential related to well-being and considers evidence of causality.</p><p></p><p>Dolan, P., T. Peasgood and M. White (2006) Review of research on the influence of personal well-being and application to policy making. Report to Defra. London: Defra.</p><p>In this report, Dolan, Peasgood and White “review the evidence relating to the causative factors associated with various concepts and components of well-being.” (p7). This includes an “extensive review of the existing literature on the relationship between a range of economic, social and environmental factors associated with well-being as defined according to the different measures.” (p7). The report concludes that currently used measures, like income, that claim to measure “preference satisfaction” provide an incomplete picture of individual well-being. This incomplete picture, and the report in general, is complicated by the interactions between factors related to well-being and a limited existing evidence base. The authors are able to suggest that “researchers should at least be aware of the impact of income, relative incomes, health, personal and community relationships and employment status in their analysis.” (p10). Additionally, the report categorizes potential influences on well-being under seven broad headings: income, personal characteristics, socially developed characteristics, how we spend our time, attitudes and beliefs, relationships, and wider economic, social political and natural environment (p8).</p><p></p><p>Dolan, P., T. Peasgood and M. White (2008) ‘Do we really know what makes us happy? A review of the economic literature on the factors associated with subjective well-being’. Journal of Economic Psychology 29: 94-122.</p><p>Similarly to their 2006 report, Dola, Peasgood and White again review of the literature considering subjective well-being and its determinants. In this article the authors find that “the evidence suggests that poor health, separation, unemployment and lack of social contact are all strongly negatively associated with SWB [subjective well-being].” (p94). The authors again caution against drawing firm conclusions or overstating the conclusivity. The article systematically considers numerous factors that fit into the seven broad headings previously established by the authors.</p><p></p><p>Easterlin, R. (1995) ‘Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?’ Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 27: 35-47.</p><p>Based on data on reported happiness, material norms, and income from a number of countries, Easterlin concludes that “raising the income of all does not increase the happiness of all.” (p35). Easterlin explains this by noting that “material norms on which judgements of well-being are based increase in the same proportion as the actual income of the society” (p35) --which is to say that judgements of well-being are based on how you measure up to material norms, and material norms tend to increase with the incomes of a society. This conclusion supports that increasing income equity would do more to improve subjective well-being and happiness of the economically less fortunate than increasing the incomes of everyone would. It is important to note, that reviews of the literature since this article have cautioned against over-stating conclusions about the causality of subjective well-being.</p><p></p><p>Max-Neef, M. (1995) ‘Economic growth and the quality of life: A threshold hypothesis’. Ecological Economics 15: 115-118.</p><p>Max-Neef dismisses the generalizability put forth by Arrow et al. (1995) that “‘as income goes up there is an increasing environmental degradation up to a point, after which environmental quality improve’” and instead suggests that policies be facilitated by a different inverted u-shaped curve: the threshold hypothesis. The threshold hypothesis states: </p><p>“...for every society there seems to be a period in which economic growth (as conventionally measured) brings about an improvement in the quality of life, but only up to a point--the threshold point--beyond which, if there is more economic growth, quality of life may begin to deteriorate.” (p117).</p><p>Such a hypothesis suggests that beyond this threshold point, further economic growth does not necessarily increase quality of life, and may actually cause reductions. It would follow, that pursuing economic growth above all else does not align with maximizing quality of life. Max-Neef supports this hypothesis by analyzing the relationship between the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and Gross National Product (GNP) for the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. (p116). Though this analyses supported the threshold hypothesis some literature since Max-Neef’s article has cautioned against making bold conclusions concerning the role of income and economic growth in well-being.</p><p></p><p>Muraca, B. (2012) ‘Towards a fair degrowth-society: Justice and the right to a “good life” beyond growth’. Futures 44(6): 535-545.</p><p>Murace provides “a critical scrutiny...of the ethical assumptions of growth and degrowth theories with respect to distributive justice and the normative conditions for a ‘good human life’”. (p535). In this analysis, Muraca presents four, and considers two (#2 and #3), basic questions we are confronted with in the growth-degrowth debate:</p><p>“1. Is growth as we know it possible at all under the biophysical conditions of our common planet--in other words, can we still grow?</p><p>2. Is growth as we know it morally justifiable or is it even morally necessary? Which issues in terms of intragenerational and intergenerational justice are we confronted with on the path towards a post-growth-society? In other words, may we still grow?</p><p>3. Does growth as a path of development make sense at all? Is it ethically acceptable? Is it something we might reasonably and meaningfully opt for? In other words, do we still want to grow?</p><p>4. Who is ‘we’? Whose voices and whose perspectives are heard and have the chance of making a difference?”</p><p>Muraca further considers the welfarism, resourcism, and capabilities approach to justice; defining and discussing each in depth. Muraca ultimately finds the capabilities approach, that “the currency of distributive justice are ‘capabilities of function’ and the focus lies on people’s substantial freedom to achieve the life that they have reason to value”, most appropriate. Further, the author finds: “From the point of view of the capabilities approach, economic growth above a certain threshold does not seem to be a necessary condition for quality of life and for justice”. Muraca calls for a shift away from employment being central to well-being, and the need to address the issue of alternative forms of social recognition and public participation for all citizen.</p><p></p><p>Platt, J. (1973) ‘Social traps’. American Psychologist 28: 642-651.</p><p>The article by Platt provides an in-depth description and discussion of social traps: “situations in society that contain traps...where men or organizations or whole societies get themselves started in some direction or some set of relationships that later prove to be unpleasant or lethal and that they see no easy way to back out of or to avoid”. (p641) Platt identifies three major classes of social traps, including “group traps of the Commons type, where the common pursuit of individual goods leads to collective bads, because of scarcities, overcrowding, and the like”. (p643). Other authors have used this concept to contextualize what we need to overcome to remove growing economies and incomes from how we assign self-value.</p><p></p><p>Sen, Amartya (1984) ‘The Living Standard’. Oxford Economic Papers 36: 74-90. </p><p>In this paper Sen investigates the concept of the “living standard”. Sen presents three general approaches to the standard of living of a person: “The first is to see the living standard as some notion of the utility of a person. The second is some notion of opulence. The third is to see the standard of living as one type of freedom” (p76). It is the third approach which Sen argues for in this paper. “In this approach what is valued is the capability to live well, and in the specific economic context of standard of living, it values the capabilities associated with economic matters” (p78). This approach differs from the typical use of income-based indicators and the indexing of commodities to determine standard of living, and could shift focus away from continually growing economic production.</p><p></p><p>Sacks, D.W., B. Stevenson and J. Wolfers, (2010) ‘Subjective well-being, income, economic development and growth. CEPR Discussion Paper 8048. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-1251813753820/6415739-1251815804823/Justin_Wolfers_paper.pdf.</p><p>This paper from Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers counters the “threshold hypothesis” put forth by Max-Neef. Using the log of income, the authors find that reported life satisfaction increases with increased log of income within countries studied, across countries studied, and over time. The authors conclude that their findings “suggest that absolute income plays a large role in determining subjective well-being” (p1). These findings highlight the continued level of uncertainty present in research on causation of subjective well-being. It is also worth noting, that the authors analyzed the relationship with the log of income.</p><p></p><p>SDC (2003) ‘Redefining prosperity. Resource productivity, economic growth and sustainable development’. London: Sustainable Development Commission. http://tinyurl.com/ckuurl.</p><p>This report from the UK Sustainable Development Commission calls for a fundamental rethinking of “the dominance of economic growth as the driving force in the modern political economy, and a far more rigorous distinguishing between the kind of economic growth that is compatible with the transition to a genuinely sustainable society and the kind that absolutely isn’t” (p3). This call is made in the context of presenting the realities of the limits that exist in a finite system, the externalities that result from continued economic growth, and the apparent disconnect between economic growth and increased well-being. The report reminds government officials “that for governments, the end goal of their use of their democratic mandate is to improve people’s wellbeings” (p8). It is therefore paramount that a better understanding of what drives wellbeing and prosperity be pursued and that defaulting to GDP not be accepted.</p><p></p><p>Equity</p><p>Daily, G.C. and P.R. Ehrlich (1996) ‘Socioeconomic Equity, Sustainability, and Earth’s Carrying Capacity’. Ecological Applications 6(4): 991-1001. Doi: 10.2307/2269582.</p><p>Daily and Ehrlich “examine the relationship between socioeconomic equity in opportunity and sustainability, as reflected in patterns of food production and fertility.’ (p991). The authors find that across levels of social organization, increasing equality of opportunity has the dual benefits of increasing food production and lowering fertility rates. Furthermore, the authors note that these benefits are in addition to the ethical merit of reducing the disparity between rich and poor. However, “equity in consumer lifestyles within and between nations cannot be achieved globally be leveling up to consumption from the bottom. Run-away consumption in rich countries must be curbed as part of an effort to reduce the scale of human enterprise to below carrying capacity while still permitting needed development among the poor.” (p991). Throughout this article, the authors describe de-development as “controlling runaway consumption in order to reduce the physical throughput of their economies,” and assert that equity can be increased in this context.</p><p></p><p>Daly, H. E. (1990) ‘Toward some operational principles of sustainable development’. Ecological Economics 2: 1-6. </p><p>Daly once again puts forth a distinction between growth and development: “growth is quantitative increase in physical state, while development is qualitative improvement or unfolding of potentialities.” Daly goes on to clarify that, “An economy can growth without developing, or develop without growing.” (p1). Based on these definitions, “The term sustainable growth should be rejected as a bad oxymoron. The term sustainable development is much more apt.” (p1). Therefore, according to Daly, limits exist for growth, but not necessarily for development. Based on other literature concerning human wellbeing, it could be argued that increasing development as opposed to growth would be better aligned with the goal in increasing wellbeing.</p><p></p><p>Dasgupta, P.S. and P.R. Ehrlich (2013) ‘Pervasive externalities at the population, consumption, and environment nexus’. Science 340(6130): 324-328. DOI: 10.1126/science.1224664</p><p>http://science.sciencemag.org/content/340/6130/324.full.pdf+html </p><p></p><p>Dasgupta and Ehrlich present a theoretical consideration of the socio-ecological processes operating at the nexus of population-consumption-environment. The authors’ analysis focuses on the presence of externalities “of decisions made by each of us on reproduction, consumption, and the use of our natural environment.” (p324). In addition to the presence of externalities at this nexus, the authors demonstrate that, “the externalities studied in this paper are not self-correcting,” (p327) and, “that fundamental nonlinearities, built into several categories of externalities, amplify the socio-ecological processes operating at the nexus.” (p234). The authors therefore call for, “urgent collective action at both local and global levels.” (p234). It is important to note that this action is needed because the market structure alone cannot correct the presence of externalities at the population-consumption-environment nexus.</p><p></p><p>Theories in Response to Limits (T)</p><p>Accepting that there are real limits to the scale of the economy, and that in some cases these limits have already been surpassed with the benefits and burdens being distributed inequitably, alternative economic theories are needed. Below are some resources presenting different theories.</p><p></p><p>Ayres, R. (2008) ‘Sustainability economics: where do we stand’. Ecological Economics 67: 281-310.</p><p>In this overview of environmental economics, resource economics and sustainable economics, Ayres provides thorough explanation of the limits facing continual economic growth with special attention to to the linked problems of energy supply and climate change. Ayres explains how the assumed elasticity of substitution (how easily and completely can they be used in place of one another) between resources and capital influences perceptions of limits. “In principle, it has been widely accepted by economists that scarcity is not an immediate problem and that capital may be substituted for most physical resources, at least up to some point that might be quite far in the future” (p284). Echoing Georgescu-Roegen, Ayres describes the popular conceptualization of economic activity as a closed loop between production, consumption and investment as “an immaterial perpetual motion machine, in violation of both of the laws of thermodynamics” (p292). Ayres argues that the real economy more closely resembles a large-scale materials processing system in which virtually none of the materials consumed by the economy are recycled at present, especially in regards to energy. With this in mind, and the limits imposed by a finite amount of resources, Aryes calls for a shift from our current throw-away product orientation towards a lifetime service orientation. “One of the advantages of an economy based on service is that it is inherently more labor-intensive than the mass-production manufacturing and ‘throw-away’ economy. Treating products as capital goods will create more jobs because repair, renovation, disassembly and remanufacturing are inherently more labor-intensive that original equipment manufacturing” (p292).</p><p></p><p>Ayres, R. and J. van den Bergh (2005) ‘A theory of economic growth with material/energy resources and dematerialisation: Interaction of three growth mechanisms’. Ecological Economics 55, 96-118.</p><p>Ayres and van den Bergh clarify the nature of energy and material resources in a non-optimizing growth theory framework. The authors modify the conventional theory by: (1) identifying multiple feedback mechanisms so that the cost of production through demand on growth is considered; (2) developing a production function that distinguishes between resource use, technical efficiency, and value creation. The authors developed the model recognizing, “that existing growth theory with environment and resources does not give rise to theoretical and empirical information that is useful in a debate on structural economic change aimed at reducing the use of energy and materials” (p97). The authors’ model reflects the reality that, “in the future, as growth continues, both renewable and non-renewable natural resources may become scarce and even limiting, whereas unskilled human labor and produced capital will be increasingly plentiful” (p97).</p><p></p><p>Boulding. K. E. (1966) ‘The economics of the coming Spaceship Earth’. In H. Jarrett (ed.), Environmental quality in a growing economy, pp. 3-14. Baltimore, MD: Resources for the Future/John Hopkins University Press.</p><p>Boulding suggests that systems need to be reconsidered from an open “frontier” system, to a closed “spaceship” system. The “spaceship” represents a system “without unlimited reservoirs of anything, either for extraction or for pollution, and in which, therefore many must find his place in a cyclical ecological system which is capable of continuous reproduction of material form even though it cannot escape having inputs of energy.” (p8). Boulding explains that within a closed system, fossil fuels represent a capital stock of stored-up sunshine (one of the two available energy inputs, the other being from the earth’s own internal heat and motion). “Because of this capital stock of energy, we have been able to maintain an energy input into the system, particularly over the last two centuries, much larger than we would have been able to do with existing techniques if had had to rely on the current input of available energy from the sun or the earth itself. This supplementary input, however, is by its very nature exhaustible.” (p4). The “spaceship” economy therefore would not aim to maximize throughput through consumption and production, rather with stock maintenance.</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R., R. d’Arge, R. de Groot, S. Farber, M. Grasso, B. Hannon, K. Limburg, S. Naeem, R.V. O’Neill, J.Paruelo, R.G. Raskin, P. Sutton, and M. van den Belt (1997) ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital’. Nature 387(6630): 253-260. Doi: 10.1038/387253a0.</p><p>Costanza et al. estimate the current economic value of 17 ecosystem services for 16 biomes, finding that for the entire biosphere the value is estimated to be in the range of US$16-54 trillion per year --compared to the global gross national product total around US$18 trillion per year. This approach has received some push back, and the authors rightfully note: “The economics of the Earth would grind to a halt without the services of ecological life-support systems, so in one sense their total value to the economy is infinite.” (p253). Instead, the calculations are for the “incremental” or “marginal” value of ecosystem services, that is “the estimated rate of change of value compared with changes in the ecosystem services from their current levels.” (p253). Ultimately, the authors conclude that the exercise of assigning monetary values to the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital makes it clear “that ecosystems provide an important portion of the total contribution of welfare on this planet,” and that, “We must begin to give the natural stock that produces these services adequate weight in the decision making process, otherwise current and continued future human welfare may drastically suffer.” (p259).</p><p></p><p>Cropper, M. L. and W. E. Oates (1992) ‘Environmental economics: A survey’. Journal of Economic Literature 30: 675-740.</p><p>Cropper and Oates review the field of environmental economics. The authors identify “two major issues in environmental economics: the regulation of polluting activities and the valuation of environmental amenities.” (p678). It is important to note here that environmental economics is not ecological economics, which is defined below. Environmental economics very much operates within the current economic and political system. Cropper and Oates focus on how environmental economics may be able to influence policy through broadening the consideration of costs in setting environmental regulations. The authors note, “Environmental economics have… made some important strides in the valuation of ‘nonmarket’ environmental services and have shown themselves able to introduce discussion of these measures in more effective ways in the policy arena.” (p677).</p><p></p><p>Daly, H. E. (1990) ‘Toward some operational principles of sustainable development’. Ecological Economics 2: 1-6. </p><p>Daly once again puts forth a distinction between growth and development: “growth is quantitative increase in physical state, while development is qualitative improvement or unfolding of potentialities.” Daly goes on to clarify that, “An economy can growth without developing, or develop without growing.” (p1). Based on these definitions, “The term sustainable growth should be rejected as a bad oxymoron. The term sustainable development is much more apt.” (p1). Therefore, according to Daly, limits exist for growth, but not necessarily for development. The article goes on to examine the complementarity of natural and manmade capital. Daly proposes that, “We are now entering an era of ‘full-world economics’ in which natural capital will be increasingly limitative,” while manmade capital becomes increasingly available. Daly specifically notes that the scale of the economy must remain within the carrying capacity of the region, and does not hesitate to note that the scale is a product of human population size and per capita resource use. Consequently, Daly claims that, “Quantitative growth in populations of both people and commodities must ultimately end.” (p5).</p><p></p><p>Holling, C.S. (2001) ‘Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and social systems’. Ecosystems 4: 390-405.</p><p>In this article Holling analyzes the hierarchies and adaptive cycles that comprise the basis of ecosystems and social-ecological systems, with the intention of using the analysis to clarify the meaning of “sustainable development.” Holling puts forth the argument that “sustainable development” is not an oxymoron but rather a term that describes a logical partnership given that “sustainability is the capacity to create, test, and maintain adaptive capability” and “development is the process of creating, testing, and maintaining opportunity” (p390). Together, sustainable development “refers to the goal of fostering adaptive capabilities and fostering opportunities” (p390). In assessing sustainability Holling relies on the panarchy theory, which “focuses on the critical features that affects or trigger reorganization and transformation in a system” (p402). The panarchy theory provides a guide for “how a healthy socioecological system can invent and experiment, benefiting from inventions that create opportunity while it is kept safe from those that destabilize the system due to their nature or excessive exuberance” (p402). Based on this theory and analysis of complex systems, Holling puts forth five elements of a prescription for facilitating constructive change under conditions of crisis:</p><p>Identify and reduce destructive constraints and inhibitions on change, such as perverse subsidies.</p><p>Protect and preserve the accumulated experience on which change will be based.</p><p>Stimulate innovation and communicate the results in a variety of fail-safe experiments designed to probe possible directions in a way that is low in costs in terms of human careers and organizational budgets.</p><p>Encourage new foundations for renewal that build and sustain the capacity of people, economies, and nature to deal with change.</p><p>Encourage programs to expand an understanding of change and communicate it to citizens, businesses, and people at different levels of administration and governance, engaging them in the process of change. (p404).</p><p>This article is noteworthy for its definition of sustainable development and also for the analyses of complex systems that resulted in the list of elements above. </p><p></p><p>Kerschner, C. (2010) ‘Economic de-growth vs. steady-state economy’. Journal of Cleaner Production 18: 544-551.</p><p>In this review of the concepts of economic de-growth and a steady-state economy. Kerschner concludes that the concepts are in fact complements. Kerschner does note that economic de-growth and steady-state economics differ in their handling of the population issue. Kerschner advocates for de-growth to be considered as, “the rich North’s path towards a globally equitable SSE [steady-state economy].” By considering these concepts as complements, de-growth can benefit from the strong economic historic roots of the SSE and Daly’s macroeconomic concepts, while SSE can gain lessons about the bottom-up approaches inherent to the de-growth movement. Overall, this article provides excellent background on both concepts and argues that de-growth provides a promising, bottom-up path towards approximating the goal of globally equitable SSE.</p><p></p><p>Lawn, P. A. (2003) ‘A Theoretical Foundation to Support the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), and Other Related Indexes’. Ecological Economics 44(1): 105-118.</p><p>Lawn responds to concerns regarding the validity of the indexes being used by ecological economics to measure and compare the benefits and costs of growth--chief among them the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare. Ecological economists often use these indexes to analyze, and overwhelming reinforce, the ‘threshold hypothesis’. “The ISEW and GPI are designed to more closely approximate the sustainable economic welfare or progress of a nation’s citizens. The sustainable economic welfare implied here is the welfare a nation enjoys at a particular point in time given the impact of past and present activities” (p106). Some critics were uncertain about accepting indexes formulated by ecological economists as valid reinforcement of the hypothesis also championed by the same group. “One of the concerns commonly expressed is the supposed lack of theoretical foundation to support the ISEW, the GPI, and other related indexes” (p105). In this paper Lawn demonstrates that the indexes are indeed theoretically sound. Lawn explains, “The ISEW and GPI serve as very good indicators of both income and sustainable economic welfare precisely because they are consistent with Fisher’s concept of income and capital” (p112). Lawn demonstrates this by considering each item used to construct the ISEW and its theoretical backing. Though Lawn finds the indexes theoretically sound, Lawn does call for “a more robust and consistent set of valuation methods” (p106). This article provides strong theoretical and practical background for alternative indexes.</p><p></p><p>Marglin, Stephen A. (1963) ‘The social rate of discount and the optimal rate of investment’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 77: 95-112.</p><p>Discount rates are often used to back decisions to prioritize current well-being, development, and income generation over that which may occur in the future. In this article, Marglin provides an extensive analysis of optimal discount rates and considers how personal and public discount rates differ. To the question “is the concept of a social rate of discount distinct from the individual rates of discount applied to unilateral saving decisions a myth or a must?” (p95) Marglin identifies three possible answers: “(1) An argument for authoritarian rejection of individual time-preference maps; (2) the argument that individuals do not have unique ‘time preference’ maps but instead are ‘schizophrenic,’ each of us having one map for private and another for public decisions; and (3) the argument that, even accepting individual time-preference maps and assuming them to be unique, interdependence between one individual’s consumption and another’s utility renders the calculus of collective savings vs. consumption decisions fundamentally different from the private calculus” (p96). This article provides in-depth information on discount rate analysis, along with consideration of how and why personal and public preferences are not always aligned.</p><p></p><p>Martinez-Alier, J. (2016) ‘Global environmental justice and the environmentalism of the poor’. The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory.</p><p>Martinez-Alier argues that increasing human population and increasing metabolism of industrial economies are driving fundamental clashes between economy and the environment. These clashes comes in the form of resource extraction conflicts and waste disposal conflicts, which are often unjustly distributed “not only as regards other species and future generations of humans but also among humans living today” (p14). “Such ecological distribution conflicts sometimes overlap with other social conflicts on class, ethnicity or indigenous identity, gender, caste, or territorial rights” (p2). Due to these common overlaps, Martinez-Alier suggests, “Environmental justice is a powerful lens through which to make sense of many struggles over the negative impacts that the increasing metabolism imposes on human livelihoods and nature conservation worldwide” (p2). Martinez-Alier provides a thorough definition of environmental justice, presentation of powerful concepts that have emerged from conflicts, and examination of the history of the global environmental justices movement. The ecological distribution conflicts at the heart of environmental injustices are fueled by “rich” people using the resources of lands and waters of “poor” people therefore “outsourcing” the waste and costs of further economic growth.</p><p></p><p>Muraca, B. (2012) ‘Towards a fair degrowth-society: Justice and the right to a “good life”’. Futures 44(6): 535-545.</p><p>Murace provides “a critical scrutiny...of the ethical assumptions of growth and degrowth theories with respect to distributive justice and the normative conditions for a ‘good human life’”. (p535). In this analysis, Muraca presents four, and considers two (#2 and #3), basic questions we are confronted with in the growth-degrowth debate:</p><p>“1. Is growth as we know it possible at all under the biophysical conditions of our common planet--in other words, can we still grow?</p><p>2. Is growth as we know it morally justifiable or is it even morally necessary? Which issues in terms of intragenerational and intergenerational justice are we confronted with on the path towards a post-growth-society? In other words, may we still grow?</p><p>3. Does growth as a path of development make sense at all? Is it ethically acceptable? Is it something we might reasonably and meaningfully opt for? In other words, do we still want to grow?</p><p>4. Who is ‘we’? Whose voices and whose perspectives are heard and have the chance of making a difference?”</p><p>Muraca further considers the welfarism, resourcism, and capabilities approach to justice; defining and discussing each in depth. Muraca ultimately finds the capabilities approach, that “the currency of distributive justice are ‘capabilities of function’ and the focus lies on people’s substantial freedom to achieve the life that they have reason to value”, most appropriate. Further, the author finds: “From the point of view of the capabilities approach, economic growth above a certain threshold does not seem to be a necessary condition for quality of life and for justice”. Muraca calls for a shift away from employment being central to well-being, and the need to address the issue of alternative forms of social recognition and public participation for all citizen</p><p></p><p>Schneider, F., G. Kallis and J. Martinez-Alier (2010) ‘Crisis or opportunity? Economic degrowth for social equity and ecological sustainability. Introduction to this special issue’. Journal of Cleaner Production 18(6): 511–518.</p><p>This article provides an introduction for a special issue of the Journal of Cleaner Production comprised of articles originally presented at the April 2008 conference in Paris on Economic Degrowth for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity. At this conference, “For the first time, scientists gathered in an interdisciplinary and international academic setting with representatives of the civil society on the topic of economic degrowth as a possible path for more ecology, more equality or more well-being” (p512). Schneider, Kallis, and Martinez-Alier review the literature on sustainable degrowth, asking “how positive would degrowth be if instead of being imposed by an economic crisis, it would actually be a democratic collective decision, a project with the ambition of getting closer to ecological sustainability and socio-environmental justice worldwide” (p511). The authors define sustainable degrowth as “an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions of the local and global level, in the short and long terms” (p512) and differentiate it from recession, which is “degrowth within a growth-based economy” (p516). In addition to defining sustainable degrowth, the authors go on to tackle some of the misconceptions surrounding degrowth including that decreasing GDP is the primary goal. “Sustainable degrowth will involved a decrease in GDP as currently measured, because of a reduction in large-scale, resource-intensive productive and consumptive activities that constitute a big portion of GDP. However, what happens to GDP is of secondary importance; the goal is the pursuit of well-being, ecological sustainability and social equity” (p512). The efforts to define, tackle misconceptions, and introduce the latest contributions to the field, make this article an excellent introduction to the sustainable degrowth movement. </p><p></p><p>Of relevance, is Christian Kerschner’s efforts to specifically raise the question of population degrowth and express concern that the question is often tactically avoided by degrowth scholars, which the authors commend. The authors go on to explain: “In our view is would be positive (for humans and other species) if the human population would reach soon the peak at about 8000 million persons and then decline a bit. Such population degrowth to a steady state would be the outcome of bottom-up action and empowerment of women to control their reproductive rights. Authoritarian, state-imposed population control policies, such as the tradable birth quotas suggested by Boulding and Daly (and recalled by Kerschner) are undesirable from a degrowth perspective. Population and economic degrowth are not an imperative to be imposed at all costs, but a collective choice, coevolving with a deepening democratization” (p514).</p><p></p><p>Van den Bergh, J. (2011) ‘Environment versus growth --A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”’. Ecological Economics 70(5): 881-890.</p><p>Van den Bergh provides a critical examination of the strategy of degrowth by considering five common interpretations of “degrowth” as a concept: GDP degrowth, consumption degrowth, work-time degrowth, radical degrowth, and physical degrowth. Van den Bergh also, briefly, discusses market degrowth, selective or differential degrowth, degrowth in rich countries, and population degrowth. Fundamentally, Van den Bergh argues that these multiple interpretations alone present a challenge for effectively using the strategy of degrowth as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth. The author also argues that “degrowth may not be an effective, let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure” (p881). Van den Bergh supports this argument by systematically considering the environmental effectiveness, social and political feasibility, economic efficiency, ability to limit rebound of strategies based on each interpretation (Table I, p887). The author also includes in this analysis the strategy of GDP a-growth, or being indifferent about growth in GDP, and concludes that this strategy “is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth” (p881). A-growth would involve “convincing society about public policies and strategies on the basis of expected impacts on real welfare and happiness rather than on income” (p886). Rather than aiming to degrow in one way or another, Van den Bergh presents six complementary policies and institutional changes that would promote prioritizing social and environmental consequences of policy decisions and the “removal of the GDP indicator from policy and political debate and decision-making” (p889). These policies can be summarized as: “encourage people to work shorter hours; regulate commercial advertisement—notably of status goods; tax status goods with serious environmental repercussions; undertake communication and information provision to motivate changes in preferences, attitudes and voluntary action; stimulate economists, politicians and the public media to ignore GDP; and install technology-specific policies (like research subsidies)” (p889). Van den Bergh concludes, “Following an a-growth strategy, we would in some periods be willing --without realizing even-- to give up part of potential GDP growth for a better environment, less unemployment and more leisure, namely if this would work out well in terms of individual well-being and social welfare” (p890).</p><p></p><p>Van den Bergh, J and G. Kallis (2012) ‘Growth, a-growth or degrowth to stay within planetary boundaries?’. Journal of Economic Issues 46(4): 909-920.</p><p>Following up on their respective articles, Van den Bergh and Kallis come together to present a comparison of the a-growth and degrowth approaches in the context of the growth paradigm. This article summarizes well the two approaches and then provides a comprehensive side-by-side comparison of where the growth paradigm, a-growth view, and degrowth view fall on a range of statements and assumptions (Table I, p914). Following the comparison, the authors provide potential areas for further research and how institutional economics can be involved in moving these views forward. For a-growth, the authors suggest research on “Why economics, economists, and politicians alike remain loyal to GDP?” and also “how GDP growth is exactly perceived in different schools of macroeconomics” (p917). In comparison, from a degrowth perspective, more attention is needed “on the evolution of alternative economic practices that can flourish outside of the growth economy” (p917).</p><p>Ecological Economics (EE)</p><p>Ecological economics holds three interdependent goals: sustainable scale, fair distribution, and efficient allocation (Costanza et al. 1997). In defining these three goals, ecological economics brings explicit attention and priority to the consideration of scale --the physical volume of throughput. This necessarily expands the definition of growth, from just increased GDP to recognition that this also means increased throughputs of limited resources and waste. Broadly, “Ecological economics represents an attempt to recast economics in this different scientific paradigm, to reintegrate the many academic threads that are needed to weave the whole cloth of sustainability” (Costanza et al. 1997). </p><p></p><p>Brown, P.G. & Timmerman, P. ed. (2015) Ecological Economics for the Anthropocene: An emerging paradigm. New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press. </p><p>Editors Brown and Timmerman bring together a comprehensive look at the origins of ecological economic, how the field has developed and diverged from its original aims, and finally how an increased consideration of ethics, justice, and liberty are required for the field to adequately respond to the challenges of the anthropocene. Brown and Timmerman describe the explicit objectives of ecological economics as “being concerned with three issues: scale, distribution, and efficiency’ (p4). Whereas ecological economics was critical in pushing for the inclusion of scale in these objectives, and for scale to be defined by the realities of thermodynamics and ecology, throughout the book authors call for greater incorporation of ethics. Erickson writes in the Foreword, “Natural science must help ecological economists define the boundary conditions of sustainable scale. Ethical debate and public process must negotiate just distribution. Sustainability and justice then frame the design of well-regulated markets to achieve genuine economic efficiency” (p xi). This book pushes ecological economists beyond the comfortable territory they have settled into applying mainstream economics to the existing agenda of ecologists and environmentalist: seen in efforts to get the price “right”, assign market-value to ecosystem services, and incorporate externalities. Erickson notes that bolder conversations occur among ecological economists, but that they have largely “grown content to talk to one another but are unwilling to step outside [their] comfort zone to articulate and lobby for change in policy circles” (p xii).</p><p></p><p>In contrast to claims that as a value-neutral approach economics should remain separate from ethics, Brown and Timmerman argue that ethics reside at the very heart of economics. “Two important elements of the current economistic approach are often overlooked: (1) it not only provides an explanation of how markets, transactions, and so on function, but it also contains (in spite of its value-neutral rhetoric) a powerful ethical formulation of what it is to be a human being in search of well-being; and (2) at its heart is an abstract, ideal model --a set of quasi-scientific claims about the operations of a social system” (p1). In Chapter 1, Timmerman provides examples of alternative economic theories to demonstrate that standard economic theory “is based on a specific range of assumptions drawn from a specific period in modern history --a historical artifact of a particular period of thought and time rather than a universal truth” (p22). Timmerman goes on to explain how standard economic theory goes about taking “elements of how people might act and then does what it can to prove that that is how they do in fact act --or if they do not act in that way, they are somehow wrong or misguided” (p23). Taken together, the Introduction and first chapter prove precedent for inclusion of ethics in economic theory. </p><p></p><p>Brown goes on in Chapter Two to present an ethics for economics in the Anthropocene. Brown’s discussion touches on what both justice and liberty mean in a world with natural resource constraints. “One prerequisite for shifting from the existing economy to an ecological economy would be to provide an accounting of the injustices we do in exercising free choice” (p106). This discussion is carried into Chapters Four and Five, in which Goldberg and Garver consider the possible measurements, indicators, and boundaries that should be standard to ecological economics. Goldberg and Garver agree that the scale of these boundaries needs to be derived from natural science, but that ethics-based decisions are also necessary in terms of distribution and pursuing efficiency.</p><p></p><p>Jennings expands upon this discussion in Chapter Ten in considering an ecological political economy and liberty. Jennings defines the ecological political economy as the activity system, whereas an ecological political philosophy is the conceptual and normative order needed to achieve it. In contemplating liberty, Jennings argues:</p><p>“...our task is to reclaim and reconstruct the concept of liberty so that, in our moral imagination and our public philosophy, ecologically destructive behavior would not be seen as a manifestation of freedom at all; rather, it would come to be repudiated as a manifestation of ignorance, irresponsibility, and alienation that negates freedom” (p295).</p><p>In Chapter Eleven, Harvey expands on Jennings call and explicitly looks at how such fundamental changes to culture can be accomplished. Harvey presents the process as fundamentally discoursive and goes on to outline two conditions under which challenger discourses achieve cultural acceptance: genuine accommodation to some extent of competing ideologies and expectations (limited to secondary principles), and resonation to some degree with the subconscious “common sense” of popular culture. “...there is a gap to be filled between analysis of the problem --the ecological crisis-- and the solution, an ecological political economy. This gap is a systematic consideration of the process by which the solution may be realized --and most importantly, the levers and interventions available to change agents and how they be used to best effect” (p350).</p><p></p><p>The book concludes with an overview of future research opportunities and a fresh vision for the human prospect. Areas for future research are far reaching and include: rethinking ethics, rethinking agency, rethinking rationality, rethinking the human, changing our relationship to the community of beings, reconsidering justices and distribution, recasting education, rethinking price, embracing a plurality of values, measuring economic production as a biophysical process, modeling and growth, fitting the economy to the earth, developing the field of ecological finance, trading in the language of “free” trade, rethinking transactions, and rebuilding governance and law. Clearly, the authors believe that ecological economics in the context of the Anthropocene cannot continue to be a side-shoot of the traditional market-based economic system, but instead must fully embrace systematic changes to our economic, social, and ethical ways of being.</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R., Cumberland, J., Daly, H., Goodland, R., & Norgaard, R. (1997) An Introduction to Ecological Economics. Boca Raton, FL, USA: St. Lucie Press.</p><p>The authors present an introduction to ecological economics, including the economic and ecological histories it builds upon, how it differs from neoclassical economics, and what it means for our way forward. Broadly, “Ecological economics represents an attempt to recast economics in this different scientific paradigm, to reintegrate the many academic threads that are needed to weave the whole cloth of sustainability” (p18). The authors state, “Economics arose in midst of moral questions with respect to the obligations of individuals to larger societal goals while chances for personal material improvement emerged...Key ethical issue has always been whether the pursuit of individual greed can be in the interest of society as a whole” (p19). Classic economics answered these questions with the theory that market forces operate as an “invisible hand” that guides free markets to a beneficial state of equilibrium. Individuals pursuing self-interests within the market, therefore, benefit the common good. This theory relies on multiple assumptions, some which deviate from reality. Despite these differences, the theory of the market as an “invisible hand” continues to dictate economic policies. Ecological economics is a commitment to working across the disciplines of ecology and economics to improve both economic and environmental policies. At its heart, ecological economics holds three interdependent goals: sustainable scale, fair distribution, and efficient allocation (p79).</p><p></p><p>It is ecological economics’ inclusion of scale that most distinguishes it from neoclassical economics. Scale refers to the “physical volume of throughput”, that is “the flow of matter-energy from the environment as low-entropy raw material and back to the environment as high-entropy wastes” (p80). The author argue that when attention is paid to the scale of the current economy is is clear that “limits have been reached and exceeded” (p12). Unlike neoclassical economics, ecological economics does not make the assumption of substitutability between human-made and natural capital, which is often used to argue against the presence of environmental limits to economic growth. Grounded heavily in the science of thermodynamics, ecological economics instead assumes the types of capital are complements but not perfect substitutes and makes the point that due to the “increasing scale of human presence” we have switched from facing a limiting factor of human-made capital to one of natural capital. As we move forward, natural capital and the unique role it plays in the economy, must be sustained.</p><p></p><p>The total impact, or economic throughput, determines whether natural capital can be sustained and serve as assets for future generations. Similarly to the I=PAT formula of Holdren and Ehrlich, the authors note “In a full world both human numbers and per capita resources use must be constrained” (p88). The authors go on to dismiss the potential for decoupling and further technological fixes to meaningfully reduce this impact. Stating, “...the welfare of the poor, and indeed of the rich as well, depends much more on population control, consumption control, and redistribution than on the technical fix of a 5- to 10-fold increase in total factor productivity” (p103).</p><p></p><p>In the above statement, and in other instances throughout the book, the authors explicitly mention the need to realize a stable human population size that is consistent with an economy of sustainable scale. In this, the authors are clear that “...the policy of focusing solely on population control is known to be insufficient” (p110). Instead, they propose that demographic research and policies expand to consider other issues and move beyond solely focusing of population control:</p><p>“...a new framework should expand the definitions of issues: focus not only on population size, density, rate of increase, age distribution, and sex ratios by also on access to resources, livelihoods, social dimensions of gender, and structures of power. New models have to be explored in which population control is not simply a question of family planning but of economic, ecological, social and political planning; in which the wasteful use of resources is not simply a question of finding new substitutes but of reshaping affluent lifestyles; and in which sustainability is seen not only as a global aggregate process but also as one having to do with sustainable livelihoods for a majority of local people” (p111).</p><p></p><p>This new framework fits with the general point that the scale of population and consumption together determine our total impact. Whereas the total impact is ultimately constrained by what earth has capacity for, it is up to society to decide how to divide it between numbers of people and per capita resources. Decisions about this division relate to the second and third goals of ecological economics: fair distribution and efficient allocation. In regards to fair distribution, the authors assert that it would be “Reasonable for ‘the poor’ to demand access to remaining natural resource base --at least to reach minimally acceptable material living standards” (p14). Referencing concepts including the threshold hypothesis for the relationship between wellbeing and income and Max-Neef’s nine categories of human needs, the authors also stress the difference between qualitative development and quantitative throughput growth. “A developing economy is one that is getting better, not necessarily bigger, so that the well-being of the (stable) population improves” (p16).</p><p></p><p>Ultimately, the authors present some concrete directions for ecological economic policies to pursue: 1) broad natural capital depletion tax (Costanza & Daly 1992); (2) application of precautionary polluter pays principle; and (3) system of ecological tariffs (p221). Additionally, the case is made for “Getting the price right” by finding ways to include environmental externalities. The author conclude with the following sentiment:</p><p>“...over centuries of believing the progress will take care of our progeny, modern peoples lost their sense of responsibility for their offspring and the institutions needed to assure appropriate transfers of assets. Let’s consider the institutional aspects that complemented and maintained responsibility” (p160).</p><p></p><p>Overall, the book provides a very sound introduction to economics, ecology, and ecological economics. This is helpful both for understanding the strengths of ecological economics, and some of the critiques the movement have received. Particularly, criticism that the ecological economic movement thus far has fallen short of its goals because it continues to look for solutions within the neo classical economic system, is also applicable to this book.</p><p></p><p>Martínez-Alier, J. (2002) The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. </p><p>In this paper prepared for the conference on The Policy Economy of Sustainable Development: Environmental Conflict, Participation and Movements Martínez-Alier considers the ecological distribution conflicts that arise. Martínez-Alier makes the argument that “They are not only conflicts of interests but also conflicts on values” (p5). This is supported by descriptions of several conflicts, with particular attention paid to the the discrepancies in languages of valuation used by different players in the conflict. The conflicts considered include: biopiracy in agriculture, urban conflicts, conflicts on the extraction of oil, conflict between mangrove conservation and shrimp exports in different countries, and conflict on tree plantations in Costa Rica. Contrary to common assumptions that “the poor” are concerned solely with economic security as it is defined by the market-system, these examples show how “languages of human rights, indigenous territorial rights, and sacredness, are brought into play” (p5). Throughout, Martínez-Alier points out how the interests and values of “the poor” are often counter to, and neglected from, environmental policy decisions. The notion of “ecological debt” from North to South is explained and the effect of increasing debt on ecological distribution conflicts is explored. Environmentalism of the poor is summarized as “an environmentalism of livelihood concerned not only with economic security in the market sphere but also concerned with non-market access to environmental resources and services” (p6). Based on this, Martínez-Alier submits policy proposals based on the growing worldwide movement from environmental justice. This paper is critical for considering how language is, and should be, used when bringing together environmentalism and environmental justice. It also provides guidance for how the interests of “the poor” need to be incorporated into movements for a sustainable economy.</p><p></p><p>Odum, H.T. (1974) Energy, Ecology, & Economics http://www.mnforsustain.org/energy_ecology_economics_odum_ht_1973.htm</p><p>Odum thoughtfully lays out the case for considering a single system of energy, ecology and economic and argues for transitioning to a steady state while the energy exists “to make a change, to hold order, and to cushion a period when populations must drop” --it should be noted this article was written in 1974. While ecologists are familiar with, and have encountered in their work, both growth states and steady states, Odum points out, “economists were all trained in their subject during rapid growth and most don’t even know there is such a thing as steady state. Most economic advisors have never seen a steady state even though most of man’s million year history was close to steady state.” The growth that economists expect, largely because the discipline knows nothing else, is temporary in that it has been made possible by “use of special energy supplies that accumulated over long periods of geologic time,” which are also temporary. With more energy being required to extract, refine, and utilise the same amount of energy output, Odum states we are effectively “decreasing our percentage of net energy production” and must shift “from rapid growth as the criterion of economic survival to steady-state non-growth as the criterion for maximizing one’s work for economic survival.” This shift, according to Odum, will necessarily occur no matter what course is taken, the question is if we can preempt a forced transition and conserve the resources necessary to make the transition.</p><p></p><p>SDC (2003) ‘Redefining prosperity. Resource productivity, economic growth and sustainable development’. London: Sustainable Development Commission. http://tinyurl.com/ckuurl.</p><p>This report from the UK Sustainable Development Commission calls for a fundamental rethinking of “the dominance of economic growth as the driving force in the modern political economy, and a far more rigorous distinguishing between the kind of economic growth that is compatible with the transition to a genuinely sustainable society and the kind that absolutely isn’t”. (p3). This call is made in the context of presenting the realities of the limits that exist in a finite system, the externalities that result from continued economic growth, and the apparent disconnect between economic growth and increased well-being. The report states, “At the heart of today’s worsening ecological crisis lies a systemic misperception about the relationship between the earth and the global economy that has expanded so dramatically over the last fifty years. For more economists and politicians, the global economy has become the centre of reality, the overarching system within which all else is subsumed. Human societies, communities, eco-systems, and habitats are all see as subsystems of the overarching system.” The report goes on to point out that such a world view, though not surprising, “ignores both the basic laws of thermodynamics and the natural laws on which all life support systems depend.” (p3) The report instead positions the global economy as “a sub-system of human society, which is in itself a sub-system of the totality of life on earth.” (p3). This re-positioning of the economy within the natural order aligns with the concept of ecological economics.</p><p></p><p>The Worldwatch Institute (2013) State of the World 2013: Is Sustainability Still Possible? https://crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/news/files/2013-04/sow2013-11-costanza.pdf</p><p>The authors being this report with the reminder that “...the goal of any economy should be to sustainably improve human well-being and quality of life and that material consumption and GDP are merely means to that end” (p126). This reminder runs throughout the report, with a call “to understand better what really does contribute to sustainable human well-being and recognize that substantial contributions of natural and social capital, which are now the limiting factors to improving well-being in many countries” (p126). The report goes on to break down the basic characteristics of the current economic model, a proposed green economy model, and a proposed ecological economics model in a comprehensive table that pays particular attention to considering how each contributes to sustainable human well-being (p127). The proposed ecological economic model is based on the principles that:</p><p>Our material economy is embedded in society, which is embedded in our ecological life-support system, and we cannot understand or manage our economy without understanding the whole interconnected system.</p><p>Growth and development are not always linked, and true development must be defined in terms of the improvement of sustainable human well-being, not merely improvement in material consumption.</p><p>A balance of four basic types of assets is necessary for sustainable human well-being: built, human, social, and natural capital (financial capital is merely a marker for real capital and must be managed as such.)</p><p>Growth in material consumption is ultimately unsustainable because of fundamental planetary boundaries, and such growth is or eventually becomes counterproductive (uneconomic) in that it has negative effects on well-being and on social and natural capital. (p128)</p><p>The authors claim, that if society “adopts the central economic goal of sustainable human well-being” macroeconomic policies will have to radically change to stay aligned. With this goal, the authors argue that we can achieve “a global economy that is not growing in material terms but that is sustainable and provides a high quality of life for most, if not all, people” (p140). The authors cite evidence from history, groups and communities who are creating local economies that fit the model, and integrated modeling studies --all support the feasibility of such an economic system.</p><p>Low-Growth/No-Growth (LG/NG)</p><p>These resources present projections and models that include options for reduced GDP growth (low-growth) and complete elimination of GDP growth (no-growth). These are grounded in ecological economic theory and the need to find ways to move away from reliance on continually high GDP growth.</p><p></p><p>Victor, P.A. (2012) ‘Growth, degrowth, and climate change: A scenario analysis’, Ecological Economics 84: 206-212. http://degrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Victor_Growth-Degrowth-and-Climate-Change.pdf</p><p>Victor uses the simulation model of the Canadian economy, LowGrow, to consider several macroeconomic scenarios: ‘business as usual’ that uses past trends to project into the future, ‘selective growth’ that applies differential growth rates to parts fo the economy according to their direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions, and ‘degrowth’ in which the average GDP/capita of Canadians is reduced towards a level consistent with a world economy that respects global environmental limits. The paper concludes by comparing these scenarios. Victor concludes: “the differences between the low/no growth scenario and the business as usual scenario are far less dramatic than those between the two scenarios and the degrowth scenario. This finding highlights the significance of the level at which any high consumption economy stabilizes, something that should be made more explicit by those who advocate a steady-state economy and degrowth” (p7).</p><p></p><p>Jackson, T. and P.A. Victor (2011) ‘Productivity and Work in the “Green Economy”: Some Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Tests’. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1(1): 101-108. Doi: 10.1016/j.eist.2011.04.005.</p><p>Jackson and Victor define and explore the concept of “the ‘productivity trap’ that arises from the systematic pursuit of labour productivity” (p101). The authors go on to describe two solutions to the trap: reduce working hours, engage in structural shifts towards low productivity growth sectors” (p101). The authors argue that understanding the macro-economics of productivity is critical for understanding the transition to a sustainable economy. According to their exploration, technology, work-time reduction and structural economic change will all have a role in achieving environmental targets, including carbon targets (p108).</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter A. and Gideon Rosenbluth (2007) ‘Managing without growth’. Ecological Economics 61(2-3): 492-504. Doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.03.022.</p><p>Victor and Rosenbluth use the dynamic simulation model LOWGROW to explore various growth scenarios for Canada. This analysis is driven by arguments that developed countries should consider managing without economic growth due to the environmental and resources constraints, the apparent decoupling of growth from increased well-being, and the insufficiency of economic growth for meeting policy objectives including full employment, reduced poverty, and protection of the environment. Ultimately, the authors describe a scenario with conditions under which “the rate of unemployment in Canada could be reduced to historically low levels, poverty eliminated and greenhouse gas emissions reduced to comply with Canada’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, without relying on economic growth”. Through analysis of multiple scenarios, the authors found that simply setting the model parameters to no-growth resulted in economic collapse. Instead, the authors found that explicit policy changes, such as a slightly reduced work week, increased income distribution, and increased worker support programs, were critical to achieving a stable, no-growth outcome. Accordingly, the authors recommend that no-growth not be a state to be pursued, but rather that dependence and defence of growth no longer take priority over pursuing welfare enhancing objectives.</p><p>Steady-State Economy(SS)</p><p>A steady-state economy is “an economy with constant population and constant stock of capital, maintained by a low rate of throughput that is within the regenerative and assimilative capacities of the ecosystem” (Daly 2008). Herman Daly champions the steady-state economy theory, building upon the theories put forth by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen heavily influenced by the laws of physics and particularly thermodynamics. Advocates for a steady-state economy have been criticized for placing too much focus on ‘getting the price right’ and staying within the confines of the current economic system, which differs from the degrowth movement described below.</p><p></p><p>Boumans, R., R. Costanza, J. Farley, M.A. Wilson, R. Portela, J. Rotmans, F. Villa, and M. Grasso (2002) ‘Modeling the Dynamics of the Integrated Earth System and the Value of Global Ecosystem Services Using the Gumbo Model’. Ecological Economics 41(3): 529-560. Doi: 10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00098-8.</p><p>The authors developed a global unified metamodel of the biosphere (GUMBO) to simulate the integrated earth system and assess the dynamics and values of ecosystem services. GUMBO is explicitly built within the confines of a finite planet in which infinite material growth is impossible. The model therefore supports either purposeful attainment of no-growth and some sort of steady state or forced no-growth as the average rate of growth asymptotically approaches zero. GUMBO is used to project different scenarios based on two variations concerning assumptions about key parameters in the model, arrayed against two variations of policy settings concerning the rates of investment across natural, social, human, and built capital. From this scenario analysis, the ‘technologically skeptical’ investment plan provides the best chance, given uncertainty about key parameters, of achieving high and sustainable welfare per capita. This investment plan involves increased relative rates of investment in knowledge, social capital, and natural capital, and reduced relative rates of consumption and investment in built capital.</p><p></p><p>Daly, H.E. (2008) Can We Redefine Prosperity? http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6051</p><p>Daly outlines the steady-state economy borrowing the definition from Mills of the SSE “as an economy with constant population and constant stock of capital, maintained by a low rate of throughput that is within the regenerative and assimilative capacities of the ecosystem.” In this model of an economy Daly points out that production must become viewed as a cost of maintenance, contrary to its current position of esteem. Further, in a SSE, maintenance and repair become more important, which is beneficial for maintaining employment as they typically require higher labor inputs, are less likely to be automated, and often need to be local. Nevertheless, Daly does recognize that in a SSE, alternative forms of income generation may need to be considered. Though natural resources present a very real limit to economic production, Daly points out that knowledge is truly limitless and non-exclusive. However, current policies make knowledge artificially scarce, despite existing knowledged being “the most important input to the production of new knowledge.” Daly argues that “keeping it artificially scarce and expensive is perverse,” and is counter to the transition to a ‘full-world economy’ in which humans are not a limited resource. In a compelling conclusion, Daly calls for use to:</p><p>“...recognize that private property loses its legitimacy if too unequally distributed, and that markets lose their legitimacy if prices do not tell the whole truth about costs. In addition, the macro-economy becomes an absurdity if its scale is structurally required to grow beyond the biophysical limits of the Earth. And well before that radical physical limit we are encountering the conservative economic limit in which extra costs of growth become greater than the extra benefits.”</p><p>With this in mind, Daly provides a ten-point policy summary: (1) cap-auction-trade system for basic resources, (2) ecological tax reform, (3) limit the range of inequality in income distribution, (4) free up the length of the working day, week and year, (5) re-regulate international commerce, (6) downgrade the IMF-WB-WTO, (7) move to 100% reserve requirements, (8) enclose the remaining commons of rival natural capital in public trusts, (9) stabilize population, and (10) reform national accounts.</p><p></p><p>Daly, H.E. (2009) From a Failed Growth Economy to a Steady-State Economy http://www.theoildrum.com/node/5464#more</p><p>Echoing many of the sentiments and arguments laid out in his previous articles, Daly again makes the case for moving to a Steady-State Economy. In this article Daly adds an brief explanation for why a SSE receives such considerable push-back:</p><p>“Without growth the only way to cure poverty is by sharing. But redistribution is anathema. Without growth to push the hoped for demographic transition, the only way to cure overpopulation is by population control. A second anathema. Without growth the only way to increase funds to invest in environmental repair is by reducing current consumption. Anathema number three.”</p><p>Unfortunately, the unwillingness to shift towards a SSE does not affect the necessity to do so. As Daly explains, “A long run norm of continuous growth could make sense, only if one of the three following conditions were true:</p><p>(a) if the economy were not an open subsystem of a finite and non-growing biophysical system,</p><p>(b) if the economy were growing in a non physical dimension, or</p><p>(c) if the laws of thermodynamics did not hold.”</p><p>Daly concludes by again proposing the ten-point policy summary shared above: (1) cap-auction-trade system for basic resources, (2) ecological tax reform, (3) limit the range of inequality in income distribution, (4) free up the length of the working day, week and year, (5) re-regulate international commerce, (6) downgrade the IMF-WB-WTO, (7) move to 100% reserve requirements, (8) enclose the remaining commons of rival natural capital in public trusts, (9) stabilize population, and (10) reform national accounts.</p><p></p><p>Kerschner, C. (2010) ‘Economic de-growth vs. steady-state economy’. Journal of Cleaner Production 18: 544-551.</p><p>In this review of the concepts of economic de-growth and a steady-state economy. Kerschner concludes that the concepts are in fact complements. Kerschner does note that economic de-growth and steady-state economics differ in their handling of the population issue. The article provides extensive overview of Herman Daly’s SSE concept and institutions, sharing Daly’s normative concept of an ontological steady-state as: </p><p>“‘an economy with constant stocks of people and artefacts, maintained at some desired, sufficient level by low rates of maintenance “throughput”, that is, by the lowest feasible flow of matter and energy from the first stage of production (depletion of low entropy materials from the environment) to the last state of consumption (pollution of the environment with high entropy wastes and exotic materials).’” (p546).</p><p>Kerschner presents the criticisms of Daly’s SSE, including those based in thermodynamics that a steady-state is an entropic impossibility. In response, Daly advocated a quasi SSE --neither static nor eternal, rather a dynamic equilibrium within its containing, sustaining and entropic biosphere. Kerschner argues that for this goal of quasi SSE to be reached in a global and equitable manner, de-growth is a necessary pathway to consider. Kerschner also points to de-growth’s bottom-up approach as an asset.</p><p></p><p>O’Neill, D.W. (2012) ‘Measuring progress in the degrowth transition to a steady state economy’. Ecological Economics 84: 221-231.</p><p>O’Neill points out that in order to determine whether degrowth is occurring, or an economy’s proximity to the concept of a state steady economy, clearer indicators are needed. The paper provides an analysis of four different indicator approaches: (1) Gross Domestic Product, (2) the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, (3) biophysical and social indicators, and (4) a composite indicator. From this analysis O’Neill concludes that “separate biophysical and social indicators represent the best approach, but a unifying conceptual framework is required to choose appropriate indicators and interpret the relationship between them” (p1). The biophysical indicators used are derived from Daly’s definition of a steady state economy and focus on measuring the major stocks and flows in the economy-environment system. The social indicators are based on the stated goals of the degrowth movement and focus on measuring the functioning of the socio-economic system and how effectively it promotes well-being. O’Neill goes on to show how these indicators can be used to categorize national economies in states of: desirable growth, undesirable growth, desirable degrowth, undesirable degrowth, or steady. This paper provides descriptions of both degrowth and steady state economics that can be operationalized, it further provides concrete indicators and how they can be used in tracking the “progress” of national economies towards a steady state. </p><p>Degrowth (DG)</p><p>Degrowth is a socially sustainable reduction of society’s throughput (or metabolism) (Kallis, Ecological Economics, 2011). This theory emerges from the diverse social movement and deals much more with social and political components than the previously presented theories. The degrowth movement emerged from the approach of Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen. Some argue that degrowth is a pathway to a steady-state economy with degrowth being needed among over-developed countries. Unlike Daly’s steady-state economy, degrowth does not include explicit positions about population growth. Degrowth can generally be defined as a collective and deliberative process aimed at the equitable downscaling of the overall capacity to produce and consume and of the role of markets and commercial exchanges as a central organising principle of human lives (Schneider et al. 2010).</p><p></p><p></p><p>Baykan, B.G. (2007) ‘From limits to growth to degrowth within French green politics’. Environmental Politics 16(3): 513-517 *PhD candidate in 2007*</p><p>Baykan considers the degrowth political movement and emergence of the Degrowth Party in France. “The degrowth movement stands for degrowth within wealthy societies that are driven by growth economics within the aim of overcoming these [environmental, social, political, and humanity] crises” (p514). Baykan explains that La de´ croissance (degrowth) entered the scientific and political lexicon in 1979 with Jaques Grinevald’s translation of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s major works. Georgescu-Roegen “introduced degrowth as an inevitable consequence of the limits imposed by the laws of nature” (p514).</p><p> </p><p>Demaria, F., F. Schneider and F. Sekulova (2013) ‘What is Degrowth? From an activist slogan to a social movement’. Environmental Values 22: 191-215.</p><p>Demaria, Schneider and Sekulova discuss the definition, origin, evolution, practices and construction of degrowth. The article provides an introduction to the degrowth movement and expands the discussion beyond an economic concept. Launched at the beginning of the 21st century, the degrowth movement is “an attempt to re-politicise debates about desired socio-environmental futures” (p1919). Initially, the degrowth movement emerged as a “project of voluntary societal shrinking of production and consumption aimed at social and ecological sustainability’ (p192). Though it quickly became a common slogan for those opposing economic growth, the movement centers around a “proposal for radical change” that requires more than economic reform. The authors also demonstrate how the degrowth movement’s diverse strategies and actors provide an example of an activist-led science that academics are now attempting to consolidate into a single concept.</p><p></p><p>Douthwaite, R. (2012) ‘Degrowth and the supply of money in an energy-scarce world’. Ecological Economics 84: 187-193.</p><p>Douthwaite outlines how energy will become scarcer as fossil fuel resources are used, how this will affect the price of energy and consequently financing systems. Douthwaite explains, “As energy gets scarcer, its cost in terms of length of time we have to work to buy a kilowatt-hour, or its equivalent, is going to increase...energy is cheaper today that it is ever likely to be again in terms of what we have to give up to get it.” (p7). This leads the author to concluding that richer countries do not have a choice between growing and de-growing their economies. Degrowth is going to be forced by declining fossil energy supply. The choice they do have, as Douthwaite see it, is how they handle and are prepared to handle, the contraction. The article presents three tools that Douthwaite sees as essential if degrowth is not to result in catastrophic collapse: “(i) a system to share the benefits from using increasingly-scarce fossil fuels, (ii) new ways of financing businesses and (iii) the introduction of debt-free regional and local currencies.” (p1).</p><p></p><p>Fournier, V. (2008) ‘Escaping from the economy: the politics of degrowth’. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 28(11/12): 528-545. http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/01443330810915233 </p><p>Fournier considers how the degrowth movement relates to green politics, and argues, “the movement’s main emphasis is not merely on calling for less growth, consumption or production, but more fundamentally, in inviting one to shift and re-politicise the terms in which economic relations and identities are considered.” (p528). The movement is grounded in democracy and citizenship, with a central theme of “putting the economy back in its place” (p532). That “place” is behind social and humanistic values. Therefore:</p><p>“...for proponents of degrowth, in order to challenge neo-liberal economics of growth it is not enough to propose alternative economic models because the proposal of alternative economics does not in itself question the importance accorded to the economy; instead we need to start with value and politics, we need to oppose economic determinism of ‘economism’ by going back to the terrain of the political. Thus one of the starting point[s] of the degrowth movement is to politicise the economy, to reveal it as an abstract idea, a self-referential system of representations rather than an objective reality, a set of ‘given’ facts and forces as it is commonly presented” (p533). </p><p>This article provides a thorough background on the social and political roots of the degrowth movement and gives indications of how it differs from steady state theory in matter of origin, methods, and priority aims.</p><p></p><p>Garcia, E. (2012) ‘Degrowth, the past, the future, and the human nature’. Futures 44(6): 546-552.</p><p>Garcia brings together historical and anthropological evidence, philosophy, and sociology to consider how surpassed limits, degrowth, and potential collapse will affect human nature and the social world. Among other interesting aspects to this article, Garcia brings up the issue of deciding “the point or level at which degrowth should stop. What should be the end point of a degrowth process?” (p547). Two basic visions have emerged, “degrowth as a path towards extinction and degrowth as a transition to a society constructed at the human scale” (p547). Both run up against the assumption of human freedom. “People who state that degrowth could open the doors to a desirable social re-organization usually also state that it is just one of many possible paths. And after all it is probable that a series of erroneous decisions could also result in permanent economic regression and increasing social conflict” (9548). This article, overall, provides an interesting perspective on how human nature might respond to degrowth.</p><p></p><p>Garver, G. (2013) ‘The Rule of Ecological Law: The Legal Complement to Degrowth Economics’. Sustainability 5(1): 316-337. Doi: 10.3390/su5010316.</p><p>Garver presents the rule of ecological law and the legal and political structure to complement economic degrowth. The rule of ecological law is built upon the scientific and ethical foundation of planetary boundaries to the safe operating space for humanity. This foundation should be reinforced by several features:</p><p>It should recognize humans are part of Earth’s life systems.</p><p>Ecological limits must have priority over social and economic regimes.</p><p>The rule of ecological law must permeate all areas of law.</p><p>It should focus on radically reducing material and energy throughput.</p><p>It must be global, but distributed, use the principle of subsidiarity.</p><p>It must ensure fair sharing of resources among present and future generations of humans and other life.</p><p>It must be binding and supranational, with supremacy over sub-global legal regimes as necessary.</p><p>It requires a greatly expanded program of research and monitoring.</p><p>It requires precaution about crossing global ecological boundaries.</p><p>It must be adaptive.</p><p>The call for ecological law is made in response to how “the envelope of contemporary environmental law is deficient as a means to enclose and regulate the human enterprise within systems-based ecological constraints” (p317). This article provides another example of how the aims and narrative of the degrowth movement transcend the economic system.</p><p></p><p>Kallis, G. (2011) ‘In defence of degrowth’. Ecological Economics 70: 873-880. </p><p>Kallis uses the article to defend the proposal of sustainable degrowth, as an inevitable hypothesis and “potent political vision that can socially transformative” (p873). This article is largely in response to van den Bergh 2011 article: Environment versus growth --A criticism of “degrowth” and a plan for “a-growth”. Kallis begins by arguing the premise that “resource and CO2 limits render further growth of the economy unsustainable” (p873). With limits established Kallis goes on to ask how, in a world where degrowth is inevitable due to the limits the economy faces, can degrowth “become socially sustainable, i.e. a prosperous and stable, rather than a catastrophic, descent” (p873)? In order for degrowth to be socially sustainable, Kallis argues that operating within existing market economies is insufficient. What is required is “An intertwined cultural and political change… that will embrace degrowth as a positive social development and reform those institutions that make growth an imperative” (p873). Critically, Kallis distinguishes sustainable degrowth from “negative GDP growth in a growth economy,” which is “recession, or if prolonged, depression” whereas sustainable degrowth “is a vision of a smooth process of downshifting the economy through institutional changes, managing collectively a ‘prosperous way down’ (Odum & Odum 2011)” (p875). This requires serious consideration of redistribution and the politics and ethics involved. </p><p></p><p>Kallis counters van den Bergh’s argument for “a-growth”, or indifference to the question of growth, with the claim that “the capitalist, market economies in which the majority of us live today” cannot conceivably degrow voluntarily and stabilise into a steady-state, which is what is required by the limits we face (p875). Therefore, it is more than a change in metrics or policy priorities that is needed. Kallis goes on to make the more general point: “Economists’ and politicians’ fixation with GDP is a manifestation, not a cause of society’s ‘growth fetishism’” (p877). The social embeddedness of growth is precisely why the degrowth movement includes cultural and institutional critiques of growth that reach beyond economics. </p><p></p><p>In addition to providing a clear rebuttal to van den Bergh’s critique of sustainable degrowth, Kallis also goes on to distinguish between sustainable degrowth and what has been the typical means of promoting a steady-state economy. In line with Brown and Timmerman (eds. 2015), Kallis argues that pursuit of a steady-state economy has largely been limited to consideration of scale, whereas sustainable degrowth explicitly concerns itself with the political and ethical considerations of distributing “selective growth”. Additionally, Kallis argues that sustainable degrowth is not achievable within the institutions of market economies and that steady-state economists often push policies that operate within these institutions, like cap-and-trade programs. Ultimately, this is a good article for becoming acquainted with the nuances of sustainable degrowth and how it attempts to reach into the political, cultural, and ethical dimensions of growth.</p><p></p><p>Kallis, G., C. Kerschner and J. Martínez-Alier (2012) ‘The economics of degrowth’. Ecological Economics 84: 172-180.</p><p>Kallis, Kerschner and Martinez-Alier ask, “Economic degrowth is ecologically desirable, and possible inevitable; but under what conditions can it become socially sustainable?” (p1). The authors review recent contributions in the economics of degrowth to begin to answer this question, and conclude with future research directions for ecological economics. In their review, the authors grouped contributions into “those strengthening the case for the desirability and feasibility of a degrowth transition; those assessing policy instruments for the transition; and those discussing its socio-political dynamics” (p1). </p><p></p><p>Kerschner, C. (2010) ‘Economic de-growth vs. steady-state economy’. Journal of Cleaner Production 18: 544-551.</p><p>In this review of the concepts of economic de-growth and a steady-state economy. Kerschner concludes that the concepts are in fact complements. Kerschner does note that economic de-growth and steady-state economics differ in their handling of the population issue. Kerschner also sees economic de-growth strong bottom-up roots as an asset from which SSE advocates could benefit from. Kerschner does call for de-growth authors to more consistently engage with the challenge of human population. This article challenges the rejection of Herman Daly’s SSE by de-growth leaders, instead positioning de-growth as a promising path towards the goal of a global, equitable, quasi steady-state economy.</p><p></p><p>Latouche, S. (2007) ‘De-growth: An electoral state?’ The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy 3(1). January 2007 http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol3/vol3_no1_Latouche_degrowth.htm</p><p>Latouche makes the case that the project of de-growth is not strictly an economic project, but rather a political project that works towards “the construction, in the North as well as in the South, of convivial, autonomous and economical societies.” In this way, Latouche argues that de-growth is, and must remain, staunchly democratic, warning that a focus on “ecology” or “environmentalism” can be easily integrated into a neo-fascist ideology. Latouche calls for a cultural revolution based on the “laboratories of critical analysis and self-government for the defence of the common good” that are emerging through the de-growth project. Ultimately, Latouche envisions “a world network of average-size cities” that must “voluntarily limit their demographic growth to 60,000 inhabitants.” Beyond this limit, Latouche argues, the tenets of “local” and “slowness” that are central to de-growth become meaningless.</p><p></p><p>Martínez-Alier, J. (2012) ‘Environmental Justice and Economic Degrowth: An alliance between two movements’. Capitalism Nature Socialism 23(1): 51-73.</p><p>Martínez-Alier analyzes the potential alliance between the movements of environmental justice and economic degrowth OECD Countries. According to the author these movements are linked as the increased metabolism needed for a growing economy drives conflicts at the points of resource extraction and waste disposal. The environmental justice movement has risen from these points of conflict, in which outside demands for resources and/or waste disposal place unjust burdens on frontline communities. “The increase in the flows of energy and materials (the social metabolism of advanced economies) has been achieved at heavy social and environmental costs, not only for future generations but for those living now” (p65). Martínez-Alier also argues that relying on GDP to measure growth and track progress under-estimates the benefits poor, rural communities afford from their local environments that are not captured in GDP. </p><p>“For poor rural people involved in resource extraction conflicts, the threat to their livelihood in the form of water pollution and land grabbing is obvious. They draw environmental resources and service directly from nature, outside the market. When displaces, they cannot afford to buy a house and land. They cannot even pay for water in plastic bottles when their rivers and aquifers are polluted by mining. This fact has given rise to the notion of the ‘GDP of the poor.’ These lost amounts of welfare are not subtracted from the economic accounts. This is one of the reasons why we should mistrust national macroeconomic account and go ‘Beyond GDP’” (p63).</p><p>Ultimately, Martínez-Alier finds that an alliance between the movements environmental justice and economic degrowth can be built around “a common perspective against ‘debt-fueled’ economic growth and the hegemony of economic accounting in favor of a pluralism of values (as recommended by ecological economics; Martínez-Alier, et al. 1998 1999), the acceptance and support of bottom-up feminist new-Malthusianism, the defense of human rights and indigenous territorial rights along with the rights of nature, the recognition of the ecological debt, and the critique of ecologically unequal exchange” (p66). This is a useful article for understanding how economic growth, in its current form, can negatively affect people of non-OECD countries, and how the movement of environmental justice can be allied with.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Muraca, B. (2012) ‘Towards a fair degrowth-society: Justice and the right to a “good life” beyond growth’. Futures 44(6): 535-545.</p><p>Muraca provides “a critical scrutiny...of the ethical assumptions of growth and degrowth theories with respect to distributive justice and the normative conditions for a ‘good human life’”. (p535). In this analysis, Muraca presents four, and considers two (#2 and #3), basic questions we are confronted with in the growth-degrowth debate:</p><p>“1. Is growth as we know it possible at all under the biophysical conditions of our common planet--in other words, can we still grow?</p><p>2. Is growth as we know it morally justifiable or is it even morally necessary? Which issues in terms of intragenerational and intergenerational justice are we confronted with on the path towards a post-growth-society? In other words, may we still grow?</p><p>3. Does growth as a path of development make sense at all? Is it ethically acceptable? Is it something we might reasonably and meaningfully opt for? In other words, do we still want to grow?</p><p>4. Who is ‘we’? Whose voices and whose perspectives are heard and have the chance of making a difference?”</p><p>Muraca further considers the welfarism, resourcism, and capabilities approach to justice; defining and discussing each in depth. Muraca ultimately finds the capabilities approach, that “the currency of distributive justice are ‘capabilities of function’ and the focus lies on people’s substantial freedom to achieve the life that they have reason to value”, most appropriate. Further, the author finds: “From the point of view of the capabilities approach, economic growth above a certain threshold does not seem to be a necessary condition for quality of life and for justice”. Muraca calls for a shift away from employment being central to well-being, and the need to address the issue of alternative forms of social recognition and public participation for all citizen</p><p></p><p>O’Neill, D.W. (2012) ‘Measuring progress in the degrowth transition to a steady state economy’. Ecological Economics 84: 221-231.</p><p>O’Neill points out that in order to determine whether degrowth is occurring, or an economy’s proximity to the concept of a state steady economy, clearer indicators are needed. The paper provides an analysis of four different indicator approaches: (1) Gross Domestic Product, (2) the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, (3) biophysical and social indicators, and (4) a composite indicator. From this analysis O’Neill concludes that “separate biophysical and social indicators represent the best approach, but a unifying conceptual framework is required to choose appropriate indicators and interpret the relationship between them” (p1). The biophysical indicators used are derived from Daly’s definition of a steady state economy and focus on measuring the major stocks and flows in the economy-environment system. The social indicators are based on the stated goals of the degrowth movement and focus on measuring the functioning of the socio-economic system and how effectively it promotes well-being. O’Neill goes on to show how these indicators can be used to categorize national economies in states of: desirable growth, undesirable growth, desirable degrowth, undesirable degrowth, or steady. This paper provides descriptions of both degrowth and steady state economics that can be operationalized, it further provides concrete indicators and how they can be used in tracking the “progress” of national economies towards a steady state. </p><p></p><p>Ott, K. (2012) ‘Variants of de-growth and deliberative democracy: A Habermasian proposal’. Futures 44(6): 571-581.</p><p>Ott asks which combinations of economic degrowth orientation and democratic policy making might be “feasible, attractive or even mandatory” (p571). In doing so Ott distinguishes four types of degrowth: </p><p>DG-1, in which “GDP is regarded as being (1) a mere measure of economic activity and (2) as one indicator of social welfare among many” (p572). Growth rates of GDP may fluctuate between low positive and negative rates. “By implication, DG-1 rejects growth rates of GDP as evidence for good policy making” (p573).</p><p>DG-2, in which “de-growth is seen as being a mandatory strategy in order to reach specific environmental goals that might be dubbed as ‘strong sustainability,’ strong reduction of material throughput in the economic system, and standards of environmental justice which can be determined by a threshold within a capability approach and is enlarged to future generations” (p573). This type of de-growth primarily concerns itself with environmental protection and nature conservation and restoration, and opposed growth of GDP because of its environmental impacts.</p><p>DG-3, in which “de-growth is seen as liberating our lives from pervasive competition, ‘rat-race’-careers, dependency on monetary income, acceleration of the speed of life, noise and many kinds of struggling..By opposing such lifestyles and visions of happiness, DG-3 wishes to improve overall quality of life” (p574). Included in this vision of an improved quality of life are political participation and citizenship, and DG-3 therefore supports “further democratization of democratic life” (p574).</p><p>DG-4, in which “de-growth is seen as an integral part of an overall strategy to transform and eventually replace capitalistic modes of production and distribution by other modes” (p574). The variants of DG-4 are “united under that claim that reforms and regulations of contemporary capitalism would not suffice and the system should be shifted” (p574).</p><p>Ott groups the initial three types of degrowth as ‘reformist variants” as they aim to maintain the cohesion of society and its achievements. In analyzing how each of the types of degrowth fits with democratic policy making, Ott concludes, “...reformist variants of de-growth strategies and ambitious variants of democracy can, at least conceptually, be conjoined to a viable and wishful political outlook” (p571).</p><p></p><p>Schneider, F., G. Kallis and J. Martinez-Alier (2010) ‘Crisis or opportunity? Economic degrowth for social equity and ecological sustainability. Introduction to this special issue’. Journal of Cleaner Production 18(6): 511–518.</p><p>This article provides an introduction for a special issue of the Journal of Cleaner Production comprised of articles originally presented at the April 2008 conference in Paris on Economic Degrowth for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity. At this conference, “For the first time, scientists gathered in an interdisciplinary and international academic setting with representatives of the civil society on the topic of economic degrowth as a possible path for more ecology, more equality or more well-being” (p512). Schneider, Kallis, and Martinez-Alier review the literature on sustainable degrowth, asking “how positive would degrowth be if instead of being imposed by an economic crisis, it would actually be a democratic collective decision, a project with the ambition of getting closer to ecological sustainability and socio-environmental justice worldwide” (p511). The authors define sustainable degrowth as “an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions of the local and global level, in the short and long terms” (p512) and differentiate it from recession, which is “degrowth within a growth-based economy” (p516). In addition to defining sustainable degrowth, the authors go on to tackle some of the misconceptions surrounding degrowth including that decreasing GDP is the primary goal. “Sustainable degrowth will involved a decrease in GDP as currently measured, because of a reduction in large-scale, resource-intensive productive and consumptive activities that constitute a big portion of GDP. However, what happens to GDP is of secondary importance; the goal is the pursuit of well-being, ecological sustainability and social equity” (p512). The efforts to define, tackle misconceptions, and introduce the latest contributions to the field, make this article an excellent introduction to the sustainable degrowth movement. </p><p></p><p>Of relevance, is Christian Kerschner’s efforts to specifically raise the question of population degrowth and express concern that the question is often tactically avoided by degrowth scholars, which the authors commend. The authors go on to explain: “In our view is would be positive (for humans and other species) if the human population would reach soon the peak at about 8000 million persons and then decline a bit. Such population degrowth to a steady state would be the outcome of bottom-up action and empowerment of women to control their reproductive rights. Authoritarian, state-imposed population control policies, such as the tradable birth quotas suggested by Boulding and Daly (and recalled by Kerschner) are undesirable from a degrowth perspective. Population and economic degrowth are not an imperative to be imposed at all costs, but a collective choice, coevolving with a deepening democratization” (p514).</p><p></p><p>The authors call for reform of social institutions and also a radical reform of financial institutions. The suggestions outlined are presented in the context of the current global economic downturn and the “appropriate” path to take to “recover”.</p><p></p><p>Schwartzman, D. (2012) ‘A Critique of Degrowth and its Politics’. Capitalism Nature Socialism 23(1): 119-125.</p><p>Schwartzmann presents of critique of the degrowth as presents by Mauro Bonaiuti in Capitalism Nature Socialism vol.23, no.1 (2012). The critique centers on the failure of degrowth to distinguish between the qualitative versus quantitative aspects of economic growth, and also argues that its focus on the local economy neglects the urgency of global anthropogenic changes. Schwartzmann does agree that a reduction in certain kinds of consumption is imperative. Specifically, “arguments for degrowth such as those found in Latouche (2009) should be taken seriously insofar as they address economic activities that increase consumption of fossil fuels, especially coal and tar sands, the two most intense carbon emitters” (p121). Some might argue, that due to the nature of a globalized economy almost all economic activities currently increase consumption of fossil fuels and Schwartzman’s more “limited” application of degrowth amounts to a call for reduced consumption across the economy.</p><p></p><p>Sekulova, F., G. Kallis, B. Rodríguez-Labajos and F. Schneider (2013) ‘Degrowth: from theory to practice’. Journal of Cleaner Production 38: 1-6.</p><p>This article by Sekulova et al. serves as an introduction to the Special Issue of the Journal of Cleaner Production that provides a sample of contributions from the Second International conference on degrowth. The authors classify the nine contributions to the Special Issue into two categories: “four contemplate on the present system for production of goods and services and raise a number of proposals for transformation in this respect, whereas the second group deals with work and the interplay between labour and a possible energetic decline” (p2). In reviewing the contributions the authors provide insightful summaries of multiple critical concepts and policy options of the degrowth movement. They conclude with final remarks including a call for degrowth to integrate the approach of reducing the level of social and economic complexity with the approach of managing the reduction and influencing its societal context (p5).</p><p>“The first one requires re-localization of production, reduction of intermediaries, decreasing the number of appliances and volume of goods used or consumed per household, introduction of simpler technologies, etc. The second one involves adaptive and widespread macro-level measures which respond to the existing complexity and therefore: regulation of advertising, legal facilitation of work- sharing, establishing non-tradable caps on the extraction of natural resources, replicating the “Yasuni” example4 of leaving resources underground, redirecting investment away from infra- structure in fast and car-based modes of transport to slow-mode ones, strengthening social and ecological standards” (p5).</p><p>This call is partnered with encouragement for continued participation and exploration through debate and action, and the recognition that crafting alternatives to our current unsustainable economy requires diverse perspectives.</p><p></p><p>Trainer, T. (2012) ‘De-growth: Do you realise what it means?’. Futures 44(6): 590-599.</p><p>By presenting the magnitude and nature of the global predicament, Trainer makes the case that “consumer-capitalist society cannot be made sustainable or just” and that a “viable post-capitalist society must take a particular form” (p590). Tainer defines this particular form as the “Simpler Way, centering on the enjoyment of non-affluent lifestyles within mostly small and highly self-sufficient local economies under local participatory control and not driven by market forces” (p590). With a specific goal of what form post-capitalist society must take, a transition strategy can be developed. A successful transition strategy, according to Trainer, will involve changes from the bottom “via slow development of ideas, understandings, and values within ordinary people, leading them to begin building and taking control of their local economies” (p597). In placing the impetus upon ordinary people, and not politicians or corporations, Trainer outlines the task of the degrowth movement as helping “people to see that radical change is necessary and attractive, so that they enthusiastically set about building the new local economies” (p597). “The most effective way to do this is to plunge into building elements of The Simpler Way, here and now, where we live… Then things begin to shake loose we will need to have established enough impressive examples so that people can see there is a better alternative, and begin moving into it” (p598). With this call and more explicit support, Trainer holds the Transition Towns Movement as a promising development to work with. In arguing for The Simpler Way and placing the priority at galvanizing a bottom-up movement, Trainer diverges from efforts to “fix” the predicament through changes in policies and economic systems.</p><p></p><p>Van den Bergh, J. (2011) ‘Environment versus growth --A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”’. Ecological Economics 70(5): 881-890.</p><p>Van den Bergh provides a critical examination of the strategy of degrowth by considering five common interpretations of “degrowth” as a concept: GDP degrowth, consumption degrowth, work-time degrowth, radical degrowth, and physical degrowth. Van den Bergh also, briefly, discusses market degrowth, selective or differential degrowth, degrowth in rich countries, and population degrowth. Fundamentally, Van den Bergh argues that these multiple interpretations alone present a challenge for effectively using the strategy of degrowth as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth. The author also argues that “degrowth may not be an effective, let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure” (p881). Van den Bergh supports this argument by systematically considering the environmental effectiveness, social and political feasibility, economic efficiency, ability to limit rebound of strategies based on each interpretation (Table I, p887). The author also includes in this analysis the strategy of GDP a-growth, or being indifferent about growth in GDP, and concludes that this strategy “is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth” (p881). A-growth would involve “convincing society about public policies and strategies on the basis of expected impacts on real welfare and happiness rather than on income” (p886). Rather than aiming to degrow in one way or another, Van den Bergh presents six complementary policies and institutional changes that would promote prioritizing social and environmental consequences of policy decisions and the “removal of the GDP indicator from policy and political debate and decision-making” (p889). These policies can be summarized as: “encourage people to work shorter hours; regulate commercial advertisement—notably of status goods; tax status goods with serious environmental repercussions; undertake communication and information provision to motivate changes in preferences, attitudes and voluntary action; stimulate economists, politicians and the public media to ignore GDP; and install technology-specific policies (like research subsidies)” (p889). Van den Bergh concludes, “Following an a-growth strategy, we would in some periods be willing --without realizing even-- to give up part of potential GDP growth for a better environment, less unemployment and more leisure, namely if this would work out well in terms of individual well-being and social welfare” (p890).</p><p></p><p>Van den Bergh, J and G. Kallis (2012) ‘Growth, a-growth or degrowth to stay within planetary boundaries?’. Journal of Economic Issues 46(4): 909-920.</p><p>Van den Bergh and Kallis come together to compare the approaches of a-growth and degrowth in the context of the growth paradigm and consider their respective merit. Whereas a-growth ”proposes to ignore or even ‘abolish’ GDP as a welfare and progress indicator, and focusing, in this way, on sound environmental, social, and economic policies independently of their effects on economic growth,” “Degrowth is the intentional limiting and downscaling of the economy to make it consistent with biophysical boundaries” (p910). Van den Bergh and Kallis present a side-by-side comparison of growth, a-growth, and degrowth in regards to various statements they do or do not support (Table I, p914). The authors conclude with outlining how institutional economics can further develop alternatives to the growth paradigm. Explaining that “Institutional economists analyze the economy as an open system within which technological, cultural, and ecological factors interact,” the authors argue that this analysis and assessment of development cannot be reduced to tracking GDP (p909). The potential areas for research include: “Why economics, economists, and politicians alike remain loyal to GDP?”; “[H]ow GDP growth is exactly perceived in different schools of macroeconomics”; “[H]ow core institutions of the market economy pose obstacles to the emergence of such alternatives”; and other applications of the insights of institutional economics to understanding the history of GDP and evolution of alternative economic practices.</p><p></p><p>Victor, P.A. (2012) ‘Growth, degrowth, and climate change: A scenario analysis’, Ecological Economics 84: 206-212. http://degrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Victor_Growth-Degrowth-and-Climate-Change.pdf</p><p>Victor uses the simulation model of the Canadian economy, LowGrow, to consider several macroeconomic scenarios: ‘business as usual’ that uses past trends to project into the future, ‘selective growth’ that applies differential growth rates to parts fo the economy according to their direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions, and ‘degrowth’ in which the average GDP/capita of Canadians is reduced towards a level consistent with a world economy that respects global environmental limits. The paper concludes by comparing these scenarios. Victor concludes: “the differences between the low/no growth scenario and the business as usual scenario are far less dramatic than those between the two scenarios and the degrowth scenario. This finding highlights the significance of the level at which any high consumption economy stabilizes, something that should be made more explicit by those who advocate a steady-state economy and degrowth” (p7).</p><p>Macroeconomic Models (MM)</p><p>The below resources apply and explore the above theories through macroeconomic modeling. Finding a method for effectively modeling macroeconomics globally under these conditions remains difficult and requires tradeoffs between generalizability, precision, and realism (Costanza et al. 1993).</p><p></p><p>Ayres, R. and J. van den Bergh (2005) ‘A theory of economic growth with material/energy resources and dematerialisation: Interaction of three growth mechanisms’. Ecological Economics 55, 96-118.</p><p>Ayres and van den Bergh clarify the nature of energy and material resources in a non-optimizing growth theory framework. The authors modify the conventional theory by: (1) identifying multiple feedback mechanisms so that the cost of production through demand on growth is considered; (2) developing a production function that distinguishes between resource use, technical efficiency, and value creation. The authors developed the model recognizing, “that existing growth theory with environment and resources does not give rise to theoretical and empirical information that is useful in a debate on structural economic change aimed at reducing the use of energy and materials.” (p97). The authors’ model reflects the reality that, “in the future, as growth continues, both renewable and non-renewable natural resources may become scarce and even limiting, whereas unskilled human labor and produced capital will be increasingly plentiful.” (p97).</p><p></p><p>Boumans, R., R. Costanza, J. Farley, M.A. Wilson, R. Portela, J. Rotmans, F. Villa, and M. Grasso (2002) ‘Modeling the Dynamics of the Integrated Earth System and the Value of Global Ecosystem Services Using the Gumbo Model’. Ecological Economics 41(3): 529-560. Doi: 10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00098-8.</p><p>The authors developed a global unified metamodel of the biosphere (GUMBO) to simulate the integrated earth system and assess the dynamics and values of ecosystem services. GUMBO is unique in that it: (1) focuses on ecosystem services and has them explicitly affect both economic production and social welfare; (2) sets both ecological and socioeconomic changes as endogenous with emphasis on interactions and feedbacks; and (3) defines natural, human, social, and built capital separately allowing limited substitution and the imposition of strong sustainability constraints. The article demonstrates GUMBO through four different scenarios based on two variations concerning assumptions about key parameters in the model, arrayed against two variations of policy settings concerning the rates of investment across natural, social, human, and built capital. This article provides detailed description of the tradeoffs inherent in developing complex, global models.</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R., L. Wainger, C. Folke, and K.-G. Mäler (1993) ‘Modelling complex ecological economic systems: Toward an evolutionary, dynamic understanding of humans and nature’. BioScience 43(8): 545-555.</p><p>The authors introduce some of the general types of models that can be used for considering complex systems and outline the required trade-offs between generalizability, precision and realism. The authors define complex systems as “groups of interacting, interdependent parts linked together by exchanges” that “are characterized by strong (usually non-linear) interactions between the parts, complex feedback loops that make it difficult to distinguish cause from effect, and significant time and space lags, discontinuities, thresholds, and limits” (p545). Considering this definition, reductionist modeling techniques popular in neoclassical economic analyses often neglect critical real-world interactions and can lead to misperceptions and policy failures (p546). This article serves as a critical resource for anyone attempting to develop a complex model of ecological economic systems, and stresses the importance of defining the purpose of the model and making trade-offs accordingly.</p><p></p><p>Dasgupta, P.S. and P.R. Ehrlich (2013) ‘Pervasive externalities at the population, consumption, and environment nexus’. Science 340(6130): 324-328. DOI: 10.1126/science.1224664</p><p>http://science.sciencemag.org/content/340/6130/324.full.pdf+html </p><p>Dasgupta and Ehrlich present a theoretical consideration of the socio-ecological processes operating at the nexus of population-consumption-environment. The authors’ analysis focuses on the presence of externalities “of decisions made by each of us on reproduction, consumption, and the use of our natural environment.” (p324). In addition to the presence of externalities at this nexus, the authors demonstrate that, “the externalities studied in this paper are not self-correcting,” (p327) and, “that fundamental nonlinearities, built into several categories of externalities, amplify the socio-ecological processes operating at the nexus.” (p234). The authors therefore call for, “urgent collective action at both local and global levels.” (p234). It is important to note that this action is needed because the market structure alone cannot correct the presence of externalities at the population-consumption-environment nexus.</p><p></p><p>Jackson, T. and P.A. Victor (2011) ‘Productivity and Work in the “Green Economy”: Some Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Tests’. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1(1): 101-108. Doi: 10.1016/j.eist.2011.04.005.</p><p>Jackson and Victor define and explore the concept of “the ‘productivity trap’ that arises from the systematic pursuit of labour productivity” (p101). The authors go on to describe two solutions to the trap: reduce working hours, engage in structural shifts towards low productivity growth sectors” (p101). The authors argue that understanding the macro-economics of productivity is critical for understanding the transition to a sustainable economy. According to their exploration, technology, work-time reduction and structural economic change will all have a role in achieving environmental targets, including carbon targets (p108).</p><p></p><p>Jackson, T., B. Drake, P. A. Victor, K. Kratena, and M. Sommer (2014) Foundations for an Ecological Macroeconomics: literature review and model development. Work Package 205, MS38 “Research paper on literature review and model development” Working Paper no. 65. Welfare, Wealth, Work for Europe: Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities Europe.</p><p>The authors of this update provide a description of the challenges facing modelling combined economic, ecological, and financial systems. In particular they highlight the need for modelling of full employment, financial stability, social equity under the probable condition of constrained resource consumption and reality of ecological limits. With these challenges and needs in mind, the authors describe two modelling approaches: “One of these approaches, led by WIFO, uses a Dynamic New Keynesian (DYNK) model to explore the implications of different long-run equilibrium paths for energy consumption, The other approach, led by Surrey in collaboration with York University, is motivated primarily by the desire to integrate a comprehensive model of the financial economy into a mode of a (resource and emission-constrained) real economy” (p1). This article would be a good starting point for someone interested in developing an ecological macroeconomic model, who is familiar with economic modeling.</p><p></p><p>Sorman, A.H. and M. Giampietro (2013) ‘The energetic metabolism of societies and the degrowth paradigm: analyzing biophysical constraints and realities’. Journal of Cleaner Production 38: 80-93.</p><p>Sorman and Giampietro analyze the implications, the feasibility and the desirability of possible trajectories of economic downscaling from an energetic perspective. The authors use the approach of societal metabolism to account for the profile of energy flows required and consumed by societies. The authors specifically analyze the implications of: (i) demographic changes; (ii) the declining supply of net energy sources; and (iii) the effects of Jevons’ Paradox on the metabolic pattern of a sample of developed countries. The analysis of the energetic metabolism of societies is based on the Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal and Ecosystem Metabolism methodology, or MuSIASEM. MuSIASEM allows investigation of the feasibility of the dynamic energy budget of societies by checking if the requirement and supply of energy flows match. The approach also allows for the study of how changes taking place in the characteristics of a dynamic energy budget will affect the structure and function of society. (p82).</p><p></p><p>Turner, G. M. (2008) ‘A Comparison of the Limits to Growth with 30 Years of Reality’. Global Environmental Change 18(3): 397-411. Doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.05.001.</p><p>Turner compares historical data for 1970-2000 to scenarios presented in the Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (1972). The Limits to Growth scenarios are based on a computer model developed at MIT called World3. “The World3 model permitted Meadows et al. to examine the interactions of five subsystems of the global economic system, namely: population, food production, industrial production, pollution, and consumption of non-renewable natural resources” (p397). Turner’s analysis shows that historical data align with the business-as-usual scenario, or “standard run” scenario, as reported in The Limits to Growth. This paper provides background on the World3 model, and an example of how historical data can be used with modeling to provide strong predictions.</p><p></p><p>Victor, P.A. (2012) ‘Growth, degrowth, and climate change: A scenario analysis’, Ecological Economics 84: 206-212. http://degrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Victor_Growth-Degrowth-and-Climate-Change.pdf</p><p>Victor uses the simulation model of the Canadian economy, LowGrow, to consider several macroeconomic scenarios: ‘business as usual’ that uses past trends to project into the future, ‘selective growth’ that applies differential growth rates to parts fo the economy according to their direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions, and ‘degrowth’ in which the average GDP/capita of Canadians is reduced towards a level consistent with a world economy that respects global environmental limits. The paper concludes by comparing these scenarios. Victor concludes: “the differences between the low/no growth scenario and the business as usual scenario are far less dramatic than those between the two scenarios and the degrowth scenario. This finding highlights the significance of the level at which any high consumption economy stabilizes, something that should be made more explicit by those who advocate a steady-state economy and degrowth” (p7).</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter A. and Gideon Rosenbluth (2007) ‘Managing without growth’. Ecological Economics 61(2-3): 492-504. Doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.03.022.</p><p>Victor and Rosenbluth use the dynamic simulation model LowGrow to explore various growth scenarios for Canada. This analysis is driven by arguments that developed countries should consider managing without economic growth due to the environmental and resources constraints, the apparent decoupling of growth from increased well-being, and the insufficiency of economic growth for meeting policy objectives including full employment, reduced poverty, and protection of the environment. Ultimately, the authors describe a scenario with conditions under which “the rate of unemployment in Canada could be reduced to historically low levels, poverty eliminated and greenhouse gas emissions reduced to comply with Canada’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, without relying on economic growth”. Through analysis of multiple scenarios, the authors found that simply setting the model parameters to no-growth resulted in economic collapse. Instead, the authors found that explicit policy changes, such as a slightly reduced work week, increased income distribution, and increased worker support programs, were critical to achieving a stable, no-growth outcome. Accordingly, the authors recommend that no-growth not be a state to be pursued, but rather that dependence and defence of growth no longer take priority over pursuing welfare enhancing objectives. The LowGrow model is described in depth along with the parameters included. The model does allow for manipulation of the “growth in population and the labor force”. (p495). For this parameter, “The annual increase in population as projected by the Statistics of Canada is multiplied by a factor that varies from 0 to 1. If this factor is set at 0 there is no increase in population. This effect carries over to the labour force which is estimated as a linear function of population and GDP”. </p><p></p><p>The Worldwatch Institute (2013) State of the World 2013: Is Sustainability Still Possible? https://crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/news/files/2013-04/sow2013-11-costanza.pdf</p><p>The authors begin this report with the reminder that “...the goal of any economy should be to sustainably improve human well-being and quality of life and that material consumption and GDP are merely means to that end” (p126). This reminder runs throughout the report, with a call “to understand better what really does contribute to sustainable human well-being and recognize that substantial contributions of natural and social capital, which are now the limiting factors to improving well-being in many countries” (p126). The report goes on to break down the basic characteristics of the current economic model, a proposed green economy model, and a proposed ecological economics model in a comprehensive table that pays particular attention to considering how each contributes to sustainable human well-being (p127). The proposed ecological economic model is based on the principles that:</p><p>Our material economy is embedded in society, which is embedded in our ecological life-support system, and we cannot understand or manage our economy without understanding the whole interconnected system.</p><p>Growth and development are not always linked, and true development must be defined in terms of the improvement of sustainable human well-being, not merely improvement in material consumption.</p><p>A balance of four basic types of assets is necessary for sustainable human well-being: built, human, social, and natural capital (financial capital is merely a marker for real capital and must be managed as such.)</p><p>Growth in material consumption is ultimately unsustainable because of fundamental planetary boundaries, and such growth is or eventually becomes counterproductive (uneconomic) in that it has negative effects on well-being and on social and natural capital. (p128)</p><p>The authors claim, that if society “adopts the central economic goal of sustainable human well-being” macroeconomic policies will have to radically change to stay aligned. With this goal, the authors argue that we can achieve “a global economy that is not growing in material terms but that is sustainable and provides a high quality of life for most, if not all, people” (p140). The authors cite evidence from history, groups and communities who are creating local economies that fit the model, and integrated modeling studies --all support the feasibility of such an economic system.</p><p>Practices and Policies Based on Theories (P&P;)</p><p>Based on the theories presented above, various practices and policies have been proposed. These include, but are not limited to: identifying and prioritizing alternate measures of wellbeing and economic success, purposefully changing policies, and redefining our values and goals.</p><p></p><p>Holling, C.S. (2001) ‘Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and social systems’. Ecosystems 4: 390-405.</p><p>In this article Holling analyzes the hierarchies and adaptive cycles that comprise the basis of ecosystems and social-ecological systems, with the intention of using the analysis to clarify the meaning of “sustainable development.” Holling puts forth the argument that “sustainable development” is not an oxymoron but rather a term that describes a logical partnership given that “sustainability is the capacity to create, test, and maintain adaptive capability” and “development is the process of creating, testing, and maintaining opportunity” (p390). Together, sustainable development “refers to the goal of fostering adaptive capabilities and fostering opportunities” (p390). In assessing sustainability Holling relies on the panarchy theory, which “focuses on the critical features that affects or trigger reorganization and transformation in a system” (p402). The panarchy theory provides a guide for “how a healthy socioecological system can invent and experiment, benefiting from inventions that create opportunity while it is kept safe from those that destabilize the system due to their nature or excessive exuberance” (p402). Based on this theory and analysis of complex systems, Holling puts forth five elements of a prescription for facilitating constructive change under conditions of crisis:</p><p>Identify and reduce destructive constraints and inhibitions on change, such as perverse subsidies.</p><p>Protect and preserve the accumulated experience on which change will be based.</p><p>Stimulate innovation and communicate the results in a variety of fail-safe experiments designed to probe possible directions in a way that is low in costs in terms of human careers and organizational budgets.</p><p>Encourage new foundations for renewal that build and sustain the capacity of people, economies, and nature to deal with change.</p><p>Encourage programs to expand an understanding of change and communicate it to citizens, businesses, and people at different levels of administration and governance, engaging them in the process of change. (p404).</p><p>This article is noteworthy for its definition of sustainable development and also for the analyses of complex systems that resulted in the list of elements above. ***UPDATE FOR P&P;***</p><p></p><p>The Worldwatch Institute (2013) State of the World 2013: Is Sustainability Still Possible? https://crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/news/files/2013-04/sow2013-11-costanza.pdf</p><p>The authors begin this report with the reminder that “...the goal of any economy should be to sustainably improve human well-being and quality of life and that material consumption and GDP are merely means to that end” (p126). This reminder runs throughout the report, with a call “to understand better what really does contribute to sustainable human well-being and recognize that substantial contributions of natural and social capital, which are now the limiting factors to improving well-being in many countries” (p126). The report goes on to break down the basic characteristics of the current economic model, a proposed green economy model, and a proposed ecological economics model in a comprehensive table that pays particular attention to considering how each contributes to sustainable human well-being (p127). The proposed ecological economic model is based on the principles that:</p><p>Our material economy is embedded in society, which is embedded in our ecological life-support system, and we cannot understand or manage our economy without understanding the whole interconnected system.</p><p>Growth and development are not always linked, and true development must be defined in terms of the improvement of sustainable human well-being, not merely improvement in material consumption.</p><p>A balance of four basic types of assets is necessary for sustainable human well-being: built, human, social, and natural capital (financial capital is merely a marker for real capital and must be managed as such.)</p><p>Growth in material consumption is ultimately unsustainable because of fundamental planetary boundaries, and such growth is or eventually becomes counterproductive (uneconomic) in that it has negative effects on well-being and on social and natural capital. (p128)</p><p>The authors claim, that if society “adopts the central economic goal of sustainable human well-being” macroeconomic policies will have to radically change to stay aligned. With this goal, the authors argue that we can achieve “a global economy that is not growing in material terms but that is sustainable and provides a high quality of life for most, if not all, people” (p140). The authors cite evidence from history, groups and communities who are creating local economies that fit the model, and integrated modeling studies --all support the feasibility of such an economic system. ***UPDATE FOR P&P;***</p><p></p><p>Metrics & Indicators</p><p></p><p>Carpenter, S.R., B.H. Walker, J.M. Anderies and N. Abel, (2001) ‘From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What to What?’. Ecosystems, 4: 765-781.</p><p>Resilience theory and measurements of “resilience” are popular for considering socioecological systems, and may be useful in exploring how our current economic system will handle disturbances and how we might be able to reduce the time of instability that would follow a disturbance that surpasses what the system can tolerate. Carpenter et al. suggest that before applying resilience to any system, what resilience is, what is being measured, and how resilience can be promoted in a system all deserve explicit attention. Specifically, the question of “what is resilient to what” or “which system configuration and which disturbances are of interest” need to be defined for the system under investigation (p765).</p><p></p><p>Easterlin, R. (1995) ‘Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?’ Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 27: 35-47.</p><p>Based on data on reported happiness, material norms, and income from a number of countries, Easterlin concludes that “raising the income of all does not increase the happiness of all.” (p35). Easterlin explains this by noting that “material norms on which judgements of well-being are based increase in the same proportion as the actual income of the society” (p35) --which is to say that judgements of well-being are based on how you measure up to material norms, and material norms tend to increase with the incomes of a society. This conclusion supports that increasing income equity would do more to improve subjective well-being and happiness of the economically less fortunate than increasing the incomes of everyone would. It is important to note, that reviews of the literature since this article have cautioned against over-stating conclusions about the causality of subjective well-being.</p><p></p><p>Folke, C. (2006) ‘Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses’. Global Environmental Change 16: 253-267.</p><p>Though this article does not directly pertain to economics, Folke presents a comprehensive introduction to the resilience perspective and how it can be used in analyses. Folke’s introduction to resilience includes its role in social and environmental scientists challenging the stable equilibrium view that was dominant. “The resilience approach emphasizes non-linear dynamics, thresholds, uncertainty and surprise, how periods of gradual change interplay with periods of rapid change and how such dynamics interact across temporal and spatial scales” (p253). The resilience approach therefore could hold implications for considering limits to economic growth and also the stability of different economic systems when faced with disturbances. </p><p></p><p>Galaz, V., F. Biermann, B. Crona, D. Loorbach, C. Folke, P. Olsson, M. Nilsson, J. Allouche, A. Persson and G. Reischl (2012) ‘“Planetary Boundaries”’--Exploring the Challenges for Global Environmental Governance’. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 4(1): 80-87. Doi: 10.1016/j.cosust.2012.01.006.</p><p>Following-up on Rockström et al.’s article A safe operating space for humanity in which nine ‘planetary boundaries’ with possible threshold effects are identified, Galaz et al. consider the global governance challenges of responding to these boundaries. Though the original article’s conclusion of drawing a ‘safe operating space for humanity’ can prove highly controversial, Galaz et al. argue that article’s more general insight should not be overlooked: “that global environmental change unfolds between complex and multiple bio-geophysical systems with possible non-linear dynamics.” (p80). Focusing on that insight, Galaz et al. ask what are the implications for Earth system governance. The authors discuss four interrelated global environmental governance challenges:</p><p>“The four identified challenges are related to, first, the interplay between Earth system science and global policies, and the implications of difference in risk perceptions in defining these boundaries; second, the capacity of international institutions to deal with individual ‘planetary boundaries’, as well as interactions between them; third, the role of international organizations in dealing with ‘planetary boundaries’ interactions; and fourth, the role of global governance in framing social-ecological innovations.” (p80).</p><p>The authors conclude by providing some suggestions for addressing these challenges, which they present in Table 1, along with each possible intervention’s potential and limitations. (p85). </p><p></p><p>Lawn, P. A. (2003) ‘A Theoretical Foundation to Support the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), and Other Related Indexes’. Ecological Economics 44(1): 105-118.</p><p>Lawn responds to concerns regarding the validity of the indexes being used by ecological economics to measure and compare the benefits and costs of growth--chief among them the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare. Ecological economists often use these indexes to analyze, and overwhelming reinforce, the ‘threshold hypothesis’. “The ISEW and GPI are designed to more closely approximate the sustainable economic welfare or progress of a nation’s citizens. The sustainable economic welfare implied here is the welfare a nation enjoys at a particular point in time given the impact of past and present activities” (p106). Some critics were uncertain about accepting indexes formulated by ecological economists as valid reinforcement of the hypothesis also championed by the same group. “One of the concerns commonly expressed is the supposed lack of theoretical foundation to support the ISEW, the GPI, and other related indexes” (p105). In this paper Lawn demonstrates that the indexes are indeed theoretically sound. Lawn explains, “The ISEW and GPI serve as very good indicators of both income and sustainable economic welfare precisely because they are consistent with Fisher’s concept of income and capital” (p112). Lawn demonstrates this by considering each item used to construct the ISEW and its theoretical backing. Though Lawn finds the indexes theoretically sound, Lawn does call for “a more robust and consistent set of valuation methods” (p106). This article provides strong theoretical and practical background for alternative indexes.</p><p></p><p>OECD (2007) ‘Beyond GDP --measuring progress, true wealth and the wellbeing of nations’. Summary Notes from the Conference. Online at www.beyond-gdp.eu/download/bgdp-summary-notes-pdf.</p><p>“The Beyond GDP initiative is about developing indicators that are as clear and appealing as GDP, but more inclusive of environmental and social aspects or progress.” The website includes updates on recent developments and ongoing work. Recent news includes the 2016 Edition of the Happiness Atlas Germany, released in October 2016, which presents data on life satisfaction in 19 German regions. “Life satisfaction” is comprised, for this report, of self-assessments on different dimensions including work, health, and leisure. The website also devotes a section to other indicators, which provides useful background for those considering ways to measure progress other than GDP growth. Indicators are primarily grouped into five themes: GDP, Enlarged GDP, Social Indicators, Environmental Indicators, and Well-being. More information is available for specific indicators within each category. </p><p></p><p>O’Neill, D.W. (2012) ‘Measuring progress in the degrowth transition to a steady state economy’. Ecological Economics 84: 221-231.</p><p>O’Neill points out that in order to determine whether degrowth is occurring, or an economy’s proximity to the concept of a state steady economy, clearer indicators are needed. The paper provides an analysis of four different indicator approaches: (1) Gross Domestic Product, (2) the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, (3) biophysical and social indicators, and (4) a composite indicator. From this analysis O’Neill concludes that “separate biophysical and social indicators represent the best approach, but a unifying conceptual framework is required to choose appropriate indicators and interpret the relationship between them” (p1). The biophysical indicators used are derived from Daly’s definition of a steady state economy and focus on measuring the major stocks and flows in the economy-environment system. The social indicators are based on the stated goals of the degrowth movement and focus on measuring the functioning of the socio-economic system and how effectively it promotes well-being. O’Neill goes on to show how these indicators can be used to categorize national economies in states of: desirable growth, undesirable growth, desirable degrowth, undesirable degrowth, or steady. This paper provides descriptions of both degrowth and steady state economics that can be operationalized, it further provides concrete indicators and how they can be used in tracking the “progress” of national economies towards a steady state. </p><p></p><p>SDC (2003) ‘Redefining prosperity. Resource productivity, economic growth and sustainable development’. London: Sustainable Development Commission. http://tinyurl.com/ckuurl.</p><p>This report from the UK Sustainable Development Commission calls for a fundamental rethinking of “the dominance of economic growth as the driving force in the modern political economy, and a far more rigorous distinguishing between the kind of economic growth that is compatible with the transition to a genuinely sustainable society and the kind that absolutely isn’t”. (p3). This call is made in the context of presenting the realities of the limits that exist in a finite system, the externalities that result from continued economic growth, and the apparent disconnect between economic growth and increased well-being. The report reminds government officials “that for governments, the end goal of their use of their democratic mandate is to improve people’s wellbeings”. (p8). It is therefore paramount that a better understanding of what drives wellbeing and prosperity be pursued and that defaulting to GDP not be accepted. In addition to discussion potential metrics of wellbeing, the report includes a comprehensive sustainable development strategy.</p><p></p><p>SDC (2009) Prosperity without Growth? The transition to a sustainable economy. London: Sustainable Development Commission. www.sd-commission.org/uk/pages/redefining-prosperity.html</p><p>This report from the UK Sustainable Development Commission calls for a fundamental rethinking of “the dominance of economic growth as the driving force in the modern political economy, and a far more rigorous distinguishing between the kind of economic growth that is compatible with the transition to a genuinely sustainable society and the kind that absolutely isn’t”. (p3). This call is made in the context of presenting the realities of the limits that exist in a finite system, the externalities that result from continued economic growth, and the apparent disconnect between economic growth and increased well-being. The report reminds government officials “that for governments, the end goal of their use of their democratic mandate is to improve people’s wellbeings”. (p8). It is therefore paramount that a better understanding of what drives wellbeing and prosperity be pursued and that defaulting to GDP not be accepted. In addition to discussion potential metrics of wellbeing, the report includes a comprehensive sustainable development strategy.</p><p></p><p>Van den Bergh, J. (2011) ‘Environment versus growth --A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”’. Ecological Economics 70(5): 881-890.</p><p>Van den Bergh provides a critical examination of the strategy of degrowth by considering five common interpretations of “degrowth” as a concept: GDP degrowth, consumption degrowth, work-time degrowth, radical degrowth, and physical degrowth. Van den Bergh also, briefly, discusses market degrowth, selective or differential degrowth, degrowth in rich countries, and population degrowth. Fundamentally, Van den Bergh argues that these multiple interpretations alone present a challenge for effectively using the strategy of degrowth as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth. The author also argues that “degrowth may not be an effective, let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure” (p881). Van den Bergh supports this argument by systematically considering the environmental effectiveness, social and political feasibility, economic efficiency, ability to limit rebound of strategies based on each interpretation (Table I, p887). The author also includes in this analysis the strategy of GDP a-growth, or being indifferent about growth in GDP, and concludes that this strategy “is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth” (p881). A-growth would involve “convincing society about public policies and strategies on the basis of expected impacts on real welfare and happiness rather than on income” (p886). Rather than aiming to degrow in one way or another, Van den Bergh presents six complementary policies and institutional changes that would promote prioritizing social and environmental consequences of policy decisions and the “removal of the GDP indicator from policy and political debate and decision-making” (p889). These policies can be summarized as: “encourage people to work shorter hours; regulate commercial advertisement—notably of status goods; tax status goods with serious environmental repercussions; undertake communication and information provision to motivate changes in preferences, attitudes and voluntary action; stimulate economists, politicians and the public media to ignore GDP; and install technology-specific policies (like research subsidies)” (p889). Van den Bergh concludes, “Following an a-growth strategy, we would in some periods be willing --without realizing even-- to give up part of potential GDP growth for a better environment, less unemployment and more leisure, namely if this would work out well in terms of individual well-being and social welfare” (p890).</p><p>Considering Externalities: “Getting the Price Right”</p><p>Bishop, Richard C. (1993) ‘Economic efficiency, sustainability, and biodiversity’. Ambio 22: 69-73.</p><p>Bishop considers the relationship between economic efficiency and sustainability, and concludes that while “[a]n economy can be both efficient and sustainable… efficiency does not guarantee sustainability” (p69). Bishop describes economic efficiency:</p><p>“Markets promote efficiency by providing opportunities for individuals to achieve mutually agreeable gains from trade. If Alpha and Beta can both benefit from trade, then markets provide the opportunity for them to come together and realize those gains. Under standard theoretical assumptions, once all the Alphas and betas in an economy have completed traded, efficiency will be achieved” (p69).</p><p>Following this explanation, Bishop demonstrates that multiple efficient states are possible, and while some might be deemed sustainable and distributed fairly, others are definitely not. This is especially true when the time frame is expanded to consider intergenerational distribution. High levels of uncertainty surround the potential for successfully reallocating natural resources to future generations. In regards to this uncertainty, Bishop proposes that the safe minimum standard (SMS) of conservation and other similar measures be utilized as bounds on the quest for efficiency, so that the likelihood of achieving an efficient and sustainable economy is increased. Bishop suggests that a taxation on resource exploitation would help fund biologically-preserving programs and other sustainability promoting activities, but would also serve as a means for applying these bounds to discourage economically marginal resource uses (p73).</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R. and L. Cornwell (1992) ‘The 4P approach to dealing with scientific uncertainty’. Environment 34: 12-20, 42.</p><p>Costanza and Cornwell provide a thorough exploration of the uncertainty inherent in science and how it has contributed to inaction in the political realm, particularly on issues of environmental science. Costanza and Cornwell propose that a regulatory system that recognizes and incorporates uncertainty, and shifts the burden of proof would be much more effective. They suggest a “precautionary polluter pays principle” (4P) approach based on environmental assurance bonds. Environmental assurance bonds would provide “a contractual guarantee that the principal would perform in an environmentally benign manner, but would be levied according to the best estimate of the largest potential future environmental damages. Funds in the bond would be invested and would produce interest that could be returned to the principal” (p5). “The bond would be held until some or all of the uncertainty was removed. This would provide a strong incentive for principals to reduce the uncertainty about their environmental impacts as quickly as possible, either by funding independent research or by changing their processes to ones that are less damaging”(p6). The authors conclude with the argument that the 4P approach has the promise to be effective at reducing the likelihood of environmental crisis, practical and politically feasible.</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R. and H. E. Daly (1992) ‘Natural capital and sustainable development’. Conservation Biology 6: 37-46.</p><p>Costanza and Daly come together in this article to support the “constancy of total natural capital” rule as a prudent minimum condition for assuring sustainability. The authors explain: “A minimum necessary condition for sustainability is the maintenance of the total natural capital stock at or above the current level. While lower stock of natural capital may be sustainable, society can allow no further decline in natural capital given the large uncertainty and the dire consequences of guessing wrong.” (p37). The authors also distinguish between growth, “material increase in size”, and development, “improvement in organization without size change”. This differentiation implies that, “growth cannot be sustainable indefinitely on a finite planet. Development may be sustainable, but even this aspect of change may have some limits.” (p37). In light of the definition of development and the “constancy of total natural capital” rule, Constanza and Dalysuggest some principles of sustainable development. Included in these suggestions, the authors remain committed to maintaining natural capital stocks. “By maintaining natural capital stocks (preferably by using a natural capital depletion tax), we can satisfy both the [technological] skeptics (since resources will be conserved for future generations) and the [technological] optimists (since this will raise the price of natural capital depletion and more rapidly induce the technical change they predict).” (p38).</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R. and C. Perrings (1990) ‘A flexible assurance bonding system for improved environmental management’. Ecological Economics 2: 57-76.</p><p>Costanza and Perrings outline the details of implementing a flexible assurance bonding system to improve environmental management. The flexible environmental assurance bonding system being proposed by the authors is “designed to incorporate environmental criteria and uncertainty into the market system, and to induce positive environmental technological innovation” (p57). Such a system would “bring the private and social costs of environmental resource use into concordance, by confronting individual users with the marginal social cost of their activities” (p72). As it is extremely difficult to quantify the environmental damage due to any given activity, the flexible assurance bonding system would include two dominant features: “that economic measures of environmental damage should be sensitive to informational flows throughout the period over which the damage is expected to occur; and that the burden of proof as to the magnitude of these damages should fall on the parties that stand to profit from them, not the general public” (p72). The authors conclude with the argument that the flexible assurance bonding system is a critical step towards developing a scheme for environmental protection that works across scenarios to limit further environmental degradation.</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R. and W. Shrum (1988) ‘The effects of taxation on moderating the conflict escalation process: An experiment using the dollar auction game’. Social Science Quarterly 69: 416-432.</p><p>Costanza and Shrum use the “dollar auction game” to investigate how the amount and timing of taxation moderate the conflict escalation process. “Expected utility theory predicts that the amount, while social trap theory predicts that the timing, of the tax should be most effective in reducing escalation. The “dollar auction game” has players bid on the prize of $1, with the understanding that both the highest bidder and second highest bidder have to pay the auctioneer at the end of the game, but only the highest bidder receives the $1 prize. “Taxation” is introduced into the game as a bidding tax (an additional amount players would have to pay on their bid, but that does not influence the value of their bid for determining a highest bidder). This tax differed in amount from $0 to $2, and was introduced to the game at a random point when the bidding was between $0 and $2. Costanza and Shrum “...found that the timing of the tax was much more important that the amount of the tax in determining the degree of observed escalation in the bidding process. Oddly, it seems to make little difference whether the subjects are taxed heavily or only lightly taxed--the extent to which taxation discourages subsequent bids is mainly a function of when the tax is implemented” (p430). This study holds implications for how taxation can most effectively be implemented to moderate the escalation process caused by social traps.</p><p></p><p>Cropper, M. L. and W. E. Oates (1992) ‘Environmental economics: A survey’. Journal of Economic Literature 30: 675-740.</p><p>Cropper and Oates review the field of environmental economics. The authors identify “two major issues in environmental economics: the regulation of polluting activities and the valuation of environmental amenities.” (p678). It is important to note here that environmental economics is not ecological economics, which is defined above. Environmental economics very much operates within the current economic and political system. Cropper and Oates focus on how environmental economics may be able to influence policy through broadening the consideration of costs in setting environmental regulations. The authors note, “Environmental economics have… made some important strides in the valuation of ‘nonmarket’ environmental services and have shown themselves able to introduce discussion of these measures in more effective ways in the policy arena.” (p677).</p><p>Social Shifts</p><p>Assadourian, Erik (2010) ‘The Rise and Fall of Consumer Cultures’. In State of the World 2010: Transforming Cultures; from Consumerism to Sustainability, edited by Linda Starke and Lisa </p><p>This call for society to move aways from a culture of consumerism situates the myriad of current efforts to change economic system within the context of social changes necessary. “Preventing the collapse of human civilization requires nothing less than a wholesale transformation of dominant cultural patterns.” (p3). In this initial chapter, Assadourian recognizes, “Transforming cultures is of course no small task. It will require decades of effort in which cultural pioneers--those who can step out of their cultural realities enough to critically examine them--work tirelessly to redirect key culture-shaping institutions: education, business, government, and the media, as well as social movements and long-standing human traditions.” (p4). Throughout the chapter, Assadourian provides a critical look at cultural norms, how they have been shifted by industry and media, and how we can cultivate cultures of sustainability. Assadourian relies heavily on Donella Meadows exploration of leverage points to consider the importance--and resistance--of shifting the paradigm of the system.</p><p></p><p>Daily, G.C. and P.R. Ehrlich (1996) ‘Socioeconomic Equity, Sustainability, and Earth’s Carrying Capacity’. Ecological Applications 6(4): 991-1001. Doi: 10.2307/2269582.</p><p>Daily and Ehrlich “examine the relationship between socioeconomic equity in opportunity and sustainability, as reflected in patterns of food production and fertility.’ (p991). The authors find that across levels of social organization, increasing equality of opportunity has the dual benefits of increasing food production and lowering fertility rates. Furthermore, the authors note that these benefits are in addition to the ethical merit of reducing the disparity between rich and poor. However, “equity in consumer lifestyles within and between nations cannot be achieved globally be leveling up to consumption from the bottom. Run-away consumption in rich countries must be curbed as part of an effort to reduce the scale of human enterprise to below carrying capacity while still permitting needed development among the poor.” (p991). Throughout this article, the authors describe de-development as “controlling runaway consumption in order to reduce the physical throughput of their economies,” and assert that equity can be increased in this context. The authors call for, “ways of reducing the scale of the human enterprise and to build in forms of insurance so that a high frequency of ecological ‘mistakes,’ even serious ones, will not bring the entire edifice crashing down,” and note that increasing equity is one way to pursue this end.</p><p></p><p>Fuchs, C., M. Schafranek, D. Hakken and M. Breen (2010) ‘Capitalist Crisis, Communications, and Culture –Introduction to the Special Issue of TripleC’. TripleC 8(2), 193-204. </p><p>Arguing that the current economic downturn is an indicator for a new crisis of capitalism, Fuchs et al. review how communication fits into capitalism and culture. The authors present a “general model of the political economy of capitalist communication” (p193). The model of the media economy is comprised of seven interlinked analytical aspects: (1) The media content industry, (2) The media infrastructure industry, (3) The interaction of the media economy and the non-media economy, (4) The interaction of the finance sector and the media economy, (5) Alternative media, (6) Media reception, and (7) Media prosumption (p200). This model allows for the systematic assessment of the discourse taking place at the intersection of capitalist crisis and communication. “The current capitalist crisis is a challenge for both politics and academia. It remains to be seen if critical analyses of finance, communication, and culture will contribute to the creation and communication of alternatives to the crisis economy” (p203).</p><p></p><p>Hagens, N. (2011) ‘The psychological roots of resources over-consumption’ Fleeing Vesuvius (New Society Publishers). http://www.theoildrum.com/node/7901</p><p>Hagens outlines how human pursuits of status and novelty have become increasingly energy- and resource-intensive in the modern world. Unfortunately, these are the precies pursuits humans have been rewarded throughout evolution from times when success was contingent on surviving and procreating. The reward pathways created through the process of evolution remain present in today’s consumers, and are placated by the accumulation of financial wealth and conspicuous consumption which have become signals of modern succes. These same pathways are by design also easily habituated to novel stimuli, causing a rapid adjustment in what is perceived as “normal” or “the standard of living”. Hagens goes on to examine consumption through the lens of addiction. “Irrespective of whether they [activities] are ‘good’ for the organism in the current context — they ‘feel’ good, which is the mechanism our brain has left us as a heritage of natural selection.” As we consume more, the pathways become accustomed to more and require even greater stimulation to achieve the same level of ‘feeling’ good. In this way, Hagens argued, through an addiction to consumption and the energy needed to produce consumables, humans have become addiction to oil. Further, in the modern world this addiction has been to inexpensive oil, a luxury Hagens argues that has an end. By effectively ratcheting-up our tolerance for consumption while simultaneously removing natural constraints like distance, time, and oceans, inexpensive oil has fueled a cultural addiction to unsustainable consumption. In response, Hagens argues that, “In addition to asking source/sink questions like ‘how much do we have’ we should begin asking questions like ‘how much is enough?’” Hagens also suggests that instead of pushing back against human nature to compete for more stuff that have more novelty, we “change cultural cues on how we define the ‘more’ and thereby reduce resource use.”</p><p></p><p>Hudson, I. and M. Hudson (2003) ‘Removing the Veil? Commodity Fetishism, Fair Trade, and the Environment’. Organization & Environment 16(4): 413-430. Doi: 10.1177/1086026603258926.</p><p>Applying Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, Hudson and Hudson considers if fair trade can move us past commodity fetishism. Marx used the term commodity fetishism in reference to “a phenomenon in which participants in commodity production and exchange experience and come to understand their social relations as relations between the products of their labor--relations between things, rather than relations between people” (p413). The authors argue that commodity fetishism is both pervasive and intensifying in our current social and economic system. The prevalence of commodity fetishism “has crucial implications for our collective abilities to recognize and address the forms of environmental and social destruction unfolding within the social relations of capitalist production” (p414). In contrast, “alternative (or fair) trade is a movement that is attempting to make the social and environmental conditions in which commodities are produced a very visible part of the product” (p419). The authors find that this movement does have “significant potential as a means of peeling back the veil that shrouds commodity production” however, it must expand and become more visible, while still retaining its standards.</p><p></p><p>Martinez-Alier, J. (2016) ‘Global environmental justice and the environmentalism of the poor’. The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory.</p><p>Martinez-Alier argues that increasing human population and increasing metabolism of industrial economies are driving fundamental clashes between economy and the environment. These clashes comes in the form of resource extraction conflicts and waste disposal conflicts, which are often unjustly distributed “not only as regards other species and future generations of humans but also among humans living today” (p14). “Such ecological distribution conflicts sometimes overlap with other social conflicts on class, ethnicity or indigenous identity, gender, caste, or territorial rights” (p2). Due to these common overlaps, Martinez-Alier suggests, “Environmental justice is a powerful lens through which to make sense of many struggles over the negative impacts that the increasing metabolism imposes on human livelihoods and nature conservation worldwide” (p2). Martinez-Alier provides a thorough definition of environmental justice, presentation of powerful concepts that have emerged from conflicts, and examination of the history of the global environmental justices movement. The ecological distribution conflicts at the heart of environmental injustices are fueled by “rich” people using the resources of lands and waters of “poor” people therefore “outsourcing” the waste and costs of further economic growth.</p><p></p><p>Martínez-Alier, J. (2012) ‘Environmental Justice and Economic Degrowth: An alliance between two movements’. Capitalism Nature Socialism 23(1): 51-73.</p><p>Martínez-Alier analyzes the potential alliance between the movements of environmental justice and economic degrowth OECD Countries. According to the author these movements are linked as the increased metabolism needed for a growing economy drives conflicts at the points of resource extraction and waste disposal. The environmental justice movement has risen from these points of conflict, in which outside demands for resources and/or waste disposal place unjust burdens on frontline communities. “The increase in the flows of energy and materials (the social metabolism of advanced economies) has been achieved at heavy social and environmental costs, not only for future generations but for those living now” (p65). In this way, environmental justice deals with both inter- and intragenerational distribution of benefits and burdens. Martínez-Alier also argues that relying on GDP to measure growth and track progress under-estimates the benefits poor, rural communities afford from their local environments that are not captured in GDP, and therefore calls to go “Beyond GDP.”</p><p>Ultimately, Martínez-Alier finds that an alliance between the movements environmental justice and economic degrowth can be built around “a common perspective against ‘debt-fueled’ economic growth and the hegemony of economic accounting in favor of a pluralism of values (as recommended by ecological economics; Martínez-Alier, et al. 1998 1999), the acceptance and support of bottom-up feminist new-Malthusianism, the defense of human rights and indigenous territorial rights along with the rights of nature, the recognition of the ecological debt, and the critique of ecologically unequal exchange” (p66). Such an alliance would be beneficial to both movements in their efforts to shift the priority away from economic growth at all cost.</p><p></p><p>Mastny, 3-20. Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute. http://blogs.worldwatch.org/transformingcultures/contents/.</p><p>The 2010 State of the World Report from the Worldwatch Institute asks “How do we make it as natural to live sustainably as living as a consumer feels today?” The report argues the current consumer cultural paradigm is maladaptive and “threatens to cause significant disruptions to the planet and subsequently to human societies.” Bringing together 26 articles from 60 different researchers and experts on consumerism, sustainability, and cultural change, the report explores the areas of:</p><p>Traditions Old and New;</p><p>Education’s New Assignment (Sustainability);</p><p>Business and Economy: Management Priorities;</p><p>Government’s Role in Design;</p><p>Media: Broadcasting Sustainability; and</p><p>The Power of Social Movements.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Meadows, D.H. (1999) Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System. The Sustainability Institute. Hartland, VT. http://donellameadows.org/archives/leverage-points-places-to-intervene-in-a-system/</p><p>Drawing from a renowned career in systems analysis Meadows presents a comprehensive, yet accessible, introduction to systems analysis and the concept of leverage points. Meadows defines leverage points as “places within a complex system (a corporation, an economy, a living body, a city, an ecosystem) where a small shift in one thing can produce big changes in everything.” Though people can sometimes identify where leverage points are, they usually end of pusing in the direction opposite of what needs to happen. Meadows uses the term backwards intuition to describe this phenomenon and an expanded version of the classic bathtub system model to outline how it occurs. For example:</p><p>“Growth. Not only population growth, but economic growth. Growth has costs as well as benefits, and we typically don’t count the costs — among which are poverty and hunger, environmental destruction, etc. — the whole list of problems we are trying to solve with growth! What is needed is much slower growth, much different kinds of growth, and in some cases no growth or negative growth.”</p><p>Using the concept of leverage points, Meadows suggests 12 places of potential intervention in a system and ranks them according to their likely effectiveness in promoting true change. Meadows is quick to point out that this list is neither final nor free of conditions and assumptions that could alter the rankings. Meadows does not intend for the list to be the final word, but rather for it to serve as inspiration for considering systems more thoroughly. The ranked list follows:</p><p>“Places to intervene in a system (in increasing order of effectiveness)</p><p>12. Constants, parameters, numbers (such as subsidies, taxes, standards).</p><p>11. The sizes of buffers and other stabilizing stocks, relative to their flows.</p><p>10. The structure of material stocks and flows (such as transport networks, population age structures).</p><p>9. The lengths of delays, relative to the rate of system change.</p><p>8. The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the impacts they are trying to correct against.</p><p>7. The gain around driving positive feedback loops.</p><p>6. The structure of information flows (who does and does not have access to information).</p><p>5. The rules of the system (such as incentives, punishments, constraints).</p><p>4. The power to add, change, evolve, or self-organize system structure.</p><p>3. The goals of the system.</p><p>2. The mindset or paradigm out of which the system — its goals, structure, rules, delays, parameters — arises.</p><p>1. The power to transcend paradigms.”</p><p>The rankings consider the potential for realizing change and the barriers to implementation. Details are provided for each place of potential intervention, Among the notable discussion points that Meadows brings up is the critique that though shifting parameters likely have limited leverage, they continued to receive the majority of the attention. The top ranking places involve system paradigms, which Meadows explains as “The shared idea in the minds of society, the great big unstated assumptions — unstated because unnecessary to state; everyone already knows them —...or deepest set of beliefs about how the world works.“ Meadows points to changing the paradigm out of which the system arises as an influential point of leverage, even more so is “to keep oneself unattached in the arena of paradigms to stay flexible, to realize that NO paradigm is ‘true,’ that every one, including the one that sweetly shapes your own worldview, is a tremendously limited understanding of an immense and amazing universe that is far beyond human comprehension.” This framework provides an incredibly helpful lens through which to consider potential policies, and the importance of reaching into the cultural and social realms of the system.</p><p></p><p>O’Brien, K., B. Hayward and F. Berkes (2009) ‘Rethinking social contracts: Building resilience in a changing climate’. Ecology and Society. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art12/ </p><p>O’Brien, Hayward, and Berkes consider “the potential role of social contracts as a political response to a changing climate” (p1). Specifically, the authors “examine how climate change affects the foundations of political arrangements and, in turn, how the evolution of these political arrangements, exacerbates or reduces vulnerability to climate risk” (p1). In looking at how social contracts might evolve in a changing climate, the authors propose using resilience thinking as a lens to highlight important issues that might arise. The authors conclude, “An environmental contract that focuses on climate change as the problem, ignoring the underlying social, economic, and political factors that both justify and encourage the subordination of the environment to economic and political interests and goals is unlikely to change anything” (p11). They propose using resilience thinking to guide meaningful changes to social contracts: “...it is important to prioritize adaptive management and social learning and include lessons from resilience thinking, at the same time as it is necessary to address the power imbalances that are embedded in social-ecological systems and extend resilience theory to better accommodate human agency” (p12).</p><p></p><p>Rees, W.E. (2010) The Human Nature of Unsustainability (Post Carbon Institute). http://www.postcarbon.org/publications/human-nature-of-unsustainability/</p><p>Rees considers the question “Why does our reasonably intelligent species seem unable to recognize the crisis for what it is an respond accordingly?” and the potential that the driving answer is human nature. Expanding Russian-born geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky assertion, Rees claims, “nothing in human affairs--including much of economic and sociopolitical behavior--makes sense except in the light of evolution” (p2). Considering natural selection of genetic, behavioral, and cultural characteristics, Rees argues the very adaptations that helped our distant ancestors survive and were passed on to us. Those “same (now ingrained) behaviors today are decidedly not helpful in solving our sustainability crisis--they have become maladaptive” (p2). Understanding how bio- and socio-evolution contribute to modern human behavior is critical for fully grasping the human predicament and beginning to formulate effective “solutions”. From a biological perspective:</p><p>“Humans’ competitive drive as K-strategists is relentless; we have no built-in ‘off’ switch tripped by sufficiency. On the contrary, we habituate to any level of consumptions (once a given level is attained, satisfaction diminishes) so the tendency to accumulate ratchets up. This is particularly so if we perceive that another social group--or country--is ‘getting ahead’ faster than we are...To reiterate: Without powerful restraints, humans--like all other species--exploit all available resources; the difference is that, with people, what is ‘accessible’ is defined by evolving technology’ (p3).</p><p>On a socio-cultural perspective, rees uses the term meme to describe “a unit of cultural information (e.g., social norms, shared beliefs, common technologies) that, like a gene can be passed between generations and influences the cultural phenotype--the outward appearance or expression--of the society concerned” (p3). Rees notes that unlike genes, memes can also be spread horizontally among generations and populations, allowing cultural evolution to take place more rapidly that biological evolution. Through the passing of memes the global community shares “a socially constructed vision of global development and poverty alleviation centered on unlimited economic expansion fueled by open markets and more liberalized trade” (p3). Of course, as has been noted elsewhere and which Rees reminds us, “unlimited economic expansion” is inoperable in a world of finite resources. Rees expands on the conflict at the nexus of this socially constructed vision, current practices, and ecological limits, using ecological footprint analysis. “To reduce the human eco-footprint, the fetishistic emphasis in free-market capitalist societies on individualism, competition, greed, and accumulation must be replaced by a reinforced sense of community, generosity, and a sense of sufficiency” (p6).</p><p></p><p>Political Shifts</p><p></p><p>Baykan, B.G. (2007) ‘From limits to growth to degrowth within French green politics’. Environmental Politics 16(3): 513-517 *PhD candidate in 2007*</p><p>Baykan considers the degrowth political movement and emergence of the Degrowth Party in France. “The degrowth movement stands for degrowth within wealthy societies that are driven by growth economics within the aim of overcoming these [environmental, social, political, and humanity] crises” (p514). Baykan explains that La de´ croissance (degrowth) entered the scientific and political lexicon in 1979 with Jaques Grinevald’s translation of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s major works. Georgescu-Roegen “introduced degrowth as an inevitable consequence of the limits imposed by the laws of nature” (p514).</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R. (1987) ‘Social traps and environmental policy’. BioScience 36: 407-412.</p><p>Constanza argues that the multiple environmental problems facing society fall within the category of phenomenon called social traps. “A social trap is any situation in which the short-run, local reinforcements guiding individual behavior are inconsistent with the long-run, global best interest of the individual and society” (p408). There are multiple causes of social traps, including: time delay, ignorance, sliding reinforcer, externality, collective, and hybrid (Table 1, p409). Costanza cites Cross and Guyer (1980) and the four methods by which traps can be avoided or escaped: “education (about the long-term, distributed impacts); insurance; superordinate authority (i.e., legal systems, government, and religion); and converting the trap to a trade-off (i.e., correcting the road signs)” (p409). Constanza finds that the United States has primarily used education and governmental regulation to escape environmental traps even though “converting traps to trade-offs seems to be a more effective method in many experimental trap situations” (p410). Constanza interprets this method in the context of environmental policy as “determining the long-run, distributed costs of environmentally hazardous activities and charging those costs to the responsible parties in the short run” and provides examples of how it might be applied to hazardous waste management, coastal wetland management, and the nuclear arms race.</p><p></p><p>Daly, H. E. (1990) ‘Toward some operational principles of sustainable development’. Ecological Economics 2: 1-6. </p><p>Daly once again puts forth a distinction between growth and development: “growth is quantitative increase in physical state, while development is qualitative improvement or unfolding of potentialities.” Daly goes on to clarify that, “An economy can growth without developing, or develop without growing.” (p1). Based on these definitions, “The term sustainable growth should be rejected as a bad oxymoron. The term sustainable development is much more apt.” (p1). Therefore, according to Daly, limits exist for growth, but not necessarily for development. Based on other literature concerning human wellbeing, it could be argued that increasing development as opposed to growth would be better aligned with the goal in increasing wellbeing In terms of policy, Daly asserts: “Fighting poverty will be much more difficult without growth. Development can help, but serious poverty reduction will require population control and redistribution aimed at limiting wealth inequality.” Daly recognizes that, “These two implications of sustainable development are too radical to be openly affirmed… But they cannot be ‘sustainably’ evaded.” (p5). Daly makes direct statements about the need to keep the scale of economy within the carrying capacity of the region, and does not shy away from acknowledging that this scale is a product of human population size and per capita resource use.</p><p></p><p>Douthwaite, R. (2012) ‘Degrowth and the supply of money in an energy-scarce world’. Ecological Economics 84: 187-193.</p><p>Douthwaite outlines how energy will become scarcer as fossil fuel resources are used, how this will affect the price of energy and consequently financing systems. Douthwaite explains, “As energy gets scarcer, its cost in terms of length of time we have to work to buy a kilowatt-hour, or its equivalent, is going to increase...energy is cheaper today that it is ever likely to be again in terms of what we have to give up to get it.” (p7). This leads the author to concluding that richer countries do not have a choice between growing and de-growing their economies. Degrowth is going to be forced by declining fossil energy supply. The choice they do have, as Douthwaite see it, is how they handle and are prepared to handle, the contraction. The article presents three tools that Douthwaite sees as essential if degrowth is not to result in catastrophic collapse: “(i) a system to share the benefits from using increasingly-scarce fossil fuels, (ii) new ways of financing businesses and (iii) the introduction of debt-free regional and local currencies.” (p1).</p><p></p><p>Garver, G. (2013) ‘The Rule of Ecological Law: The Legal Complement to Degrowth Economics’. Sustainability 5(1): 316-337. Doi: 10.3390/su5010316.</p><p>Garver presents the rule of ecological law and the legal and political structure to complement economic degrowth. The rule of ecological law is built upon the scientific and ethical foundation of planetary boundaries to the safe operating space for humanity. This foundation should be reinforced by several features:</p><p>It should recognize humans are part of Earth’s life systems.</p><p>Ecological limits must have priority over social and economic regimes.</p><p>The rule of ecological law must permeate all areas of law.</p><p>It should focus on radically reducing material and energy throughput.</p><p>It must be global, but distributed, use the principle of subsidiarity.</p><p>It must ensure fair sharing of resources among present and future generations of humans and other life.</p><p>It must be binding and supranational, with supremacy over sub-global legal regimes as necessary.</p><p>It requires a greatly expanded program of research and monitoring.</p><p>It requires precaution about crossing global ecological boundaries.</p><p>It must be adaptive.</p><p>The call for ecological law is made in response to how “the envelope of contemporary environmental law is deficient as a means to enclose and regulate the human enterprise within systems-based ecological constraints” (p317). This article provides another example of how the aims and narrative of the degrowth movement transcend the economic system.</p><p></p><p>Kallis, G. (2011) ‘In defence of degrowth’. Ecological Economics 70: 873-880. </p><p>Kallis uses the article to defend the proposal of sustainable degrowth, as an inevitable hypothesis and “potent political vision that can be socially transformative” (p873). This article is largely in response to van den Bergh 2011 article: Environment versus growth --A criticism of “degrowth” and a plan for “a-growth”. Kallis begins by arguing the premise that “resource and CO2 limits render further growth of the economy unsustainable” (p873). With limits established Kallis goes on to ask how, in a world where degrowth is inevitable due to the limits the economy faces, can degrowth “become socially sustainable, i.e. a prosperous and stable, rather than a catastrophic, descent” (p873)? In order for degrowth to be socially sustainable, Kallis argues that operating within existing market economies is insufficient. What is required is “An intertwined cultural and political change… that will embrace degrowth as a positive social development and reform those institutions that make growth an imperative” (p873). Critically, Kallis distinguishes sustainable degrowth from “negative GDP growth in a growth economy,” which is “recession, or if prolonged, depression” whereas sustainable degrowth “is a vision of a smooth process of downshifting the economy through institutional changes, managing collectively a ‘prosperous way down’ (Odum & Odum 2011)” (p875). This requires serious consideration of redistribution and the politics and ethics involved. </p><p></p><p>Kallis counters van den Bergh’s argument for “a-growth”, or indifference to the question of growth, with the claim that “the capitalist, market economies in which the majority of us live today” cannot conceivably degrow voluntarily and stabilise into a steady-state, which is what is required by the limits we face (p875). Therefore, it is more than a change in metrics or policy priorities that is needed. Kallis goes on to make the more general point: “Economists’ and politicians’ fixation with GDP is a manifestation, not a cause of society’s ‘growth fetishism’” (p877). The social embeddedness of growth is precisely why the degrowth movement includes cultural and institutional critiques of growth that reach beyond economics. From a wide range of voices on “how to degrow”, Kallis presents concrete policies including reducing working hours, institutionally guaranteeing minimum health and economic security to all, establishing labor policies that allow for less productivity and more employment in sector where human contact adds value, and creating salary caps (p876). The author goes on to consider the role of redistributive taxation, circulation of locally-based complementary currencies, taxes on environmental damages, and potentially regulatory bans. In presenting the range of possible means, Kallis makes the point that “the degrowth package is seen as part of an overall change in direction; not only the means but also the ends change” (p876).</p><p></p><p>Kallis, G., C. Kerschner and J. Martinez-Alier (2012) ‘The economics of degrowth’. Ecological Economics 84: 172-180.</p><p>Kallis, Kerschner and Martinez-Alier ask, “Economic degrowth is ecologically desirable, and possibly inevitable; but under what conditions can it become socially sustainable?” (p1). The authors review recent contributions in the economics of degrowth to begin to answer this question, and conclude with future research directions for ecological economics. In their review, the authors grouped contributions into “those strengthening the case for the desirability and feasibility of a degrowth transition; those assessing policy instruments for the transition; and those discussing its socio-political dynamics” (p1). </p><p></p><p>Ott, K. (2012) ‘Variants of de-growth and deliberative democracy: A Habermasian proposal’. Futures 44(6): 571-581.</p><p>Ott asks which combinations of economic degrowth orientation and democratic policy making might be “feasible, attractive or even mandatory” (p571). In doing so Ott distinguishes four types of degrowth: </p><p>DG-1, in which “GDP is regarded as being (1) a mere measure of economic activity and (2) as one indicator of social welfare among many” (p572). Growth rates of GDP may fluctuate between low positive and negative rates. “By implication, DG-1 rejects growth rates of GDP as evidence for good policy making” (p573).</p><p>DG-2, in which “de-growth is seen as being a mandatory strategy in order to reach specific environmental goals that might be dubbed as ‘strong sustainability,’ strong reduction of material throughput in the economic system, and standards of environmental justice which can be determined by a threshold within a capability approach and is enlarged to future generations” (p573). This type of de-growth primarily concerns itself with environmental protection and nature conservation and restoration, and opposed growth of GDP because of its environmental impacts.</p><p>DG-3, in which “de-growth is seen as liberating our lives from pervasive competition, ‘rat-race’-careers, dependency on monetary income, acceleration of the speed of life, noise and many kinds of struggling..By opposing such lifestyles and visions of happiness, DG-3 wishes to improve overall quality of life” (p574). Included in this vision of an improved quality of life are political participation and citizenship, and DG-3 therefore supports “further democratization of democratic life” (p574).</p><p>DG-4, in which “de-growth is seen as an integral part of an overall strategy to transform and eventually replace capitalistic modes of production and distribution by other modes” (p574). The variants of DG-4 are “united under that claim that reforms and regulations of contemporary capitalism would not suffice and the system should be shifted” (p574).</p><p>Ott groups the initial three types of degrowth as ‘reformist variants” as they aim to maintain the cohesion of society and its achievements. In analyzing how each of the types of degrowth fits with democratic policy making, Ott concludes, “...reformist variants of de-growth strategies and ambitious variants of democracy can, at least conceptually, be conjoined to a viable and wishful political outlook” (p571).</p><p></p><p>Tainter, J.A., T.F.H. Allen, A. Little and T.W. Hoekstra (2003) ‘Resource Transitions and Energy Gains: Contexts of Organization’, Conservation Ecology 7(3): 4. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol7/iss3/art4/</p><p>Tainter, Allen, Little, and Hoekstra take an energy gain approach to consider what settlement and organization changes will be needed within postcarbon societies. “Since the development of industrialism and economies based on fossil fuels, the world’s wealthier nations have been in a high-gain [energy] phase… we know that someday the energy opportunity cost of fossil fuels will reach the point that our dependence on such fuels will diminish.” (p10). In transitioning to lower-gain energy sources, the authors argue that more dispersed and more organized efforts will be required to maintain a sufficient flow of energy. The authors go on to point out that dispersed use of low quality resources can cause greater environmental degradation, therefore supporting the stance that reducing energy consumption is a critical piece of transitioning to postcarbon societies that cause less environmental degradation.</p><p>Commons-Based</p><p></p><p>Bauwens, M. (2009) ‘Class and Capital in Peer Production’, Capital & Class, 33, 121-141. </p><p>In considering the role of peer production and the peer-to-peer movements in capitalism, Bauwens argues that “peer production is actually a hyperproductive mode, forcing for-profit entities to adapt to its characteristics, thereby further integrating it into the existing political economy, but now without the transformative effects of its market transcending aspects” (p121). This position situates peer production as “both immanent, i.e. part and parcel of a new type of capitalism, and also transcendent: i.e. it has sufficient post-capitalist aspects that can strengthen autonomous production communities in building an alternative logic of life and production that may, under certain circumstances, overtake the current system” (p122). According to Bauwens, peer production existing within a capitalist system might lead, not to the replacement of capitalism, but rather to “the emergence of a new section of capital, netarchical capitalists, who enable and empower participation, but also monetize it and attempt to control it” (p121).</p><p></p><p>Bollier, D. (2002) ‘Reclaiming the Commons: Why We Need to Protect Our Public Resources from Private Encroachment’, Boston Review, 27: 3-4.</p><p>Bollier provides a comprehensive definition of commons, examples of modern occurrences in the US, and justification for maintaining commons as private interests continue to threaten them. For this paper, Bollier confines the discussion to the American commons, but explains that it “comprises a wide range of shared assets and forms of community governance. Some are tangible, while others are more abstract, political, and cultural”(p1-2). A tangible asset of the commons could be any of the many types of natural resources present on public lands, or public facilities like a civic center. Intangible assets include creative works and public knowledge not under copyright law, and publically funded academic research. Bollier also identifies the category of the “frontier commons” as critically important and vulnerable. The “frontier commons” includes those “features of the natural world that have historically been too large, too small, or too elusive for any market regime to capture and that be often regarded as part of a common human heritage” (p2). Finally, there is the category of commons created by so-called “gift economies”. “These are communities of shared values in which participants freely contribute time, energy, or property and over time receive benefits from membership in the community” (p2). Across each of these categories, the commons are legally and morally owned by the American people, they are also being threatened by increasing privatization. In arguing for preserving commons, Bollier poses the question of how can we “achieve a more humane and productive balance between commons and market--to set equitable and appropriate boundaries so that the market and the commons can each retain its integrity while invigorating the other” (p3). This would be in stark contrast to the current state in which the “equilibrium [between commons and market] is now out of balance as business appropriate more and more available resources, including those that everyone owns and uses in common” (p3). Bollier is therefore not presenting a case for the replacement of the market system with a commons-based one, but rather arguing for the need to halt and in some cases reverse the infringement of the market into humans’ shared “moral and civic inheritance that cannot be alienated, commodified, or sold” (p18).</p><p></p><p></p><p>Kostakis, V., and S. Stavroulakis (2013) ‘The Parody of the Commons’. TripleC 11(2): 412-424. </p><p>Similarly to Bauwens, Kostakis and Stavroulakis argue that Commons-based peer production can operate within a capitalist system, and currently is doing so, but maintains various post-capitalistic aspects. The authors find that these aspects are “in need of protection, enforcement, stimulation and connect with progressive social movements” (p412). These needs result from the potential for peer-to-peer economic relations to be undermined or distorted if forced to operate within systems designed to maintain profit-driven relations of production. Overall, this article provides a thorough explanation of commons and peer production, how they are operating within the current system, and the potential they have transcend capitalism.</p><p></p><p>Moore, P., and Karatzogianni, A. (2009) ‘Parallel Visions of Peer Production’. Capital & Class 33: 7-11.</p><p>Moore and Karatzogianni introduce the special issue of Capital & Class, which uses the example of peer-to-peer production in the context of software development and sharing to consider how the movement is shaped by new visions for value systems, ethics and governance. The authors make the case for the growing importance of peer-to-peer production:</p><p>“The peer-to-peer politico-economic model of production is currently having a great impact on business, media and global politics to the extent that social-democratic movements have taken notice of the potential of the new technoscape for social change, just as governments are engaging more and more with the financial benefits, challenges and threats of these informal communities and skills-development environments” (p7).</p><p>Though the authors do note that peer-to-peer production networks are “becoming increasingly influential in their defiance of the status quo in market based economies” (p8), they go on to make the point that peer-to-peer models do not inherently disrupt capitalism. Conversely, if peer-to-peer production is functioning within the capitalist system, there is the potential for it to conform to the system and have familiar outcome of profit-making, colonization of knowledge, and hierarchies. </p><p></p><p>Orsi, C. (2009) ‘Knowledge-Based Society, Peer Production and the Common Good’. Capital & Class 33: 31-51. </p><p>As part of the special issue introduced by Moore and Karatzogianni, Orsi “investigates the societal conditions that might help the establishment of peer-to-peer modes of production” (p31). Through this investigation, Orsi describes the current context of neoliberal knowledge-based societies and its shortcomings, argues for the “moral legitimation of an alternative societal vision” (p31). As part of this “moral legitimation” Orsi proposes two concrete structural policies that could facilitate the further establishment and development of peer-to-peer production: reduction of working time and universal basic income.</p><p>Localized Economies</p><p></p><p>Trainer, T. (2012) ‘De-growth: Do you realise what it means?’. Futures 44(6): 590-599.</p><p>By presenting the magnitude and nature of the global predicament, Trainer makes the case that “consumer-capitalist society cannot be made sustainable or just” and that a “viable post-capitalist society must take a particular form” (p590). Tainer defines this particular form as the “Simpler Way, centering on the enjoyment of non-affluent lifestyles within mostly small and highly self-sufficient local economies under local participatory control and not driven by market forces” (p590). With a specific goal of what form post-capitalist society must take, a transition strategy can be developed. A successful transition strategy, according to Trainer, will involve changes from the bottom “via slow development of ideas, understandings, and values within ordinary people, leading them to begin building and taking control of their local economies” (p597). In placing the impetus upon ordinary people, and not politicians or corporations, Trainer outlines the task of the degrowth movement as helping “people to see that radical change is necessary and attractive, so that they enthusiastically set about building the new local economies” (p597). “The most effective way to do this is to plunge into building elements of The Simpler Way, here and now, where we live… Then things begin to shake loose we will need to have established enough impressive examples so that people can see there is a better alternative, and begin moving into it” (p598). With this call and more explicit support, Trainer holds the Transition Towns Movement as a promising development to work with. In arguing for The Simpler Way and placing the priority at galvanizing a bottom-up movement, Trainer diverges from efforts to “fix” the predicament through changes in policies and economic systems.</p><p>Restructuring: “Cinderella Economy”, Reduced Work Hours, etc.</p><p></p><p>Jackson, T. and P.A. Victor (2011) ‘Productivity and Work in the “Green Economy”: Some Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Tests’. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1(1): 101-108. Doi: 10.1016/j.eist.2011.04.005.</p><p>Jackson and Victor define and explore the concept of “the ‘productivity trap’ that arises from the systematic pursuit of labour productivity” (p101). The authors go on to describe two solutions to the trap: reduce working hours, engage in structural shifts towards low productivity growth sectors” (p101). The authors argue that understanding the macro-economics of productivity is critical for understanding the transition to a sustainable economy. According to their exploration, technology, work-time reduction and structural economic change will all have a role in achieving environmental targets, including carbon targets (p108).</p><p></p><p>Sekulova, F., G. Kallis, B. Rodríguez-Labajos and F. Schneider (2013) ‘Degrowth: from theory to practice’. Journal of Cleaner Production 38: 1-6.</p><p>This article by Sekulova et al. serves as an introduction to the Special Issue of the Journal of Cleaner Production that provides a sample of contributions from the Second International conference on degrowth. The authors classify the nine contributions to the Special Issue into two categories: “four contemplate on the present system for production of goods and services and raise a number of proposals for transformation in this respect, whereas the second group deals with work and the interplay between labour and a possible energetic decline” (p2). In reviewing the contributions the authors provide insightful summaries of multiple critical concepts and policy options of the degrowth movement. They conclude with final remarks including a call for degrowth to integrate the approach of reducing the level of social and economic complexity with the approach of managing the reduction and influencing its societal context (p5).</p><p>“The first one requires re-localization of production, reduction of intermediaries, decreasing the number of appliances and volume of goods used or consumed per household, introduction of simpler technologies, etc. The second one involves adaptive and widespread macro-level measures which respond to the existing complexity and therefore: regulation of advertising, legal facilitation of work- sharing, establishing non-tradable caps on the extraction of natural resources, replicating the “Yasuni” example of leaving resources underground, redirecting investment away from infra- structure in fast and car-based modes of transport to slow-mode ones, strengthening social and ecological standards” (p5).</p><p>This call is partnered with encouragement for continued participation and exploration through debate and action, and the recognition that crafting alternatives to our current unsustainable economy requires diverse perspectives.</p><p></p><p>Victor, P.A. (2012) ‘Growth, degrowth, and climate change: A scenario analysis’, Ecological Economics 84: 206-212. http://degrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Victor_Growth-Degrowth-and-Climate-Change.pdf</p><p>Victor uses the simulation model of the Canadian economy, LowGrow, to consider several macroeconomic scenarios: ‘business as usual’ that uses past trends to project into the future, ‘selective growth’ that applies differential growth rates to parts fo the economy according to their direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions, and ‘degrowth’ in which the average GDP/capita of Canadians is reduced towards a level consistent with a world economy that respects global environmental limits. The paper concludes by comparing these scenarios. Victor concludes: “the differences between the low/no growth scenario and the business as usual scenario are far less dramatic than those between the two scenarios and the degrowth scenario. This finding highlights the significance of the level at which any high consumption economy stabilizes, something that should be made more explicit by those who advocate a steady-state economy and degrowth” (p7).</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter A. and Gideon Rosenbluth (2007) ‘Managing without growth’. Ecological Economics 61(2-3): 492-504. Doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.03.022.</p><p>Victor and Rosenbluth use the dynamic simulation model LOWGROW to explore various growth scenarios for Canada. This analysis is driven by arguments that developed countries should consider managing without economic growth due to the environmental and resources constraints, the apparent decoupling of growth from increased well-being, and the insufficiency of economic growth for meeting policy objectives including full employment, reduced poverty, and protection of the environment. Ultimately, the authors describe a scenario with conditions under which “the rate of unemployment in Canada could be reduced to historically low levels, poverty eliminated and greenhouse gas emissions reduced to comply with Canada’s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, without relying on economic growth”. Through analysis of multiple scenarios, the authors found that simply setting the model parameters to no-growth resulted in economic collapse. Instead, the authors found that explicit policy changes, such as a slightly reduced work week, increased income distribution, and increased worker support programs, were critical to achieving a stable, no-growth outcome. Accordingly, the authors recommend that no-growth not be a state to be pursued, but rather that dependence and defence of growth no longer take priority over pursuing welfare enhancing objectives.</p><p></p><p>Additional Resources</p><p>The following list of additional sources appears according to the same sections. These additional sources are accompanied by third-party summaries, with the source noted.</p><p>Population and Ecology</p><p></p><p>Tietenberg, Tom (1988) Environmental and natural resource economics (2nd ed.). Glenville, IL: Scott Foresman and Company.</p><p>Environmental and Natural Resource Economics takes a policy-oriented approach, introducing economic theory in the context of debates and empirical work from the field. Students leave the course with a global perspective of both environmental and natural resource economics. For all readers interested in environmental and natural resource economics. (Amazon.com)</p><p></p><p>Limits to Growth</p><p>Limited Resources & Sinks</p><p>Ackerman, F., Stanton, E.A., DeCanio, S.J., Goodstein, E., Howarth, R.B., Norgaard, R.B., Norman, C.S., Sheeran, K.A., 2009. The economics of 350: the benefits and costs of climate stabilization. Economics for Equity and Environment. http://e360.yale.edu/images/features/Economics_of_350.pdf </p><p>Stopping global warming and protecting the earth’s climate is a daunting challenge. To prevent a climate crisis we have to move quickly to transform the ways in which we create and use energy, develop petroleum-free transportation, and much more. These changes will not be free; there is already resistance to paying for the first steps along this road. Some think that reaching for more ambitious mitigation targets, and quicker reductions in emissions, would mean economic disaster. Some economists have become known for advocating only slow and modest responses to climate change, lest the costs of mitigation become too large. This report demonstrates that the 'go slow' recommendations are unjustified. A number of economic analyses, informed by recent scientific findings and using reasonable assumptions, suggest that more ambitious targets and quicker action make good economic sense. The warnings about climate change are growing steadily more ominous — but it has not, as a consequence, become impossibly expensive to save the planet. We can still afford a sustainable future. The bad news about climate change relates mostly to the costs of inaction. As greenhouse gas emissions grow, it is the cost of doing nothing that is becoming unbearable, not the cost of taking action. If there is reason for optimism amidst the dire warnings it is this: the costs of insuring the planet against climate disaster are not prohibitive. The best estimates of the costs of a vigorous, immediate effort to rebuild the world economy around carbon-free technologies are still in the range of one to three percent of world output (GDP) per year, even with the more stringent emissions reduction goals we are supporting. Scientific research continues to yield evidence that climate change is occurring faster, and its consequences could be more severe, than previously expected: the costs of climate inaction, or even of delay in mounting a large-scale response to the climate crisis, are getting worse and worse. We cannot afford a little climate policy, half-measures that would leave us all vulnerable to the immense risks of an increasingly destructive climate. We need a big initiative, a comprehensive global deal on protecting the earth's climate by rapidly reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. Because the status quo is not sustainable, the most economical choice is to change, as quickly, cost-effectively, and comprehensively as possible. This study looks at both sides of the equation, beginning with the worsening news about climate risks (i.e., the costs of inaction), then turning to the costs of an adequate response. </p><p></p><p>Bardi, U. (2011) The Limits to Growth Revisited. New York, NY: Springer Publishing.</p><p>“The Limits to Growth” (Meadows, 1972) generated unprecedented controversy with its predictions of the eventual collapse of the world's economies. First hailed as a great advance in science, “The Limits to Growth” was subsequently rejected and demonized. However, with many national economies now at risk and global peak oil apparently a reality, the methods, scenarios, and predictions of “The Limits to Growth” are in great need of reappraisal. In The Limits to Growth Revisited, Ugo Bardi examines both the science and the polemics surrounding this work, and in particular the reactions of economists that marginalized its methods and conclusions for more than 30 years. “The Limits to Growth” was a milestone in attempts to model the future of our society, and it is vital today for both scientists and policy makers to understand its scientific basis, current relevance, and the social and political mechanisms that led to its rejection. Bardi also addresses the all-important question of whether the methods and approaches of “The Limits to Growth” can contribute to an understanding of what happened to the global economy in the Great Recession and where we are headed from there.</p><p>Shows how “The Limits to Growth” is a subject more relevant today than when the book was first published</p><p>Demonstrates how scenario-building using system dynamics models or other methods is an essential tool in understanding possible futures</p><p>Examines the factors that may lead to the rejection of good science when the conclusions are unpleasant</p><p>Separates the reality that the future can never be predicted with certainty from the need to prepare for it</p><p>http://www.springer.com/us/book/9781441994158</p><p></p><p>Booth, D.E. (2004) Hooked on Growth: Economic Addictions and the Environment. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.</p><p>Challenging conventional wisdom on the virtues of a consumer economy, this provocative book explores the nexus between growth and environment sustainability. The miracle of the modern affluent economy is an ever-swelling cornucopia of consumer goods, leading to expanding consumption as the essential underpinning of economic growth in more and more parts of the globe. Douglas Booth contends that expansion in this form amounts to an addiction. Are we as a society hooked on economic growth of a kind that carries with it significant threats to the natural environment? A critical dilemma for the modern economy is that growth is required to prevent the pain of unemployment. As growth continues, the environment declines, but if growth slows, unemployment rises. We seem trapped in a spiraling predicament like that of the addict. </p><p></p><p>This accessible work explores whether getting "unhooked" from growth to meet the needs of the environment is possible. Giving the environment priority over growth may seem to some like a radical idea, yet the author argues that it can be accomplished using marketable emissions allowances, transferable development rights, and other tools popular with conventional economists. It can also be achieved by creating more interesting and environmentally friendly urban landscapes less beholden to the automobile. The key problem a less growth-oriented society will face is ensuring that everyone who wants employment can find it. This will require something that many people wish for anyway, a shorter workweek. More leisure, a higher-quality environment, and more attractive cities and towns are the potential rewards of a less consumption-oriented society.</p><p></p><p>Yet powerful economic interests that benefit from a high-growth economy are arrayed against changes in the status quo. Under what circumstances can the power of special interests be overcome in the name of environmental conservation? This is the author's critical final question as he offers a clear path to a sustainable economic and environmental. https://www.amazon.com/Hooked-Growth-Economic-Addictions-Environment/dp/0742527182</p><p></p><p>Daly, H. E. and J. Cobb (1989) For the common good: Redirecting the economy towards community, the environment, and a sustainable future. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.</p><p>When For the Common Good appeared in 1989, reviews were decidedly mixed. New Optionscalled it the best political book of the year and "an endlessly provocative tour-de-force." Newsday called it "refreshing and provocative." But the book was scorned by academics. The scholarly reviews were full of foul adjectives like "ponderous" and "inconclusive." One reviewer even called it "dangerous." Many academic journals simply ignored it.</p><p>The varied response to the book seems fitting considering what Herman Daly and John Cobb set out to do here. Their main goal is to deconstruct neoclassical economic theory and set forth a more holistic model that more fully accounts for the individual, the community, and the natural world. Since the book is aimed chiefly at economists, it achieves this through very detailed and closely reasoned arguments. It makes for tough but very rewarding reading.</p><p>In the first half of the book, Daly and Cobb discuss the implicit assumptions and theoretical fallacies governing contemporary economic scholarship; in the second half, they discuss numerous policy changes toward their economic goal of a society based on community and ecological balance. The book also includes an appendix where they construct an "Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare" intended to supplant Gross National Product as a measure of economic well-being. (Scott London).</p><p></p><p>Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas (1971) The entropy law and the economic process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</p><p>"Every few generations a great seminal book comes along that challenges economic analysis and through its findings alters men's thinking and the course of societal change. This is such a book, yet it is more. It is a "poetic" philosophy, mathematics, and science of economics. It is the quintessence of the thought that has been focused on the economic reality. Henceforce all economists must take these conclusions into account lest their analyses and scholarship be found wanting. "The entropy of the physical universe increases constantly because there is a continuous and irrevocable qualitative degradation of order into chaos. The entropic nature of the economic process, which degrades natural resources and pollutes the environment, constitutes the present danger. The earth is entropically winding down naturally, and economic advance is accelerating the process. Man must learn to ration the meager resources he has so profligately squandered if he is to survive in the long run when the entropic degradation of the sun will be the crucial factor, "for suprising as it may seem, the entire stock of natural resources is not worth more than a few days of sunlight!" Georgescu-Rogen has written our generation's classic in the field of economics."Library Journal </p><p>https://www.amazon.com/Entropy-Law-Economic-Process/dp/0674281640</p><p></p><p>Harvey, D. (2010) The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.</p><p>For over forty years, David Harvey has been one of the world's most trenchant and critical analysts of capitalist development. In The Enigma of Capital, he delivers an impassioned account of how unchecked neoliberalism produced the system-wide crisis that now engulfs the world. Beginning in the 1970s, profitability pressures led the capitalist class in advanced countries to shift away from investment in industrial production at home toward the higher returns that financial products promised. Accompanying this was a shift towards privatization, an absolute decline in the bargaining power of labor, and the dispersion of production throughout the developing world. The decades-long and ongoing decline in wages that accompanied this turn produced a dilemma: how can goods--especially real estate--sell at the same rate as before if workers are making less in relative terms? The answer was a huge expansion of credit that fueled the explosive growth of both the financial industry and the real estate market. When one key market collapsed--real estate--the other one did as well, and social devastation resulted. Harvey places today's crisis in the broadest possible context: the historical development of global capitalism itself from the industrial era onward. Moving deftly between this history and the unfolding of the current crisis, he concentrates on how such crises both devastate workers and create openings for challenging the system's legitimacy. The battle now will be between the still-powerful forces that want to reconstitute the system of yesterday and those that want to replace it with one that prizes social justice and economic equality. The new afterword focuses on the continuing impact of the crisis and the response to it in 2010.</p><p></p><p>Jansson, A.-M., M. Hammer, C. Folke and R. Costanza (eds.) (1994) Investing in natural capital: The ecological economic approach to sustainability. Washington, DC: Island Press.</p><p>"Investing in Natural Capital" presents the results of a workshop held following the second biannual conference of the International Society for Ecological Economics. It focuses on the relation of human development to natural capital, and the relation of natural capital to environmental processes.Because we are capable of understanding our impact on the environment and the importance of managing it sustainably, humans play a special role in our ecosystem. The book emphasizes the essential connections between natural ecosystems and human socioeconomic systems, and the importance of insuring that both remain resilient. Specific chapters deal with methodology, case material, and policy questions, and offer a thorough exploration of this provocative and important alternative to conventional economics. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781559633161 20160605</p><p></p><p>Pearce, David and Kerry Turner (1990) Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.</p><p>Reflexive Methodology established itself as a groundbreaking success, providing researchers with an invaluable guide to a central problem in research methodology e" how to put field research and interpretations in perspective, paying attention to the interpretive, political, and rhetorical nature of empirical research. Now thoroughly updated, the Second Edition includes a new chapter on positivism, social constructionism, and critical realism, and offers new conclusions on the applications of methodology. It provides further illustrations and updates that build on the acclaimed and successful First Edition. (Google books)</p><p></p><p>Polanyi, K. (1944/2001) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.</p><p>In this classic work of economic history and social theory, Karl Polanyi analyzes the economic and social changes brought about by the “great transformation” of the Industrial Revolution. His analysis explains not only the deficiencies of the self-regulating market, but the potentially dire social consequences of untempered market capitalism. New introductory material reveals the renewed importance of Polanyi’s seminal analysis in an era of globalization and free trade. (Beacon Press)</p><p></p><p>Porritt, Jonathon (2005) Capitalism --as if the world matters. London: Earthscan.</p><p>As our great economic machine grinds relentlessly forward into a future of declining fossil fuel supplies, climate change and ecosystem failure, governments are at long last beginning to question the very structure of the global economy. In this fresh, politically charged analysis, Jonathon Porritt wades in on the most pressing question of the 21st century: can capitalism, as the only real economic game in town, be retooled to deliver a sustainable future? Porritt argues that indeed it can, and it must, as he lays out the framework for a new ?sustainable capitalism? that cuts across the political divide and promises a prosperous future of wealth, equity and ecosystem integrity. (Google books)</p><p></p><p>Schumpeter, J. (1975/1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Harper and Row.</p><p>Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy remains one of the greatest works of social theory written this century. When it first appeared the New English Weekly predicted that `for the next five to ten years it will cetainly remain a work with which no one who professes any degree of information on sociology or economics can afford to be unacquainted.' Fifty years on, this prediction seems a little understated.</p><p></p><p>Why has the work endured so well? Schumpeter's contention that the seeds of capitalism's decline were internal, and his equal and opposite hostility to centralist socialism have perplexed, engaged and infuriated readers since the book's publication. By refusing to become an advocate for either position Schumpeter was able both to make his own great and original contribution and to clear the way for a more balanced consideration of the most important social movements of his and our time. (Google books)</p><p></p><p>Stern, Nicholas (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>There is now clear scientific evidence that emissions from economic activity, particularly the burning of fossil fuels for energy, are causing changes to the Earth's climate. A sound understanding of the economics of climate change is needed in order to underpin an effective global response to this challenge. The Stern Review is an independent, rigourous and comprehensive analysis of the economic aspects of this crucial issue. It has been conducted by Sir Nicholas Stern, Head of the UK Government Economic Service, and a former Chief Economist of the World Bank. The Economics of Climate Change will be invaluable for all students of the economics and policy implications of climate change, and economists, scientists and policy makers involved in all aspects of climate change. (Google books)</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter A. (2008) Managing Without Growth: Slower by Design, Not Disaster. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.</p><p>Peter Victor challenges the priority that rich countries continue to give to economic growth as an over-arching objective of economic policy. The challenge is based on a critical analysis of the literature on environmental and resource limits to growth, on the disconnect between higher incomes and happiness, and on the failure of economic growth to meet other key economic, social and environmental policy objectives. </p><p>Shortly after World War II, economic growth became the paramount economic policy objective in most countries, a position that it maintains today. This book presents three arguments on why rich countries should turn away from economic growth as the primary policy objective and pursue more specific objectives that enhance wellbeing. The author contends that continued economic growth worldwide is unrealistic due to environmental and resource constraints. If rich countries continue to push growth, poorer countries, where the benefits are more evident, will lag. Rising incomes increase happiness and wellbeing only up to a level that has since been surpassed in rich countries. Moreover, economic growth has not brought full employment, eliminated poverty or reduced the burden of the economy on the environment. By combining a systems approach with more conventional economic analysis, Peter Victor provides new insights into a pressing issue at the frontier of ecological economics in a way that will appeal to a wide audience. (Amazon)</p><p></p><p>Young, M. D. (1992) Sustainable investment and resource use: Equity, environmental integrity, and economic efficiency. Park Ridge, NJ: Parthenon.</p><p>Each year throughout the world, humans use some 40% of the total amount of terrestrial primary production. Global, national and local resource stocks, particularly renewable resource stocks, are being depleted. There are many explanations for this decline, but one two-edged sword which is emerging to the forefront of the debate is government policy. Despite well-intentioned government programmes and objectives, government policy has significantly added to and exacerbated other pressures on resources - including those owned by governments themselves. If the situation is to be improved then government policy - fiscal policy, monetary policy, regulatory policy and education policy - must be changed. This book is largely about those actions which governments can take to improve resource use by stimulating envrionementally positive forms of investment in order to achieve what is now known as sustainable development. This work aims to alert the reader to the ecological dangers that the increasing world population, holes in the ozone layer and loss of species diversity will cause and examines the sorts of extra economic investment and growth that will be required to fight what may be irreversible change. The book emphasizes that it is critical that any planned investment take on an ecologically astute character which is "uncoupled" from environmental degradation and resource depletion. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781850703815 20160527</p><p>Economic Growth & Wellbeing</p><p>Doyal, Len and Ian Gough (1991) A Theory of Human Needs. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.</p><p>Rejecting fashionable subjectivist and cultural relativist approaches, this important new book argues that human beings have universal and objective needs for health and autonomy and a right to their optimal satisfaction. The authors develop a system of social indicators to show what such optimisation would mean in practice and assess the records of a wide range of developed and underdeveloped economies in meeting their citizens' needs. 'An extremely challenging and thought-provoking study which will undoubtedly become the focus of a major debate. After a period when social democratic and socialist thought have been in retreat this book signals a rekindling of hope and commitment...their arguments are likely to set the terms of the debate from now on.' - Andrew Gamble 'An ambitious and very welcome book...[which] combines a tight argument and a wide ranging application...This will prove a major text not just in terms of the theory presented and the data that is summarised but in the research questions it poses.' - Nigel Parton, Times Higher Education Supplement '(A) scrupulous and sophisticated case...for the ascription of universal needs...What is important and original...about [Doyal and Gough's] project is that it not only tells us what our basic needs are. ..but offers empirical criteria for the meeting of these goals...' - Kate Soper, New Left Review. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780333383247 20160527</p><p></p><p>Gorz, Audré (1999) Reclaiming Work --beyond the wage-based society. London: Policy Press. </p><p>Over the last twenty-five years, Western societies have been reversing into the future. They are able neither to reproduce themselves in accordance with past norms, nor to exploit the unprecedented freedom offered by the savings in working time which new technology has generated. In this major new book, Andr Gorz argues that the societies created by Fordism have been falling apart and have given way to "non-societies", in which a tiny dominant stratum has grabbed most of the surplus wealth. In the absence of any alternative political project, social disintegration and individual despair have prevailed. Mainstream economists seek solutions to this "crisis", but Gorz argues that we are in fact in the grip of a new system which is abolishing work as we know it. The worst forms of exploitation are being restored, as each is forced to fight against all (both at the individual and the national level) in a desperate struggle to obtain the diminishing supply of work. In the face of these developments, Gorz argues that we should fight not against the destruction of work itself (in the sense of stable employment), but against the new system's efforts to perpetuate the ideology of work as a source of rights. We should welcome the reduction in the working hours required to meet our material needs and should realize the creative potential that this reduction could release. Through measures such as a sufficient unconditional basic income for all and new, co-operative economic structures, we can reclaim work and rebuild a future beyond the wage-based society. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780745621272 20160527</p><p></p><p>Layard, R. (2005) Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London, UK: Allen Lane.</p><p>There is a paradox at the heart of our lives. We all want more money, but as societies become richer, they do not become happier. This is not speculation: It's the story told by countless pieces of scientific research. We now have sophisticated ways of measuring how happy people are, and all the evidence shows that on average people have grown no happier in the last fifty years, even as average incomes have more than doubled. The central question the great economist Richard Layard asks in "Happiness" is this: If we really wanted to be happier, what would we do differently? First we'd have to see clearly what conditions generate happiness and then bend all our efforts toward producing them. That is what this book is about-the causes of happiness and the means we have to effect it. Until recently there was too little evidence to give a good answer to this essential question, but, Layard shows us, thanks to the integrated insights of psychology, sociology, applied economics, and other fields, we can now reach some firm conclusions, conclusions that will surprise you. Happiness is an illuminating road map, grounded in hard research, to a better, happier life for us all. From one of the leading voices in the new field of happiness studies comes a groundbreaking statement of the case: what happiness is, exactly, and how to get more of it, as individuals and as a society. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781594200397 20160527</p><p></p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter (2008) Managing Without Growth --Slower by design not disaster. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.</p><p>Peter Victor challenges the priority that rich countries continue to give to economic growth as an over-arching objective of economic policy. This challenge is based on a critical analysis of the literature on environmental and resource limits to growth, on the disconnect between higher incomes and happiness, and on the failure of economic growth to meet other key economic, social and environmental policy objectives. Shortly after World War II, economic growth became the paramount economic policy objective in most countries, a position that it maintains today. This book presents three arguments on why rich countries should turn away from economic growth as the primary policy objective and pursue more specific objectives that enhance well-being. The author contends that continued economic growth worldwide is unrealistic due to environmental and resource constraints. If rich countries continue to push growth, poorer countries, where the benefits are more evident, will lag. Rising incomes increase happiness and well-being only up to a level that has since been surpassed in rich countries. Moreover, economic growth has not brought full employment, eliminated poverty or reduced the burden of the economy on the environment. By combining a systems approach with more conventional economic analysis, Peter Victor provides new insights into a pressing issue at the frontier of ecological economics in a way that will appeal to a wide audience. Academics, students, activists and interested lay readers will find this well argued book illuminating and compelling. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781847200785 20160527</p><p></p><p>Escobar, Arturo (2012) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</p><p>Exploring why the industrialized nations of North America and Europe came to be seen as appropriate development models for post-World War II societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, this study examines the roles of economics and cultural discourse in development policies. </p><p></p><p>How did the industrialized nations of North America and Europe come to be seen as the appropriate models for post-World War II societies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America? How did the postwar discourse on development actually create the so-called Third World? And what will happen when development ideology collapses? To answer these questions, Arturo Escobar shows how development policies became mechanisms of control that were just as pervasive and effective as their colonial counterparts. The development apparatus generated categories powerful enough to shape the thinking even of its occasional critics while poverty and hunger became widespread. 'Development' was not even partially 'deconstructed' until the 1980s, when new tools for analyzing the representation of social reality were applied to specific 'Third World' cases. Here Escobar deploys these new techniques in a provocative analysis of development discourse and practice in general, concluding with a discussion of alternative visions for a postdevelopment era. Escobar emphasizes the role of economists in development discourse - his case study of Colombia demonstrates that the economization of food resulted in ambitious plans, and more hunger. To depict the production of knowledge and power in other development fields, the author shows how peasants, women, and nature became objects of knowledge and targets of power under the 'gaze of experts'. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780691001029 20160528</p><p></p><p>Equity</p><p>Brown, M.T. (2010) Civilizing the Economy: A New Economics of Provision. Cambridge: </p><p>Cambridge University Press.</p><p>When a handful of people thrive while whole industries implode and millions suffer, it is clear that something is wrong with our economy. The wealth of the few is disconnected from the misery of the many. In Civilizing the Economy, Marvin Brown traces the origin of this economics of dissociation to early capitalism, showing how this is illustrated in Adam Smith's denial of the central role of slavery in wealth creation. In place of the Smithian economics of property, Brown proposes that we turn to the original meaning of economics as household management. He presents a new framework for the global economy that reframes its purpose as the making of provisions instead of the accumulation of property. This bold new vision establishes the civic sphere as the platform for organizing an inclusive economy and as a way to move toward a more just and sustainable world. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780521767323 20160604</p><p></p><p>Gadgil, Madhav and Ramachandra Guha (1996) Ecology and Equity --the use and abuse of nature in contemporary India. New York: Routledge, 35.</p><p>Environmental destruction is seen a matter of worldwide concern but as a Third World problem. This study explores the ecologically complex country of India, whose peoples range from technocrats to hunter-gathers and its environments from dense forest to wasteland. The book analyzes the use and abuse of nature on the sub-continent to reveal the interconnections of social and environmental conflict on the global scale. The authors argue that the root of this conflict is competition within different social groups and between different economic interests for natural resources. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780415125246 20160527</p><p></p><p>Piketty, Thomas (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.</p><p>What are the grand dynamics that drive the accumulation and distribution of capital? Questions about the long-term evolution of inequality, the concentration of wealth, and the prospects for economic growth lie at the heart of political economy. But satisfactory answers have been hard to find for lack of adequate data and clear guiding theories. In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, "Thomas Piketty analyzes a unique collection of data from twenty countries, ranging as far back as the eighteenth century, to uncover key economic and social patterns. His findings will transform debate and set the agenda for the next generation of thought about wealth and inequality. Piketty shows that modern economic growth and the diffusion of knowledge have allowed us to avoid inequalities on the apocalyptic scale predicted by Karl Marx. But we have not modified the deep structures of capital and inequality as much as we thought in the optimistic decades following World War II. The main driver of inequality--the tendency of returns on capital to exceed the rate of economic growth--today threatens to generate extreme inequalities that stir discontent and undermine democratic values. But economic trends are not acts of God. Political action has curbed dangerous inequalities in the past, Piketty says, and may do so again. A work of extraordinary ambition, originality, and rigor, Capital in the Twenty-First Century "reorients our understanding of economic history and confronts us with sobering lessons for today. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780674430006 20160613</p><p></p><p>Martínez-Alier, Joan (2002) The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. </p><p>The Environmentalism of the Poor has the explicit intention of helping to establish two emerging fields of study – political ecology and ecological economics – whilst also investigating the relations between them.</p><p></p><p>The book analyses several manifestations of the growing ‘environmental justice movement’, and also of ‘popular environmentalism’ and the ‘environmentalism of the poor’, which will be seen in the coming decades as driving forces in the process to achieve an ecologically sustainable society. The author studies, in detail, many ecological distribution conflicts in history and at present, in urban and rural settings, showing how poor people often favour resource conservation. The environment is thus not so much a luxury of the rich as a necessity of the poor. It concludes with the fundamental questions: who has the right to impose a language of valuation and who has the power to simplify complexity? </p><p></p><p>Joan Martinez-Alier combines the study of ecological conflicts and the study of environmental valuation in a totally original approach that will appeal to a wide cross-section of academics, ecologists and environmentalists. (Edward Elgar)</p><p></p><p>Norgaard, Richard B. (1994) Development betrayed: The end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future. London, UK: Routledge.</p><p>Modernity promised control over nature through science; material abundance through technology; and effective government through rational, social organization. Instead of leading to the promised land it has brought us to the brink of environmental and cultural disaster. Why has such a gap developed between modernity's aspirations and its achievements? Norgaard aims to provide an answer. Development with its unshakeable commitment to the idea of progress, is rooted in modernism and has been betrayed by each of its major tenets. Attempts to control nature have led towards environmental catastrophe. Western technologies have proved inappropriate for the needs of the rest of the world, and governments are unable to respond effectively to the crises that have resulted. Presenting a thorough critique of the ideas behind development, the author also offers an alternative co-evolutionary paradigm, in which development is portrayed as a co-evolution between cultural and ecological systems. Rather than a future where everyone converges upon one best way of knowing and doing things, he envisages a future patchwork quilt of cultures. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780415068611 20160527</p><p></p><p>Wilkinson, Richard (2005) The Impact of Inequality: How to make sick societies healthier. London: Routledge.</p><p>Comparing the United States with other market democracies and one state with another, this book offers irrefutable evidence that unequal societies create poor health, more social conflict, and more violence. Richard Wilkinson, a pioneering social scientist, addresses the growing feeling—so common in the United States—that modern societies, despite their material success, are social failures. The Impact of Inequality explains why inequality has such devastating effects on the quality and length of our lives.</p><p></p><p>Wilkinson shows that inequality leads to stress, stress creates sickness on the individual and mass level, and overall society suffers widespread unhappiness and high levels of violence, depression, and mistrust across the social spectrum. The evidence he presents is incontrovertible: social and political equality are essential to improve life for everyone. Wilkinson argues that even small reductions in inequality can make an important difference—for, as this book explains, social relations are always built on material foundations. (The New Press)</p><p>Theories in Response to Limits</p><p>Ecological Economics</p><p></p><p>Berkes, F. and C. Folke (1994) ‘Investing in cultural capital for sustainable use of natural capital’. In A.-M. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza (eds.), Investing in natural capital: The ecological economics approach to sustainability, pp.128-149. Washington, DC: Island Press.</p><p>"Investing in Natural Capital" presents the results of a workshop held following the second biannual conference of the International Society for Ecological Economics. It focuses on the relation of human development to natural capital, and the relation of natural capital to environmental processes.Because we are capable of understanding our impact on the environment and the importance of managing it sustainably, humans play a special role in our ecosystem. The book emphasizes the essential connections between natural ecosystems and human socioeconomic systems, and the importance of insuring that both remain resilient. Specific chapters deal with methodology, case material, and policy questions, and offer a thorough exploration of this provocative and important alternative to conventional economics. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781559633161 20160605</p><p></p><p>Common, M. and S. Stagl (2005) Ecological Economics: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press</p><p>Taking as its starting point the interdependence of the economy and the natural environment, this book provides a comprehensive introduction to the emerging field of ecological economics. The authors, who have written extensively on the economics of sustainability, build on insights from both mainstream economics and ecological sciences. Part I explores the interdependence of the modern economy and its environment, while Part II focuses mainly on the economy and on economics. Part III looks at how national governments set policy targets and the instruments used to pursue those targets. Part IV examines international trade and institutions, and two major global threats to sustainability - climate change and biodiversity loss. Assuming no prior knowledge of economics, this textbook is well suited for use on interdisciplinary environmental science and management courses. It has extensive student-friendly features including discussion questions and exercises, keyword highlighting, real-world illustrations, further reading and website addresses. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780521816458 20160528</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R. (ed) (1991) Ecological economics: The science and management of sustainability. New York: Columbia University Press.</p><p>Outlines an interdisciplinary approach to the understanding and management of the ecology and sustainable economics on local, regional and global scales. The topics discussed include the modelling of ecological economics systems and the institutional changes required. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780231075633 20160528</p><p></p><p>Daly, H. and J.C. Farley (2011) Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Island Press</p><p>Conventional economics is increasingly criticized for failing to reflect the value of clean air and water, species diversity, and social and generational equity. By excluding biophysical and social reality from its analyses and equations, conventional economics seems ill-suited to address problems in a world characterized by increasing human impacts and decreasing natural resources. Ecological Economics is an introductory-level textbook for an emerging paradigm that addresses this fundamental flaw in conventional economics. The book defines a revolutionary "transdiscipline" that incorporates insights from the biological, physical, and social sciences, and it offers a pedagogically complete examination of this exciting new field. The book provides students with a foundation in traditional neoclassical economic thought, but places that foundation within a new interdisciplinary framework that embraces the linkages among economic growth, environmental degradation, and social inequity. Introducing the three core issues that are the focus of the new transdiscipline -- scale, distribution, and efficiency -- the book is guided by the fundamental question, often assumed but rarely spoken in traditional texts: What is really important to us? After explaining the key roles played by the earth's biotic and abiotic resources in sustaining life, the text is then organized around the main fields in traditional economics: microeconomics, macroeconomics, and international economics. The book also takes an additional step of considering the policy implications of this line of thinking. Ecological Economics includes numerous features that make it accessible to a wide range of students: more than thirty text boxes that highlight issues of special importance to students; lists of key terms that help students organize the main points in each chapter; concise definitions of new terms that are highlighted in the text for easy reference; study questions that encourage student exploration beyond the text; glossary and list of further readings; An accompanying workbook presents an innovative, applied problem-based learning approach to teaching economics. While many books have been written on ecological economics, and several textbooks describe basic concepts of the field, this is the only stand-alone textbook that offers a complete explanation of both theory and practice. It will serve an important role in educating a new generation of economists and is an invaluable new text for undergraduate and graduate courses in ecological economics, environmental economics, development economics, human ecology, environmental studies, sustainability science, and community development. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781559633123 20160528</p><p></p><p>Ekins, P. and M. Max-Neef (eds) (1992) Real-life Economics: understanding wealth creation. London: Routledge.</p><p>Since the end of the Second World War, industrial economic activity has been generated on an unparalleled scale. This continuous search for yet greater output and productivity have been dominant policy objectives of practically every country in the world for the past 50 years. However, there is a cost for industrial growth on this scale and the price has been and is being paid in widespread social and cultural disruption and potentially catastrophic effects on the global environment. Real Life Economics challenges traditional economic theories which have promted this situation and constructs an economic framework within which it can be both understood and ameliorated. This framework is designed to illuminate and offer guidance about practical matters of an economic nature in the real world, in order to help in the construction of an economy more productive of human welfare. The book is divided into three parts. The first part defines the place of the economy in broader human culture. It begins with a clarification of issues of methodology, process and purpose. It goes on to develop a perspective of the whole economy and models the process of wealth creation. Part 11 presents a deeper discussion of economic progress and development and how they can be measured in practice. Part 11 discusses the relationship between the market, the state and non-monetary production. Despite its innovative interdisciplinary approach, Real-Life Economics remains recognisably economic in nature, incorporating many of the means and concepts from a variety of the schools of thought (including the neoclassical) which constitute the economics discipline today. The individual papers, from contributors manyof whom are among the acknowledged leaders in their respective fields, are woven together by editorial comment into a powerful statement of an important new economic perspective. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780415079778 20160527</p><p></p><p>Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas (1971) The entropy law and the economic process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</p><p>“Every few generations a great seminal book comes along that challenges economic analysis and through its findings alters men's thinking and the course of societal change. This is such a book, yet it is more. It is a "poetic" philosophy, mathematics, and science of economics. It is the quintessence of the thought that has been focused on the economic reality. Henceforth all economists must take these conclusions into account lest their analyses and scholarship be found wanting. “The entropy of the physical universe increases constantly because there is a continuous and irrevocable qualitative degradation of order into chaos. The entropic nature of the economic process, which degrades natural resources and pollutes the environment, constitutes the present danger. The earth is entropically winding down naturally, and economic advance is accelerating the process. Man must learn to ration the meager resources he has so profligately squandered if he is to survive in the long run when the entropic degradation of the sun will be the crucial factor, "for suprising as it may seem, the entire stock of natural resources is not worth more than a few days of sunlight!" Georgescu-Rogen has written our generation's classic in the field of economics." Library Journal</p><p></p><p>Jansson, A.-M., M. Hammer, C. Folke and R. Costanza (eds.) (1994) Investing in natural capital: The ecological economic approach to sustainability. Washington, DC: Island Press.</p><p>"Investing in Natural Capital" presents the results of a workshop held following the second biannual conference of the International Society for Ecological Economics. It focuses on the relation of human development to natural capital, and the relation of natural capital to environmental processes.Because we are capable of understanding our impact on the environment and the importance of managing it sustainably, humans play a special role in our ecosystem. The book emphasizes the essential connections between natural ecosystems and human socioeconomic systems, and the importance of insuring that both remain resilient. Specific chapters deal with methodology, case material, and policy questions, and offer a thorough exploration of this provocative and important alternative to conventional economics. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781559633161 20160605</p><p></p><p>Odum, H. T. (1971) Environment, power and society. New York, NY: John Wiley.</p><p>"Environment, Power and Society" is one of the seminal texts in Environmental Science. It is a wide-ranging book that presents systems ecology: the study of ecological relationships based on flows of matter and energy through the environment. Based on concepts adapted from the fields of engineering and operations research, systems ecology is an important tool for understanding how natural ecosystems function. Odum has been a pioneer in the field, one of the first to understand the importance of energy relationships, and also, as demonstrated in this book, one of the first to integrate human activities into the picture, thus laying the groundwork for human ecology and environmental engineering. (Amazon.com)</p><p>Steady State</p><p>Daly, H. E. and J. Cobb (1994) For the common good: Redirecting the economy towards community, the environment, and a sustainable future. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.</p><p>Updated and Expanded Edition. Winner of the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order 1992, Named New Options Best Political Book. Economist Herman Daly and theologian John Cobb, Jr., demonstrate how conventional economics and a growth-oriented industrial economy have led us to the brink of environmental disaster, and show the possibility of a different future. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>Dietz, R., and O’Neill, D. (2013) Enough is Enough: Building a sustainable economy in a world of finite resources. http://steadystate.org/discover/enough-is-enough/. San Francisco, CA : Berrett-Koehler Publishers.</p><p>We're overusing the earth's finite resources, and yet excessive consumption is failing to improve our lives. In Enough Is Enough, Rob Dietz and Dan O'Neill lay out a visionary but realistic alternative to the perpetual pursuit of economic growth--an economy where the goal is not more but enough. They explore specific strategies to conserve natural resources, stabilize population, reduce inequality, fix the financial system, create jobs, and more--all with the aim of maximizing long-term well-being instead of short-term profits. Filled with fresh ideas and surprising optimism, Enough Is Enough is the primer for achieving genuine prosperity and a hopeful future for all. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>Lewis, M., and Conaty, P. (2012) The Resilience Imperative: Cooperative Transitions to a Steady-State Economy. Gambriola Island: New Society Publishers.</p><p>We find ourselves between a rock and a hot place compelled by the intertwining forces of peak oil and climate change to reinvent our economic life at a much more local and regional scale. The Resilience Imperative argues for a major SEE (Social, Ecological, Economic) Change as a prerequisite for replacing the paradigm of limitless economic growth with a more decentralized, cooperative, steady-state economy. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p>Degrowth</p><p>Latouche, S. (2009) Farewell to Growth. Cambridge, MA: Polity.</p><p>Most of us who live in the North and the West consume far too much - too much meat, too much fat, too much sugar, too much salt. We are more likely to put on too much weight than to go hungry. We live in a society that is heading for a crash. We are aware of what is happening and yet we refuse to take it fully into account. Above all we refuse to address the issue that lies at the heart of our problems - namely, the fact that our societies are based on an economy whose only goal is growth for growth's sake. Serge Latouche argues that we need to rethink from the very foundations the idea that our societies should be based on growth. He offers a radical alternative - a society of 'de-growth'. De-growth is not the same thing as negative growth. We should be talking about 'a-growth', in the sense in which we speak of 'a-theism'. And we do indeed have to abandon a faith or religion - that of the economy, progress and development-and reject the irrational and quasi-idolatrous cult of growth for growth's sake. While many realize that that the never-ending pursuit of growth is incompatible with a finite planet, we have yet to come to terms with the implications of this - the need to produce less and consume less. But if we do not change course, we are heading for an ecological and human disaster. There is still time to imagine, quite calmly, a system based upon a different logic, and to plan for a 'de-growth society'. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780745646169 20160604</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter A. (2008) Managing Without Growth: Slower by Design, Not Disaster. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.</p><p>Peter Victor challenges the priority that rich countries continue to give to economic growth as an over-arching objective of economic policy. This challenge is based on a critical analysis of the literature on environmental and resource limits to growth, on the disconnect between higher incomes and happiness, and on the failure of economic growth to meet other key economic, social and environmental policy objectives. Shortly after World War II, economic growth became the paramount economic policy objective in most countries, a position that it maintains today. This book presents three arguments on why rich countries should turn away from economic growth as the primary policy objective and pursue more specific objectives that enhance well-being. The author contends that continued economic growth worldwide is unrealistic due to environmental and resource constraints. If rich countries continue to push growth, poorer countries, where the benefits are more evident, will lag. Rising incomes increase happiness and well-being only up to a level that has since been surpassed in rich countries. Moreover, economic growth has not brought full employment, eliminated poverty or reduced the burden of the economy on the environment. By combining a systems approach with more conventional economic analysis, Peter Victor provides new insights into a pressing issue at the frontier of ecological economics in a way that will appeal to a wide audience. Academics, students, activists and interested lay readers will find this well argued book illuminating and compelling. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781847200785 20160527</p><p>Macroeconomic Models</p><p>Hall, Robert and David Papell (2005) Macroeconomics: Economic growth, fluctuations and policy. New York: W.W. Norton 7 Co..</p><p>The Sixth Edition incorporates the most current data and theory into the text’s signature single-model approach, clearly demonstrating the real-world applications of macroeconomic theory. Additionally, the Sixth Edition has been revised to include updated and expanded coverage of long-run economic growth, the Taylor Rule, and international economics. A revised study guide and a new online edition of Macrosolve, the innovative multimedia learning resource, are fully integrated with the text. (Amazon.com)</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter A. (2008) Managing Without Growth: Slower by Design, Not Disaster. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.</p><p>Peter Victor challenges the priority that rich countries continue to give to economic growth as an over-arching objective of economic policy. This challenge is based on a critical analysis of the literature on environmental and resource limits to growth, on the disconnect between higher incomes and happiness, and on the failure of economic growth to meet other key economic, social and environmental policy objectives. Shortly after World War II, economic growth became the paramount economic policy objective in most countries, a position that it maintains today. This book presents three arguments on why rich countries should turn away from economic growth as the primary policy objective and pursue more specific objectives that enhance well-being. The author contends that continued economic growth worldwide is unrealistic due to environmental and resource constraints. If rich countries continue to push growth, poorer countries, where the benefits are more evident, will lag. Rising incomes increase happiness and well-being only up to a level that has since been surpassed in rich countries. Moreover, economic growth has not brought full employment, eliminated poverty or reduced the burden of the economy on the environment. By combining a systems approach with more conventional economic analysis, Peter Victor provides new insights into a pressing issue at the frontier of ecological economics in a way that will appeal to a wide audience. Academics, students, activists and interested lay readers will find this well argued book illuminating and compelling. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781847200785 20160527</p><p>Practices and Policies Based on Theories</p><p>Porritt, Jonathon (2007) Capitalism as if the World Matters. London: Earthscan.</p><p>When first published, "Capitalism as if the World Matters", by one of the leading 'eco-warriors' of our time, shocked a generation of both environmentalists and business people. Jonathon Porritt brushed aside their artificial battle lines with a powerful argument that the only way to save the world from environmental catastrophe is to embrace a new type of capitalism, and to do it quickly. In this substantially revised and updated edition, Porritt extends his powerful and controversial argument by providing fresh evidence and suggesting new actions. New content includes in-depth coverage of the USA, with case studies examining the role of huge American corporations such as Wal-Mart and General Electric, plus a close look at China and the global impact this economic giant may have in the 21st century. This is a must-read for everyone who has a stake in the future of the world, from business executives to environmental activists, from community leaders to the politicians with their hands on the levers of power. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781844071937 20160528</p><p>Metrics & Indicators</p><p>Anderson, Victor (1991) Alternative Economic Indicators. London: Routledge.</p><p>Growth is the main priority of economic policy, but it is now apparent that the environmental and social costs of growth are too high. If growth is no longer the goal of economic policy, what are the alternatives? "Alternative Economic Indicators" looks at this issue in the context of National Income accounting. After discussing and rejecting various possible ways of adjusting the existing systems of Gross National and Gross Domestic Product, Victor Anderson argues for an expanded conception of economics which gives attention to environmental and social indicators, as well as to financial ones. He discusses a selection of possible indicators and argues for a particular set. He presents and analyzes statistical data on the selected indicators for 14 countries and draws conclusions about the issue of indicators and the state of the world. This book should be of interest to lecturers and students of economics, environmental science and the general reader interested in green issues. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780415041645 20160527</p><p></p><p>Costanza, R., M. Hart, S. Posner and J. Talberth (2009) Beyond GDP: The Need for New Measures of Progress. The Pardee Papers, no. 4. Boston, MA: Boston University.</p><p>This paper is a call for better indicators of human well-being in nations around the world. We critique the inappropriate use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a measure of national well-being, something for which it was never designed. We also question the idea that economic growth is always synonymous with improved well-being. Useful measures of progress and well-being must be measures of the degree to which society’s goals (i.e., to sustainably provide basic human needs for food, shelter, freedom, participation, etc.) are met, rather than measures of the mere volume of marketed economic activity, which is only one means to that end. Various alternatives and complements to GDP are discussed in terms of their motives, objectives, and limitations. Some of these are revised measures of economic activity while others measure changes in community capital—natural, social, human, and built—in an attempt to measure the extent to which development is using up the principle of community capital rather than living off its interest. We conclude that much useful work has been done; many of the alternative indicators have been used successfully in various levels of community planning. But the continued misuse of GDP as a measure of well-being necessitates an immediate, aggressive, and ongoing campaign to change the indicators that decision makers are using to guide policies and evaluate progress. We need indicators that promote truly sustainable development—development that improves the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of the supporting ecosystems. We end with a call for consensus on appropriate new measures of progress toward this new social goal. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter A. (2008) Managing Without Growth: Slower by Design, Not Disaster. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.</p><p>Peter Victor challenges the priority that rich countries continue to give to economic growth as an over-arching objective of economic policy. This challenge is based on a critical analysis of the literature on environmental and resource limits to growth, on the disconnect between higher incomes and happiness, and on the failure of economic growth to meet other key economic, social and environmental policy objectives. Shortly after World War II, economic growth became the paramount economic policy objective in most countries, a position that it maintains today. This book presents three arguments on why rich countries should turn away from economic growth as the primary policy objective and pursue more specific objectives that enhance well-being. The author contends that continued economic growth worldwide is unrealistic due to environmental and resource constraints. If rich countries continue to push growth, poorer countries, where the benefits are more evident, will lag. Rising incomes increase happiness and well-being only up to a level that has since been surpassed in rich countries. Moreover, economic growth has not brought full employment, eliminated poverty or reduced the burden of the economy on the environment. By combining a systems approach with more conventional economic analysis, Peter Victor provides new insights into a pressing issue at the frontier of ecological economics in a way that will appeal to a wide audience. Academics, students, activists and interested lay readers will find this well argued book illuminating and compelling. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781847200785 20160527</p><p>Considering Externalities: “Getting the Price Right”</p><p></p><p>Booth, D.E. (2004) Hooked on Growth: Economic Addictions and the Environment. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.</p><p>This accessible and provocative book explores whether getting unhooked from economic growth to meet the needs of the environment is possible. Although giving the environment priority over growth may seem radical, the author argues that it can be accomplished using marketable emissions allowances, transferable development rights, and other tools popular with conventional economists. It can also be achieved by creating more interesting and environmentally friendly urban landscapes less beholden to the automobile. The key problem will be ensuring that everyone who wants employment can find it. This will require a transition to a shorter workweek, the wistful goal of many a harried worker. More leisure, a higher-quality environment, and more attractive cities and towns are the potential rewards of a less consumption-oriented society. Yet how can the power of special interests be overcome in the name of environmental conservation? This is the author's critical final question as he offers a clear path to a sustainable economic and environmental future. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780742527188 20160528</p><p></p><p>Jansson, A.-M., M. Hammer, C. Folke and R. Costanza (eds.) (1994) Investing in natural capital: The ecological economic approach to sustainability. Washington, DC: Island Press.</p><p>"Investing in Natural Capital" presents the results of a workshop held following the second biannual conference of the International Society for Ecological Economics. It focuses on the relation of human development to natural capital, and the relation of natural capital to environmental processes.Because we are capable of understanding our impact on the environment and the importance of managing it sustainably, humans play a special role in our ecosystem. The book emphasizes the essential connections between natural ecosystems and human socioeconomic systems, and the importance of insuring that both remain resilient. Specific chapters deal with methodology, case material, and policy questions, and offer a thorough exploration of this provocative and important alternative to conventional economics. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781559633161 20160605</p><p>Social Shifts</p><p>Dietz, R., and O’Neill, D. (2013) Enough is Enough: Building a sustainable economy in a world of finite resources. http://steadystate.org/discover/enough-is-enough/</p><p>We're overusing the earth's finite resources, and yet excessive consumption is failing to improve our lives. In Enough Is Enough, Rob Dietz and Dan O'Neill lay out a visionary but realistic alternative to the perpetual pursuit of economic growth--an economy where the goal is not more but enough. They explore specific strategies to conserve natural resources, stabilize population, reduce inequality, fix the financial system, create jobs, and more--all with the aim of maximizing long-term well-being instead of short-term profits. Filled with fresh ideas and surprising optimism, Enough Is Enough is the primer for achieving genuine prosperity and a hopeful future for all. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>Hayward, Bronwyn and Karen O’Brien (2010) ‘Security of what for whom? Rethinking social contracts in a changing climate’. In O’Brien, K.L., A. St. Clair and B. Kristofferson (eds). Climate Change, Ethics, and Human Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>http://ebooks.cambridge.org/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9780511762475&cid;=CBO9780511762475A024 </p><p>Presenting human security perspectives on climate change, this volume raises issues of equity, ethics and environmental justice, as well as our capacity to respond to what is increasingly considered to be the greatest societal challenge for humankind. Written by international experts, it argues that climate change must be viewed as an issue of human security, and not an environmental problem that can be managed in isolation from larger questions concerning development trajectories, and ethical obligations towards the poor and to future generations. The concept of human security offers a new approach to the challenges of climate change, and the responses that could lead to a more equitable and sustainable future. Climate Change, Ethics and Human Security will be of interest to researchers, policy makers, and practitioners concerned with the human dimensions of climate change, as well as to upper-level students in the social sciences and humanities interested in climate change. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780521197663 20160604</p><p></p><p>Norgaard, Richard B. (1994) Development betrayed: The end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future. London, UK: Routledge.</p><p>Modernity promised control over nature through science; material abundance through technology; and effective government through rational, social organization. Instead of leading to the promised land it has brought us to the brink of environmental and cultural disaster. Why has such a gap developed between modernity's aspirations and its achievements? Norgaard aims to provide an answer. Development with its unshakeable commitment to the idea of progress, is rooted in modernism and has been betrayed by each of its major tenets. Attempts to control nature have led towards environmental catastrophe. Western technologies have proved inappropriate for the needs of the rest of the world, and governments are unable to respond effectively to the crises that have resulted. Presenting a thorough critique of the ideas behind development, the author also offers an alternative co-evolutionary paradigm, in which development is portrayed as a co-evolution between cultural and ecological systems. Rather than a future where everyone converges upon one best way of knowing and doing things, he envisages a future patchwork quilt of cultures. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780415068611 20160527</p><p></p><p>Teger, Allen I. (1980) Too much invested to quit. New York, NY: Pergamon.</p><p>“Too Much Invested to Quit” focuses on the applications of paradigms in the resolution of international relations, taking as backdrop issues in marriage, labor disputes, and price wars. </p><p>The manuscript first offers information on the dollar auction game, a simple game that can be employed in large groups or in laboratory situations. Studies on economic and interpersonal motives when bidding against a deck of cards; sex differences and effects of team bidding; and effects of experience on the length of auction are discussed. The text also focuses on the stages of escalation and physiological and personality correlates of escalation. Topics include effects of resources on the length of auction; physiology as a dependent measure; physiology as an independent manipulation; and personality and the dollar auction. </p><p>The publication explains the dollar auction and study of conflict escalation, as well as study and theories of escalation; the dollar auction and the Vietnam War; limit setting in warfare; and price warfare. The book also takes a look at real life and the dollar auction. Considerations include generalized dollar auction game and industrial bargaining, strikes, work stoppages, and divorce. </p><p>The manuscript is a dependable source of reference for readers interested in the use of paradigms in the resolution of international relations.</p><p>(GoogleBooks)</p><p></p><p>Victor, Peter (2008) Managing Without Growth --Slower by design not disaster. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.</p><p>Peter Victor challenges the priority that rich countries continue to give to economic growth as an over-arching objective of economic policy. This challenge is based on a critical analysis of the literature on environmental and resource limits to growth, on the disconnect between higher incomes and happiness, and on the failure of economic growth to meet other key economic, social and environmental policy objectives. Shortly after World War II, economic growth became the paramount economic policy objective in most countries, a position that it maintains today. This book presents three arguments on why rich countries should turn away from economic growth as the primary policy objective and pursue more specific objectives that enhance well-being. The author contends that continued economic growth worldwide is unrealistic due to environmental and resource constraints. If rich countries continue to push growth, poorer countries, where the benefits are more evident, will lag. Rising incomes increase happiness and well-being only up to a level that has since been surpassed in rich countries. Moreover, economic growth has not brought full employment, eliminated poverty or reduced the burden of the economy on the environment. By combining a systems approach with more conventional economic analysis, Peter Victor provides new insights into a pressing issue at the frontier of ecological economics in a way that will appeal to a wide audience. Academics, students, activists and interested lay readers will find this well argued book illuminating and compelling. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781847200785 20160527</p><p></p><p>Wuthnow, Robert (1989) Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structures in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. </p><p>Compares the historical conditions that led to three abrupt cultural changes, and reexamines theories of social development. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780674151642 20160527</p><p>Political Shifts</p><p>Boutang, Y.M. (2011) Cognitive Capitalism. Cambridge: Policy Press.</p><p>We live in a time of transition, argues Yann Moulier Boutang. But the irony is that this is not a transition to a new type of society called 'socialism', as many on the Left had assumed; rather, it is a transition to a new type of capitalism. Socialism has been left behind by a new revolution in our midst. 'Globalization' effectively corresponds to the emergence, since 1975, of a third kind of capitalism. It does not have much to do with the industrial capitalism which, at the point of its birth (1750-1820), broke with earlier forms of mercantile capitalism. The aim of this book is to describe and explain the characteristics of this third age of capitalism. Boutang coins the term 'cognitive capitalism' to describe this new form of capitalism. While this notion remains a working hypothesis, it already provides some basic orientations and anchor points which are indispensible for political action. The political economy which was born with Adam Smith no longer offers us the possibility of understanding the reality which is being constructed before our eyes - namely the value, wealth and complexity of the world economic system D and it also does not enable us to deal with the challenges that await humanity, whether ecological or social. This book thus seeks to put us onto the path of a provisional politics and morality capable of dealing with this new Great Transformation. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog))9780745647333 20160608</p><p></p><p>Brown, M.T. (2010) Civilizing the Economy: A New Economics of Provision. Cambridge: </p><p>Cambridge University Press.</p><p>When a handful of people thrive while whole industries implode and millions suffer, it is clear that something is wrong with our economy. The wealth of the few is disconnected from the misery of the many. In Civilizing the Economy, Marvin Brown traces the origin of this economics of dissociation to early capitalism, showing how this is illustrated in Adam Smith's denial of the central role of slavery in wealth creation. In place of the Smithian economics of property, Brown proposes that we turn to the original meaning of economics as household management. He presents a new framework for the global economy that reframes its purpose as the making of provisions instead of the accumulation of property. This bold new vision establishes the civic sphere as the platform for organizing an inclusive economy and as a way to move toward a more just and sustainable world. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780521767323 20160604</p><p></p><p>Weiss, Edith Brown (1989) In fairness to future generations: International law, common patrimony, and intergenerational equity. Ardsley-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers.</p><p>(http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context;=auilr) </p><p>In this book Professor Weiss combines thorough research and careful analysis with imaginative solutions and a moral fervour, to show how rules of international law can be applied in an intertemporal dimension, and how the basic principles of the intergenerational equity can be developed to provide new standards for human behaviour. She manages to communicate to the reader not only that the situation is getting desperate but also that human intelligence can in time devise adequate remedies, without destroying completely our way of life. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780941320542 20160528</p><p></p><p>Young, M. D. (1992) Sustainable investment and resource use: Equity, environmental integrity, and economic efficiency. Park Ridge, NJ: Parthenon.</p><p>Each year throughout the world, humans use some 40% of the total amount of terrestrial primary production. Global, national and local resource stocks, particularly renewable resource stocks, are being depleted. There are many explanations for this decline, but one two-edged sword which is emerging to the forefront of the debate is government policy. Despite well-intentioned government programmes and objectives, government policy has significantly added to and exacerbated other pressures on resources - including those owned by governments themselves. If the situation is to be improved then government policy - fiscal policy, monetary policy, regulatory policy and education policy - must be changed. This book is largely about those actions which governments can take to improve resource use by stimulating envrionementally positive forms of investment in order to achieve what is now known as sustainable development. This work aims to alert the reader to the ecological dangers that the increasing world population, holes in the ozone layer and loss of species diversity will cause and examines the sorts of extra economic investment and growth that will be required to fight what may be irreversible change. The book emphasizes that it is critical that any planned investment take on an ecologically astute character which is "uncoupled" from environmental degradation and resource depletion. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781850703815 20160527</p><p>Commons-Based</p><p>Arvidsson, A., and Pietersen, N. (2013) The Ethical Economy: Rebuilding Value after the Crisis. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.</p><p>A more ethical economic system is now possible, one that rectifies the crisis spots of our current downturn while balancing the injustices of extreme poverty and wealth. Adam Arvidsson and Nicolai Peitersen, a scholar and an entrepreneur, outline the shape such an economy might take, identifying its origins in innovations already existent in our production, valuation, and distribution systems. Much like nineteenth-century entrepreneurs, philosophers, bankers, artisans, and social organizers who planned a course for modern capitalism that was more economically efficient and ethically desirable, we now have a chance to construct new instruments, institutions, and infrastructure to reverse the trajectory of a quickly deteriorating economic environment. Considering a multitude of emerging phenomena, Arvidsson and Peitersen show wealth creation can be the result of a new kind of social production, and the motivation of continuous capital accumulation can exist in tandem with a new desire to maximize our social impact. Arvidsson and Peitersen argue that financial markets could become a central arena in which diverse ethical concerns are integrated into tangible economic valuations. They suggest that such a common standard has already emerged and that this process is linked to the spread of social media, making it possible to capture the sentiment of value to most people. They ultimately recommend how to build upon these developments to initiate a radical democratization of economic systems and the value decisions they generate. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780231152648 20160612</p><p></p><p>Barnes, P. (2006) Capitalism 3.0: A Guide to Reclaiming the Commons. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.</p><p>Capitalism 3.0 is a remarkable look at a potential future of our economy, one that can retain capitalism's virtues while mitigating its insidious shortcomings Barnes draws on his personal and professional experience as a successful entrepreneur to offer viable solutions to some of our most pressing economic, environmental, and social concerns. Key features REVOLUTIONARY IDEA: The Commons our shared social, environmental and artistic inheritance is under threat from market pressures to be sold off by profit-seekers. Our common heritage is being traded away to the highest bidder. By looking at current issues like Social Security, and campaign finances Barnes creates an economic model that both reinforces the strengths of our capitalist system, and abates its damaging effects upon the current culture and future generations. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9781576753613 20160612</p><p></p><p>Benkler, Y. (2011) The Penguin and the Leviathan: The Triumph of Cooperation over Self-Interest. New York, NY: Crown Business.</p><p>Argues that many of the social systems need to be restructured to reflect humanity's cooperative and altruistic tendencies, citing examples while revealing the potential of collaborative organizations. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780521405997 20160528</p><p>Localized Economies</p><p>Brown, Peter and Geoffrey Garver (2008) Right Relationship: building a whole earth economy. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc..</p><p>Our current economic system is unsustainable. Its fundamental elementsunlimited growth and endless wealth accumulationfly in the face of the fact that the Earths resources are clearly finite. The destructive effects of this denial of reality are wreaking havoc on our ecological and social systems. But what is the alternative? We need to go beyond simply fixing problems as they arise, or even as we anticipate them, and offer a comprehensive new economic model. It is a moral imperative. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p></p><p>Chamberlin, S. (2009) The Transition Timeline: For a Local, Resilient Future. Cambridge: Green Books.</p><p>The Transition Timeline lightens the fear of our uncertain future, providing a map of what we are facing and the different pathways available to us. It describes four possible scenarios for the UK and world over the next twenty years, ranging from Denial, in which we reap the consequences of failing to acknowledge and respond to our environmental challenges, to the Transition Vision, in which we shift our cultural assumptions to fit our circumstances and move into a more fulfilling, lower-energy world. The practical, realistic details of this Transition Vision are examined in depth, covering key areas such as food, energy, demographics, transport and health care, and providing a sense of context for communities working towards a thriving future. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>Lewis, M., and Conaty, P. (2012) The Resilience Imperative: Cooperative Transitions to a Steady-State Economy. Gambriola Island: New Society Publishers.</p><p>We find ourselves between a rock and a hot place compelled by the intertwining forces of peak oil and climate change to reinvent our economic life at a much more local and regional scale. The Resilience Imperative argues for a major SEE (Social, Ecological, Economic) Change as a prerequisite for replacing the paradigm of limitless economic growth with a more decentralized, cooperative, steady-state economy. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>Hopkins, R. (2008) The Transition Handbook: From Oil Dependency to Local Resilience. Cambridge: Green Books.</p><p>We live in an oil-dependent world, and have got to this level of dependency in a very short space of time, using vast reserves of oil in the process - without thinking ahead to plan for when the supply is not so plentiful. Most of us avoid thinking about what happens when oil runs out (or becomes prohibitively expensive), but The Transition Handbook shows how the inevitable and profound changes ahead can have a positive outcome. These changes can lead to the rebirth of local communities, which will grow more of their own food, generate their own power, and build their own houses using local materials. They can also encourage the development of local currencies, keeping money in the local area." "There are now over 35 formal Transition Initiatives in the UK, including towns, cities, islands, villages and peninsulas, with over 500 globally at the earlier stages of launching this process. With little proactivity at government level, communities are taking matters into their own hands and acting locally. Within peak oil and climate change is the potential for the greatest economic, social and cultural renaissance we have ever seen. If your community has not yet become a Transition Initiative, this guide offers you the tools to get started. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p></p><p>McKibben, Bill (2007) Deep Economy: the wealth of communities and the durable future. New York: Henry Holt & Co..</p><p>In this powerful and provocative manifesto, Bill McKibben offers the biggest challenge in a generation to the prevailing view of our economy. For the first time in human history, he observes, "more" is no longer synonymous with "better" indeed, for many of us, they have become almost opposites. McKibben puts forward a new way to think about the things we buy, the food we eat, the energy we use, and the money that pays for it all. Our purchases, he says, need not be at odds with the things we truly value. McKibben's animating idea is that we need to move beyond "growth" as the paramount economic ideal and pursue prosperity in a more local direction, with cities, suburbs, and regions producing more of their own food, generating more of their own energy, and even creating more of their own culture and entertainment. He shows this concept blossoming around the world with striking results, from the burgeoning economies of India and China to the more mature societies of Europe and New England. For those who worry about environmental threats, he offers a route out of the worst of those problems; for those who wonder if there isn't something more to life than buying, he provides the insight to think about one's life as an individual and as a member of a larger community. McKibben offers a realistic, if challenging, scenario for a hopeful future. As he so eloquently shows, the more we nurture the essential humanity of our economy, the more we will recapture our own. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780805076264 20160528</p><p></p><p>Sharzer, G. (2012) No Local: Why Small-Scale Alternatives Won’t Change the World. Winchester: John Hunt Publishing.</p><p>Local food, local business and buying local won't change the world. Challenging market priorities will. Here's why. (OCLC WorldCat)</p><p>Restructuring: “Cinderella Economy”, Reduced Working Hours, etc.</p><p></p><p>Booth, D.E. (2004) Hooked on Growth: Economic Addictions and the Environment. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.</p><p>This accessible and provocative book explores whether getting unhooked from economic growth to meet the needs of the environment is possible. Although giving the environment priority over growth may seem radical, the author argues that it can be accomplished using marketable emissions allowances, transferable development rights, and other tools popular with conventional economists. It can also be achieved by creating more interesting and environmentally friendly urban landscapes less beholden to the automobile. The key problem will be ensuring that everyone who wants employment can find it. This will require a transition to a shorter workweek, the wistful goal of many a harried worker. More leisure, a higher-quality environment, and more attractive cities and towns are the potential rewards of a less consumption-oriented society. Yet how can the power of special interests be overcome in the name of environmental conservation? This is the author's critical final question as he offers a clear path to a sustainable economic and environmental future. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780742527188 20160528</p><p></p><p>Mulgan, G. (2013) The Locust and the Bee: predators and creators in capitalism’s future. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</p><p>The recent economic crisis was a dramatic reminder that capitalism can both produce and destroy. It's a system that by its very nature encourages predators and creators, locusts and bees. But, as Geoff Mulgan argues in this compelling, imaginative, and important book, the economic crisis also presents a historic opportunity to choose a radically different future for capitalism, one that maximizes its creative power and minimizes its destructive force. In an engaging and wide-ranging argument, Mulgan digs into the history of capitalism across the world to show its animating ideas, its utopias and dystopias, as well as its contradictions and possibilities. Drawing on a subtle framework for understanding systemic change, he shows how new political settlements reshaped capitalism in the past and are likely to do so in the future. By reconnecting value to real-life ideas of growth, he argues, efficiency and entrepreneurship can be harnessed to promote better lives and relationships rather than just a growth in the quantity of material consumption. Healthcare, education, and green industries are already becoming dominant sectors in the wealthier economies, and the fields of social innovation, enterprise, and investment are rapidly moving into the mainstream--all indicators of how capital could be made more of a servant and less a master. This is a book for anyone who wonders where capitalism might be heading next--and who wants to help make sure that its future avoids the mistakes of the past. </p><p>(Nielsen Book Data via Stanford SearchWorks catalog)9780691146966 20160612</p><p></p><p>Organizations of Interest</p><p>Organizations working to move away from growth-based economy</p><p></p><p>From the Real Economy Lab</p><p></p><p>P2P Foundation: The P2P Foundation is an international organization focused on studying, researching, documenting and promoting peer to peer practices in a very broad sense.</p><p>p2pfoundation.net/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, restricting capitalism, expanding democracy, enabling information freedom, enacting urgent and widespread change</p><p></p><p>US Solidarity Economy Network: The mission of the U.S. Solidarity Economy Network is to connect a diverse array of individuals, organizations, businesses and projects in the shared work of building and strengthening regional, national and international movements for a solidarity economy. </p><p>Ussen.org</p><p>Explicit positions:reduction of economic growth, expanding democracy, advancing social justice and equality, enacting urgent and widespread change, transformation of capitalist system</p><p></p><p>Post Carbon Institute: Post Carbon Institute’s mission is to lead the transition to a more resilient, equitable, and sustainable world by providing individuals and communities with the resources needed to understand and respond to the interrelated economic, energy, and ecological crises of the 21st century.</p><p>postcarbon.org/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, conservation and sharing, addressing climate change</p><p></p><p>Capital Institute: The Capital Institute’s mission is to explore and effect the economic transition to a more just, regenerative, and thus sustainable way of living on this earth through the transformation of finance. </p><p>capitalinstitute.org/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, conservation and sharing, expanding democracy, advancing social justice and equality, enacting urgent and widespread change: </p><p></p><p>Movement Generation: Movement Generation Justice & Ecology Project inspires and engages in transformative action towards the liberation and restoration of land, labor, and culture. Movement Generation is rooted in vibrant social movements led by low-income communities and communities of color committed to a Just Transition away from profit and pollution and towards healthy, resilient and life-affirming local economies. </p><p>“Our priority is to build leadership in the communities best position to lead an economic transformation--those who have contributed their land, labor, and cultures to the building of wealth but not benefited from that wealth.”</p><p>Movementgeneration.org</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, expanding democracy, advancing social justice and equality, enacting urgent and widespread change, restricting capitalism</p><p></p><p>REconomy Project: The REconomy Project helps people transform their local economy.</p><p>reconomy.org/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, reducing human footprint, subordinating the profit motive, advancing social justice and equality, enacting urgent and widespread change</p><p></p><p>Post Growth Institute: Post growth is about building on the existing aspects of our world that are sustainable in order to create resilient futures. This includes strengthening ecologically and socially sustainable practices, while recognizing the physical limits of the earth.</p><p>postgrowth.org/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, reducing human footprint, addressing climate change, restricting capitalism, conservation and sharing, subordinating the profit motive</p><p></p><p>Green House: Green House is about challenging the ideas that have created the world we live in now, and offering positive alternatives. Green House aims to communicate these positive alternatives more clearly, and more widely. As a think tank, Green House works to maximize its influence with journalists and policy makers, and also compiles economic data that can be used to examine what a post-growth economy would look like and how we can progress towards it.</p><p>greenhousethinktank.org/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, conservation and sharing, expanding democracy, diminishing consumption, addressing climate change</p><p></p><p>Solidarity Economy Network: The mission of the U.S. Solidarity Economy Network is to connect a diverse array of individuals, organizations, businesses and projects in the shared work of building and strengthening regional, national and international movement for a solidarity economy (A solidarity economy is an economy based on efforts that seek to increase the quality of life of a region or community through not-for-profit endeavors.)</p><p>Ussen.org</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, expanding democracy, advancing social justice and equality, enacting urgent and widespread change, transformation of capitalist system</p><p></p><p>P2P Foundation: The P2P Foundation is an international organization focused on studying, researching, documenting and promoting peer to peer practices in a very broad sense.</p><p>p2pfoundation.net/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, restricting capitalism, expanding democracy, enabling information freedom, enacting urgent and widespread change</p><p></p><p>Shareable: Shareable’s mission is to empower everyone to share for a more joyous, resilient, and equitable world. Shareable is passionate about the transformative power of sharing which brings joy, increases productivity, builds community, distributes wealth equitably, and reduces environmental impact.</p><p>Shareable.net</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, conservation and sharing, amending physical or intellectual property rights</p><p></p><p>Feasta: Feasta --The Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability-- is an international network of people who believe that inappropriate systems cause many of the world’s problems and who are trying to develop better systems.</p><p>feasta.org/</p><p>Explicit positions: reduction of economic growth, conservation and sharing, diminishing consumption, addressing climate change, advancing social justice and equality</p><p></p><p>Fellowship for Intentional Community: The Fellowship for International Community aims to support and promote the development of intentional communities and the evolution of cooperative culture --seeing cooperative culture as an essential foundation of a just and sustainable world. Intentional communities are places where the transition to cooperative culture is often accelerated and deeply practiced. The Fellowship believes this transition has powerful implications for the world at large. This can be seen especially in the realms of group dynamics, cooperative decision-making, health and well-being, cooperative economics, and social sustainability, but also in the experimentation and implementation of a wide range of sustainable technologies in community settings. Intentional communities are places where we can observe directly and articulate the benefits of cooperative culture, and we are committed to playing a role in its development and promotion.</p><p>ic.org</p><p></p><p>LIFT Economy: The LIFT Economy mission is to create, model and share a locally self-reliant economy that works for the benefit of all life --one that meets the needs for all people everywhere while enhancing and regenerating the ecosystems that surround us and within which we abide.</p><p>lifteconomy.com/</p><p>Explicit positions: addressing climate change, subordinating the profit motive, better business as a positive force, advancing social justice and equality</p><p></p><p>New Economy Coalition: The New Economy Coalition (NEC) is a network of organizations imagining and building a future where people, communities, and ecosystems thrive. Together, The Coalition is creating deep change in our economy and politics--placing power in the hands of people and uprooting legacies of harm--so that a fundamentally new system can take root.</p><p>neweconomy.net/</p><p>Explicit positions: restricting capitalism, expanding democracy, addressing climate change, subordinating the profit motive, advancing social justice and equality</p><p></p><p>Canadian Community Economic Development Network: CCEDNet is a member-led organization committed to strengthening communities by creating economic opportunities that improve environmental and social conditions. CCEDNet brings people and organizations together to share knowledge and build a collective voice for CED action. Members are part of a movement creating community-based solutions to local and global challenges.</p><p>ccednet-rcdec.ca/en</p><p>Explicit positions: reducing human footprint, addressing climate change, advancing social justice and equality, enacting urgent and widespread change</p><p></p><p></p><p>Society of Heterodox Economists: The Society of Heterodox Economists (SHE) represents a gathering of economists outside the mainstream, who believe that the study of the discipline of economics goes beyond the study of mainstream theory in its present state of development and the application of purely quantitative techniques to the formation of judgments on qualitative questions.</p><p>Business.unsw.ed.au</p><p>Explicit positions: upholding human rights, addressing climate change, regulation of trade and markets, advancing social justice and equality, amending physical or intellectual property rights</p><p></p><p>Earth Economics: Earth Economics aims to apply new economic tools and principles to account for nature and the services it provides. Earth Economics works with its clients to identify and place a dollar value on what nature provides using science-based economics.</p><p>eartheconomics.org/</p><p>Key People: David Batker, Matt Chadsey, Maya Kocian, Tania Briceno, Rowan Schmidt</p><p></p><p>Gund Institute for Ecological Economics, University of Vermont: The Gund Institute develops economic theory that is appropriately nested in biophysical, social and behavioral sciences. The Institute works to create policies and management instruments that balance what is biophysically possible, ecologically sustainable, socially equitable, and efficient</p><p>uvm.edu/giee/</p><p>Key People: Jon Erickson, Josh Farley, Gary Flomenhoft, Bob Herendeen, Eric Zencey</p><p></p><p></p>
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26 April 2017
Toxics
Talking climate policy, transit, and high-speed rail with Washington Gov. Jay Inslee.
The role of governor of a progressive West Coast state has taken on a somewhat different resonance since Jay Inslee was first elected in 2012. Comfortably reelected in 2016, he now finds himself part of a symbolic rebellion against the Trump Empire. (Sorry, just watched the Star Wars trailer.)
<p></p><p>With carbon policy moribund at the federal level, more attention than ever is focused on the west coast states that are making climate progress. California recently adopted some of the world’s most ambitious carbon targets. Oregon recently banned coal. British Columbia has a carbon tax in place.</p><p></p><p>Washington … keeps falling on its face. The story of climate policy in the state has been almost entirely dismal, culminating last year in a divisive and ultimately fruitless battle over the right kind of carbon tax. The Alliance for Jobs and Clean Energy, a state coalition of green, low-income, and labor groups, is trying again in the legislature this year, putting forward a carbon-tax bill and promising to run it as a ballot initiative in 2018 if it doesn’t pass.</p><p></p><p>In the meantime, Inslee’s Department of Ecology has put in place a legally binding cap on carbon, under the authority of the state’s Clean Air Act. It’s a bit of a no-win situation for Inslee — greens say it’s too weak; industry groups are suing anyway — but it is all the state has at the moment.</p><p></p><p>Meanwhile, in 2016, Washington voters approved Sound Transit 3, a $53.8 billion package of rail and transit improvements. But even that has left a sour aftertaste.</p><p></p><p>First, Senate Republicans immediately held transit funding hostage. Inslee had been threatening to pass a low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS) like California’s, which would have mandated reductions in the average carbon intensity of the state’s liquid transportation fuels. He held out in hopes of trading up to more comprehensive legislation; instead, Senate Republicans inserted into law a “poison pill” stating that if Inslee implemented the LCFS, transit funding would be redirected to roads. (Yes, it really was that crass.) The governor acquiesced in order to get ST3 funded.</p><p></p><p>Second, Washington voters recently discovered, when their yearly car registration fees rose, that they were actually going to have to pay for ST3. That has prompted a bout of political hysteria, egged on by the very same legislators who passed the bill funding ST3. (They now claim they didn’t notice the car-tab fees.) There are bills afoot in the legislature to address this alleged injustice, some at the expense of ST3 money.</p><p></p><p>I spoke with Gov. Inslee about all this and more at a recent event on sustainable transportation at Western Washington University. (Check out WWU’s Institute for Energy Studies, which has pulled together an excellent inter-disciplinary energy program for undergrads. More schools should follow suit!) An edited transcript of our conversation follows.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>What lessons do you take from the LCFS process? Would you do it differently if you reran it?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>I don’t drive in the rearview mirror, so I usually don’t like to answer questions like that.</p><p></p><p>Look, we’re committed to having some legal policy that will drive down carbon. We have it today in our carbon-cap rule, pursuant to the Clean Air law. We have a concrete, legally enforceable rule that reduces carbon emissions, which includes transportation fuels. This is something people have not paid enough attention to — the carbon cap applies to transportation fuels.</p><p></p><p>I think it’s a fair rule and it’s legally justified. So, we have that.</p><p></p><p>Obviously, I wasn’t pleased that folks wanted to tell people you had to make a choice between breathing and having a bus to ride to work. I never understood why you were forced to make that choice.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Do you think the carbon-cap rule will have comparable effects to an LCFS?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>I do not talk about them in combination. They stand alone on their own two feet. I do think it will be an effective and well-balanced rule.</p><p></p><p>I can tell you that our state needs to amp up its game. The science is becoming so much more compelling, the damages are occurring so much more rapidly than we would have anticipated.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>And the national scene…</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>The national scene is void of any particular hope at the moment. So I do believe our state needs more tools against this threat than we have right now. It’s clear.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>What do you think of the carbon-tax bill that’s being put forward in the House [HB 1646]? It’s allegedly going to become a referendum if it doesn’t pass this year.</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>I haven’t seen it in detail, but those concepts I have supported in the past. If it comes to an initiative — people have done good things in our state in the past, including the renewable portfolio standard.</p><p></p><p>We’d rather the legislature act. They’re going to have an opportunity in the next few weeks.</p><p></p><p>But we’re serious about considering the carbon tax because, to me, any time you get two things for a dollar, that’s a good thing. For a dollar, if you can buy part of a textbook and also get cleaner air? Why would you not do that?</p><p></p><p>It is a leveling of the economic playing field, because a system where you have two competing industries, and one industry is getting a giant subsidy — it’s not fair. And the fossil fuel industry has a giant subsidy right now, which is that they get to use the atmosphere as a garbage dump. We don’t allow the solar-cell industry to dump their stuff in Whatcom County Garbage Dump for free, and make the fossil fuel industry pay a charge. This is a capitalistic system of embedding the real cost of externalities of this product.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>The other half of any carbon pricing system is the revenue. Do you have personal preferences about what to do with it?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>Well, we proposed a mix, which included education, clean energy investments, and ways you could ameliorate any cost impact on lower-income people.</p><p></p><p>I don’t have any ideological fixation. When you talk to the public, they seem to be more comfortable with a connection between the revenue and particular spending. That’s attractive to them. So, on an initiative, that might be something you want to pay attention to.</p><p></p><p>But there are other needs, if we can fashion something through the legislature. There’s a need for water infrastructure, both for improved fish and irrigation supplies and flood control. There’s a connection, because it’s related to climate change. There’s multiple things you can do that, in my mind, would have a connection.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>But you don’t have any particular line to draw?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>I don’t. Well, my line is: Don’t waste money. Don’t buy something that’s not necessary. But we have needs for education funding, for infrastructure spending, for a variety of things.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Some bills bouncing around the Washington legislature would revise the motor vehicle excise tax — the car tabs — and take out a chunk of money that was going to Sound Transit 3. A) How do you feel about those bills? Do you plan to sign them? Veto them? And B), if that chunk of money is lost, are you going to try to remedy that in the budget?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>We don’t have a black or white answer to that yet, because we haven’t seen the bills. There are two things, though, that I think the legislature should try to accomplish, if they can.</p><p></p><p>One is to maintain the integrity of the project, which is to get from Everett to Tacoma — to maintain what the voters voted on. They voted for that project, they ought to get that project. Maintaining a revenue base that will support getting to those ends of the line is vital.</p><p></p><p>But the second is: I do believe, particularly given public reaction to this, if there can be some accommodation on “sticker shock,” to ward off something more draconian that could eliminate the whole project, that’s something the legislature ought to do. I’m amenable to things like that, as long as we don’t mortally wound our ability to actually finish the project.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>The race in Washington’s 45th District could put the Senate in Democratic hands. Are you getting involved in that race at all? And if the Senate were controlled by Democrats, what do you think its first priority should be?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>I’m really excited about that race. Manka [Dhingra] is just a tremendous candidate. She’s so well-rooted in the district, great experience — nonprofit work in mental health, a prosecuting attorney. You don’t get that high quality of a candidate, as a first-time candidate, that often. She’s great and I intend to do anything I can to help her.</p><p></p><p>Thank you 45th Dems for your unanimous endorsement. Lets turn the State blue! https://t.co/fiFlzrxKpb</p><p></p><p>— Manka Dhingra (@Dhingrama) April 6, 2017</p><p>I do think if she wins, and Democrats have control, we’ll have a really great shot at additional ways to reduce pollution and advance clean energy. I can’t predict in exactly what way, but I think at least a door will be opened.</p><p></p><p>Right now, the Republicans have shut the door. I mean, they have just slammed the door shut. They don’t want to talk about climate change. I’m sure they’re quite proud of Don Benton being the guiding light of environmental policy in the Trump administration, for a while anyway.</p><p></p><p>So, yes, it will open up doors.</p><p></p><p>I lead with a message about job creation. A lot of people are talking about how Democrats need a more compelling economic message — if this isn’t it, I don’t know what is. I can go around the state and point to the jobs we’re creating because of clean energy policy, because of research. These kids may be CEOs of companies, hiring people here in a few years.</p><p></p><p>I think it’s a perfect thing for the Democratic Party to be connecting with people on. It speaks to the innate optimism of our people; we create whole new industries here.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>There are rumors floating around about a Seattle-Vancouver high-speed rail line. Do you think that’s realistic? Will your budget fund a study?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>I think it’s viable. I’ve ridden bullet trains in China and Japan and they’re unbelievable technology. It seems to me our geography fits pretty well, looking at our economies booming on both sides of the border.</p><p></p><p>Yes, I think this should be explored. We’re trying to get seed money for researching this into the budget. We’re going to do everything we can.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>There’s lots of energy on the West Coast to work together, especially given what’s going on at the federal level. What do you think of Washington joining the Quebec-California carbon trading market? What are the prospects?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>The larger any system of trading, the better for all concerned. So it’s something I would certainly be open to. I think we have a fairly rapidly emerging group interested in this — Canada and our multiple states. And don’t forget the RGGI [Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative] states as well, eight Northeast states.</p><p></p><p>Now, you have to have your own system first, which takes some political changes. But I think those are realistic possibilities, if we get a change here in the State of Washington.</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>If Washington passes a tax, does it foreclose joining a carbon-trading system?</p><p></p><p>Jay Inslee</p><p>Not necessarily. You can convert it. None of these are permanent. If a legislature passed a carbon tax this year, it would be a pricing system, which could be converted to a cap-and-invest system at a later date, if the state wanted to go that route.</p><p></p><p>I don’t believe [a tax] would shut any doors. The biggest door to open is to realize it’s time to stop allowing polluters to use the air we breathe as their waste dump. Once you cross that barrier, the next steps are a lot easier.</p>
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